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The aim of this thesis is to analyse the nature, imposition and effects of the late 
Qing xinzheng 新政 reforms in Mongolia, and to analyze the episode from its historical 
roots till the dynasty’s demise in 1911. Put simply, xinzheng was a modernization drive 
implemented throughout the Qing empire in order to save the dynasty from irreversible 
decline and, to a certain extent, to emulate the astounding success of the Meiji reforms 
in neighbouring Japan. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the analysis has been subdivided into the categories 
of agrarian policy, administrative reform, training of new armies, establishment of 
modern schools, introduction of new enterprises, exploitation of natural resources, 
construction of railways, and establishment of postal and telegram services.  
The xinzheng were very much the product of macro-historical forces, such as the 
weakening of the Qing empire since the mid-nineteenth century, the presence of 
imperialist powers on China’s soil, and the relative rise of Han Chinese officials and 
decline of Mongolian nobility in late Qing politics. The reforms not only failed to save 
the Qing empire, but they further intensified the inter-ethnic tensions between Han, 
Manchus and Mongols. Coupled with historical contingencies (e.g. personal ambitions 
of Qing officials, the attitudes of Mongolian leaders), the xinzheng reforms eventually 
led to the independence movement of Outer Mongolia, and the parting ways between 
Outer and Inner Mongolia. 
Many scholars of Mongolian history have not considered the xinzheng reforms in 
Qing Mongolia as having had any lasting impact upon the region, apart from triggering 
the independence movement. Consequently, this important event has been largely 
neglected and generally treated only as a short chapter in Mongolia’s history, or as a 
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side aspect in the relations between China and Russia. Conversely, the reforms in 
Mongolia magnified the division between Inner and Outer Mongolia, and altered the 
geopolitical situation in Inner Asia. To date, no study has been attempted which charts 
the modernization of Mongolia as a direct consequence of the late imperial reform 
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Xinzheng studies: A Brief Survey 
 This thesis scrutinizes the Qing court’s implementation of xinzheng 新政 reforms, 
also known as New Policy/New Policies or New Administration in English, in the 
Mongolian region during the first decade of the twentieth century and its aftermath. It 
seeks to investigate why and how the Qing state carried out the reforms in Inner and 
Outer Mongolia; what were the constraints on the reforms ; how the ascendency of Han 
Chinese officials in late Qing politics influenced the reform process; and, finally, why 
the Mongols on both sides of the Gobi Desert reacted so differently to the reforms, 
leading to the permanent split of the Mongolian region into Mongolia and the 
Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia (now belonging to the People’s Republic of 
China).  
 The xinzheng reforms, which were implemented throughout the Qing empire 
between 1901-1911, were initiated by the Manchu court as its last-ditch attempt to save 
imperial rule from collapse. More specifically, the court sought, through these reforms, 
to tackle the twin challenges of (national) debt and (external) threat that had been 
plaguing the empire since the late nineteenth century. Due to the leading role played by 
the imperial court in the reform movement, Chinese scholarship before 1990 tended to 
dismiss the late Qing xinzheng as reactionary.1 Since a reactionary movement was in 
contradiction to the revolutionary sentiment of the Chinese government, the reforms did 
not receive much academic scrutiny before the 1990s: during the eleven years between 
1979 and 1989, the number of Chinese treatises on the New Policies amounted to 
                                                      
1
 Chen Xiangyang 陳向陽, “Jiushi niandai Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu shuping,” 90 年代清末新政研究述
評 [A Review of the Studies of the Late Qing Xinzheng in the 1990s] Modern Chinese History 
Studies 近代史研究, 1 (1998), p. 299. 
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slightly over 100.2 Since the 1990s, thanks to the deepening of the Chinese 
government’s own modernization reforms, newly found interest in the New 
Administration began to grow among Chinese scholars. A sign of the change was that, 
during the seven years between 1990 and 1997, the number of scholarly treatises on the 
subject exceeded 200.3 New perspectives on the reforms also emerged, with the 
“reactionary” xinzheng now being re-evaluated as a “bourgeois revolution” that helped 
to modernize China economically, politically, socially, and intellectually.4  
 Developments of Chinese scholarly interest in the implementation of xinzheng at 
the Qing empire’s frontiers followed a similar trajectory: of the 400-odd treatises on the 
New Policies that were published between 1979 and 2000, only 40 were related to the 
New Administration in the borderlands, and less than twenty of them were scholarly 
monographs on the subject.5 Between 2003 and 2010, no less than 40 monographs were 
published on the implementation of New Administration in the empire’s frontier regions 
of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet.6  
                                                      
2
 Chen, “Jiushi niandai Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu shuping,” p. 299. 
3
 Chen, “Jiushi niandai Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu shuping,” p. 299. 
4 Examples of the new narratives include: Wang Jianke 王建科, “Zailun Qingmo xinzheng,” 再論清末
新政 [Reassessment of Late Qing Xinzheng], Xuehai 學海, 6 (1993), pp. 80-83; Wang Shouzhong 
王守中, “Lun wanqing jindaihua de liangge jieduan—Yangwu yundong he Qingmo xinzheng,” 論
晚清近代化的兩個階段--洋務運動和清末新政 [On the Two Phases of Late Qing Modernization-
-Westernization Movement and Late Qing Xinzheng], Journal of Shandong Normal University 山
東師範大學學報, 5 (1990), pp. 21-27; Guo Shiyou 郭世佑, “Qingmo xinzheng yu Xinhai 
geming,” 清末新政與辛亥革命 [Late Qing Xinzheng and Xinhai Revolution], Journal of 
Xiangtan Teachers’ College 湘潭師範學院學報, 5 (1993), pp. 43-49; Cao Liqian and Guo Dasong 
曹立前、郭大松, “Qingmo xinzheng yu zhichan jieji geming liliang de fazhan zhuangda,” 清末新
政與資產階級革命力量的發展壯大 [Late Qing Xinzheng and the Development and Growth of 
Capitalist Revolutionary Force], Journal of Shandong Teachers’ University (Social Science Edition) 
山東師大學報 (社科版), 1 (1994), pp. 36-39; Xiao Gongqin 蕭功秦, “Qingmo xinzheng yu 
Zhongguo xiandaihua yanjiu,” 清末新政與中國現代化研究 [A Study of Late Qing Xinzheng and 
Modernization of China], Strategy and Management 戰略與管理, 1 (1993), pp. 61-66. 
5 Zhao Yuntian 趙雲田, Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu: Ershishijichu de zhongguobianjiang 清末新政研究: 
20 世紀初的中國邊疆 [A Study of Late-Qing’s New Administration: China’s Frontiers in Early 20th 
Century] (Harbin: Heilongjiang Educational Press, 2004), pp. 1-2. 
6 Zhao Yuntian 趙雲田, “Erlinglingsannian yilai Qingmo bianjiang xinzheng zhiliao yu yanjiu shuping,” 
2003 年以來清末邊疆新政資料與研究述評 [Study and Commentary on the Materials for Late 
Qing Xinzheng Since 2003] HistoryChina.net 中華文史網, (2011), 
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The surge of Chinese scholarly interest in frontier studies is attributable to, among 
others, the Chinese state’s sponsorship and support of such endeavor, as evidenced by 
the establishment of the Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin 中國邊疆史地研究
中心 (Centre for Research in Chinese Frontier History and Geography) within the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1983. Tasked with advancing research on 
frontier studies, the Centre has published collections of primary source materials, 
journals, and collections of articles and essays on China’s frontiers. It also has organized 
and coordinated conferences, field trips, and other activities related to the studies. The 
goal of the Centre’s promotion of research on Chinese frontier studies can best be 
illustrated by a standard introduction to its continuing series of publications, which 
reads: 
“Research in the history and geography of China’s frontiers ….is not only a 
necessity for the development of this field, but at the same time bears great significance 
for protecting sovereignty over (our) national territory, handling relations with 
neighboring countries, strengthening the unity of China’s nationalities, and 
implementing patriotism education….”7   
In short, as James A. Millward has noted, scholarship on frontier issues in China 
should serve to strengthen the State.8 An important effect of such agenda upon Chinese 
frontier studies is the assumption of the ever existence of amicable relations between 
Han Chinese in China proper and the ethnicities in the borderlands. As a consequence of 
this assumption, the Chinese state and its scholars have traditionally attributed unrests in 
the frontier regions to external factors (such as foreign powers’ instigation) rather than 
                                                      
http://www.qinghistory.cn/bjmz/362489.shtml. 
7 Zhao, Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu, pp. 1-2. 
8 James A. Millward, “New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier,” in Gail Hershatter, Emily Honig, 
Jonathan N. Lipman, and Randall Stross eds., Remapping China: fissures in historical terrain 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 119. 
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internal causes (such as interethnic tension). For instance, on Outer Mongolia’s 
declaration of independence in 1911, Chinese intellectuals mostly blame either Tsarist 
Russia’s incitation or the Qing imperial residents’ misrule in the region for causing the 
movement, whilst downplaying the interethnic tension that had long been simmering 
between the Mongols and Han Chinese that was resultant from the latter’s 
moneylending and economic exploitation in the Mongolian region.9 During the era of 
Republican China, many Chinese scholars held the view that the “ignorant Mongols” 
(or other frontier peoples) would be content to be members of the Zhonghua Minzu 中
華民族 (Chinese nation) and would not have any aspiration for nationhood. By 
drawing upon non-Chinese sources and works, I seek to reveal that interethnic tension 
between the Mongols and Han Chinese during the late Qing period constituted a crucial 
cause for the Mongols’ demand for independnece, and that the Khalkha Mongols had 
made repeated attempts to break away from the Qing empire by soliciting Russia’s 
assistance well before 1911. In this regard, works by Mongolian historians, such as M. 
Sanjdorj10, Urgunge Onon (and Derrick Pritchatt)11, B. Batbayar (better known as 
Baabar)12, and E. O. Batsaikhan13 have shed valuable light on the Mongols’ 
perspectives on the Han Chinese-Mongol tension during the late Qing period and the 
factors that led to Outer Mongolia’s declaration of independence in 1911.   
                                                      
9 For an example of Chinese narrative, see Hai Chunliang 海純良, “Qingmo xinzheng yu waimenggu 
duli,” 清末新政與外蒙古獨立 [Late Qing Xinzheng and the Independence of Outer 
Mongolia] Inner Mongolia Ethnic University Journal 内蒙古民族大學學報, 1 (2009), pp. 35-38. 
10 M. Sanjdorj, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia. Translated by Urgunge Onon. 
(London: C. Hurst, 1980). 
11 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution: Mongolia Proclaims Its 
Independence in 1911 (Leiden, The Netherlands: H. J. Brill, 1989). 
12 Baabar, From world power to Soviet satellite: history of Mongolia. Translated by D. Suhjargalmaa et 
al. (Knapwell: University of Cambridge, 1999). 
13 Emgent Ookhnoi Batsaikhan, Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, The Last King of Mongolia 
(Ulaanbaatar: Admon, 2009). 
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Since the 1980s, about ten titles focusing on the New Administration in the 
Mongolian region have been published in China. Some of them are evaluations of the 
historic actors, whilst others are narratives of the reforms.14 One common characteristic 
of these works was that they either focus on Inner Mongolia or Outer Mongolia 
exclusively. As a consequence, there has been little meaningful comparison of the 
impact of the New Policies on these two Mongolia, which, in my opinion, is important 
to our understanding of why the Mongolian region split as it is today.    
Generally speaking, these Chinese works are well grounded in published and 
archival sources, and have thus greatly facilitated other researchers in conducting their 
inquiries. However, since these authors rely almost exclusively on Chinese source 
materials and approach their subject with an ideological perspective, I sometimes find 
their narration and interpretation of the subject somewhat limited in breadth and depth. 
For example, when explaining the failure of xinzheng reforms in Mongolia, some of 
them ignore the long-standing interethnic tensions between Han Chinese and the 
Mongols, whilst others attribute the failure to the “feudal character” of the reforms 
themselves.15  
 When compared with Chinese xinzheng studies, the body of English language 
                                                      
14 Example of the former includes Xue Ruihan 薛瑞漢, “Qingmo xinzheng shiqi de Shanqi yu menggu,” 
清末新政時期的善耆與蒙古 [Shanqi and Mongolia of the New Political Period at the End of Qing 
Dynasty] History Teaching 歷史教學, 8 (2004), pp. 12-16. Examples of the latter are Xing Yichen 
邢亦塵, “Luelun qingmo menggu diqu de ‘xinzheng’,” 略論清末蒙古地區的“新政”[A Brief 
Commentary on Late-Qing’s “New Administration” in the Mongolian Region] Inner Mongolian 
Social Science 內蒙古社會科學, 3 (1986), pp. 37-42; Tian Feng 田鋒, Qingmo neimenggu “xin 
zheng” ji qi shehui ying xiang 清末內蒙古“新政”及其社會影響 [The Social influence of “new 
policies” at the End of the Qing Dynasty in Inner Mongolia]. Master Dissertation, Inner Mongolia 
Normal University (2004); Fan Mingfang 樊明方, “Qingmo Waimeng xinzheng shuping,” 清末外
蒙新政述評 [A Review of the New Policy Exercised in Outer Mongolia at the End of Qing Dynasty] 
The Western Regions Studies 西域研究, 1 (2005), pp. 35-43. 
15 Zhao, Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu, p. 166. 
14 
 
literature on the New Administration is much smaller. While many English works have 
been written on Qing China’s Self-strengthening Movement during the Tongzhi reign 
(1862-1874),16 the only English book with late Qing xinzheng reforms as its focal point 
is Douglas R. Reynolds’ China, 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan.17 
This neglect in the treatment of the late Qing reforms, as Reynolds has suggested, could 
be attributable to several factors, including (a) the xinzheng reforms were associated 
with a regime that had “failed”. Why study failure? (b) The post-1911 scholarship on 
leaders of the revolution concentrates on revolutionaries versus others. Xinzheng actors, 
merely “reformer”, are generally disqualified from serious study by their uncertain 
political views and assignments; (c) researchers have failed to appreciate the awesome 
complexities of the late Qing achievements.18 Regrettably, Reynolds’ work failed to stir 
up further interest among the Western scholars in the xinzheng reforms. Moreover, since 
this book, as its sub-title has suggested, merely focuses on how Japan helped China 
break the iron grip of tradition and embark upon its road to modernity, it is not directly 
related to the present inquiry. 
 The only English work that deals with the xinzheng reforms in the Mongolian 
region is Mei-hua Lan’s “China’s ‘New Administration’ in Mongolia”.19 An article 
published in 1999, Lan’s work is the first attempt in English language that investigates 
the origin and the implementation of New Administration in the Mongolian region, and 
                                                      
16 Examples include Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-chih 
Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957); John K. Fairbank, Edwin 
O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston, Mass: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1965). 
17 Douglas R. Reynolds, China 1898-1912: The Xinzheng Revolution and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1993). 
18 Reynolds, China 1898-1912, pp. 193-194. 
19 Lan Mei-hua, “China’s ‘New Administration’ in Mongolia,” in Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman 
eds., Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan (Armonk, N.Y. ; London : M.E. 
Sharpe, 1999), pp. 38-59. 
15 
 
the Mongolian response to the reforms. She has drawn on, in addition to Chinese 
materials, English and Mongolian sources, thus breaking a new ground in the study of 
this subject. The article has provided a solid foundation, on which further inquiries can 
be made. However, given the short length of the article (which is composed of 19 
pages), Lan’s work can hardly be considered as an adequate, in-depth study of a subject 
that is so important to the development of modern China. Moreover, the content of the 
article, which was published in 1999, needs substantial updating as a result of the new 
findings that have emerged in China’s frontier studies since then.  
 Since the twenty-first century, new works by scholars on both sides of the Strait on 
China’s borderlands, such as Jusahal’s 珠颯 18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu 
nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu 18-20世紀初東部內蒙古農耕村落化研究 (A Study of 
the Agriculturalization and Hamletization in Eastern Inner Mongolia from the 
Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Centuries), and Lin Shixuan (Lin Shih-hsuan)’s 林士鉉 
Qing ji Dongbei yi min shi bian zheng ce zhi yan jiu 清季東北移民實邊政策之研究 
(A Study of the Policy on Moving People to Strengthen the Border in Northeastern 
China during the Late Qing Period)20 have shed new light on various aspects of Qing 
frontier developments. Though they are not directly related to the xinzheng in the 
Mongolian region, they have deepened our understanding of the background of the 
reforms. 
On the other hand, the rise of the “New Qing History” historiography in the United 
States since the 1990s, which directly challenges the views of the earlier Sino-centric 
                                                      
20 Jusahal 珠颯, 18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu 18-20世紀初東部
內蒙古農耕村落化研究 [A Study of the Agriculturalization and Hamletization in Eastern Inner 
Mongolia from the Eighteenth to Early Twentieth Centuries] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia People’s 
Press, 2009); Lin Shixuan 林士鉉 [Lin Shih-hsuan], Qing ji Dongbei yi min shi bian zheng ce zhi 
yan jiu 淸季東北移民實邊政策之硏究 [A Study of the Policy on Moving People to Strengthen the 
Border in Northeastern China during the Late Qing Period] (Taipei: History Department of National 
Cheng Chi University, 2001). 
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narrative of Qing history, has prompted a wave of investigations into the Qing 
expansion at its frontiers. Works like Pamela K. Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History 
and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology,21 Mark C. Elliott’s The Manchu Way: The Eight 
Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China,22 and James A. Millward’s Beyond 
the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864,23 have 
provided us fresh perspectives on the Qing imperial institutions and their use of Central 
Asian models of rule to strengthen relations with non-Han nationalities.  
Moreover, as the above discussion shows, the publication in English of Mongolian 
works and sources in recent years has also greatly facilitated this inquiry. All these 
newly available materials have facilitated a revisit of the New Administration in the 
Mongolian region, a subject whose importance has long been underestimated, as 
evidenced by the neglect treatment it has received so far. For one thing, the reforms 
were a catalyst for the final eruption of anti-Manchu and anti-Chinese sentiment among 
the Mongols that eventually led to the Khalkha Mongols’ declaration of independence in 
1911, and this in turn has drastically transformed the geopolitical situation in Inner Asia. 
Moreover, though the xinzheng period in the Mongolian region had few concrete 
achievements to show for it, it laid the foundation for Mongolia’s continuing 
modernization. 
 
A Word on Nationalism 
A cornerstone of this thesis is the transformation of Mongolian ethnic identity into 
                                                      
21 Pamela K. Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999). 
22 Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
23 James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 




modern nationhood, culminating in the creation of the Mongolian Republic. The 
investigation into Mongolian nationalism is however dealt with implicitly rather than as 
a study of the intellectual currents leading to the gestation of the modern Mongolian 
nation. Fully developed, such an endeavour would need to entail a discussion of the 
nationalist phenomenon along three separate trajectories: Firstly, as an example of 
nationalism as a factor in the break-up of multi-ethnic empires, as would become apparent 
in the European equivalents of the Qing (Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian 
empires). Nationalism as a seminal phenomenon in the development of modern Europe 
has been analysed by a number of political historians who have established nationalism 
as a special sub-discipline in historical research. For the purpose of this study, it may 
suffice to refer to Benedict Anderson,24 Anthony Smith,25 and Ernest Gellner.26 
Secondly, the recent scholarship concerning the nature of the Qing empire would 
need to be revisited. The present thesis uses the fundamental tenets of the so-called New 
Qing History and the latesest research findings of Qing studies as a useful point of 
departure, namely that the Qing enterprise was a poly-ethnic construct from its inception 
during the early seventeenth century; that the Qing state proactively sought to further the 
economic chances and social mobility of all its subjects, thus creating the foundations for 
the modern Chinese state; and that the ethnically divided nationalism during the final 
decades of the Empire arose out of the confluence of relative economic hardship and the 
introduction of new notions of human and national destiny (Darwinism, nationalism). For 
the present thesis, authors working on aspects of nationalism(s) in the late Qing period 
influenced my progress more than any other aspect of nationalism. Zhu Weizheng’s recent 
work on modern Chinese history provided valuable insight,27 while more established 
                                                      
24 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991). 
25 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) and Ethno-
symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (London: Routledge, 2009). 
26 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006). 
27 Zhu Weizheng, Rereading Modern Chinese History (Leiden: Brill, 2015). 
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authors such as Wasserstrom 28  and Duara 29  provided crucial inspiration. Although 
separated by one whole generation and located further east, Rana Mitter’s analysis of 
nationalism in Manchuria, another Qing border zone, provided useful insight.30 
Thirdly and finally, a fully-developed study of nationalism would need to centre on 
the transformation of Mongolian self-perception, from tribal identity to the blazing image 
of Chinggis Khan as embodiment of the Mongolian country (ulus), via the responsibility 
of being the effective co-founders of the Qing empire and mainstay of Qing forces, to the 
ultimate creation of a modern Mongolian nation state. Owen Lattimore’s work is being 
cited throughout this thesis,31 while a more recent analysis has been provided by Bulag.32  
 All of the above has been taken into consideration, but the topic of nationalism was 
found to be too expansive to be studied separately in this thesis. However, the creation of 
(Outer) Mongolia as an independant state can still be identified as a consequence of the 
xinzheng reforms, and for this reason my thesis seeks to fill the huge gap that has existed 
in the body of English language literature on the subject of the xinzheng reforms in the 
Mongolian region. My paper is an inquiry into why the Qing state sought to introduce 
reforms in the Mongolian region (which it had left intact for centuries) during the last ten 
years of its rule, what the constraints on the reforms were, and how the ascendancy of 
Han Chinese officials in late Qing politics influenced the reform process. Finally, by 
adopting a comparative approach, I strive to explain why the Mongols on the two sides 
of the Gobi Desert reacted so differently to the reforms.  
 
 
                                                      
28 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom ed., Twentieth-Century China: New Approaches (London: Routledge, 2003). 
29 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
30 Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
31 Owen Lattimore and Urgungge Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1955). 
32 Uradyn E. Bulag, Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
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Sources and Methodology 
 As with all researchers of Qing studies, I started my inquiry by consulting the 
archival materials that are kept in official archives on both sides of the Strait. To this 
end, I visited the First Historical Archives in Beijing in 2013 and the National Palace 
Museum in Taipei in 2012 and 2014, where I had access to the correspondences 
between the Throne and its frontier officials, such as Zhupi zouzhe 硃批奏摺 (Palace 
memorials approved by the Emperor’s hand), Gongzhong shangyu 宮中上諭 (imperial 
edicts in the palace collection), and Lufu zouzhe 錄副奏摺 (Records of great state 
council memorials) maintained by the Qing court. These archival materials, preserved 
by successive Chinese governments since Qing as state records, have provided valuable 
insights on the thinking of the Throne and its officials about the management and 
operation of the empire’s affairs, including the implementation of xinzheng in the 
frontier regions. Since the late twentieth century, the First Historical Archives have 
published volumes of these zouzhe, shangyu, and qijuzhu 起居注 (records of an 
emperor’s words and deeds) of some of the reigns of Qing dynasty. The publication of 
these materials has greatly facilitated the scholars of Qing history in their research, 
though it does not completely obviate the need for archival visits. 
 In addition to visiting the First Historical Archives and the National Palace 
Museum, a visit to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives at Hohhot in June 
2016 also proved to be helpful to my inquiry. The records kept in the Archives, many 
written in Mongolian and some in Chinese, supplemented the materials I obtained in 
Beijing and Taipei. 
  
Apart from official archival materials, another source of primary materials of equal 
importance was the memorials, correspondences, and dossiers authored by high-ranking 
Qing officials who had been actively involved in the xinzheng in the Mongolian region, 
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such as Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, Yigu 貽穀, Xu Shichang 徐世昌, Xiliang 錫良, 
Sando 三多, and others. Since the early Republican years, the works of these senior 
Qing officials have been edited and published by their descendants, friends, or former 
subordinates. Generally, these documents were taken from the official archives of the 
various Yamen 衙門 these officials had served or from their private collections and, 
hence, the reliability of these documents was not in doubt. For this reason, some 
Chinese historians, such as Zhao Yuntian, treat these works as archival materials on par 
with the state documents mentioned above.33  
 In preparation for the introduction of reforms, the State dispatched during the early 
xinzheng era several young officers to tour the Mongolian region (mainly eastern Inner 
Mongolia) to report on what they had seen. Unlike traditional state bureaucrats, these 
officers were intellectuals who had been educated in Japan or the West. As a 
consequence, their reports offered an alternative view on Mongolian affairs to those 
boilerplate reports by frontier officials. These reports, such as Yao Xiguang’s 姚錫光 
Chou Meng chu yi 籌蒙芻議 (Humble Opinions on the Planning of Xinzheng for 
Mongolia) and Wu Luzhen’s 吳祿貞 Dong si meng Menggu shi ji 東四盟蒙古實紀 
(A Factual Record of the Four Eastern Mongolian Leagues)34, proved to be an important 
source of information about the real Mongolian situation and how the reforms were 
carried out in the region, though these authors were not entirely immune from the 
cultural and racial biases of the many Han Chinese intellectuals of the time against the 
Mongols.  
                                                      
33 Zhao, Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu, p. 3. 
34 Yao Xiguang 姚錫光, Chou Meng chu yi 籌蒙芻議 [Humble Opinions on the Planning of Xinzheng 
for Mongolia], 1908 (reprinted Hohhot: Yuan fang chu ban she, 2008); Wu Luzhen 吳祿貞, Dong si 
meng Menggu shi ji 東四盟蒙古實紀 [A Factual Record of the Four Eastern Mongolian Leagues], 




 Apart from archival materials, officially compiled histories of the successive reigns 
of the dynasty also provide valuable information about the late Qing period, including 
the New Administration in the frontier regions. Of particular relevance to my research 
are Da Qing lichao shilu 大清歷朝實錄 (The veritable records of the Qing dynasty) of 
the Guangxu and Xuantong reigns, and Guangxuchao donghualu 光緒朝東華錄 
(Records from within the Eastern Flowery Gate, Guangxu Era). These records contain a 
lot of primary materials taken from the royal archives, government publications (such as 
dichao 邸鈔 (government news announcements)), and newspaper reports of the time. 
In addition, fangzhi 方志 (gazetteer), such as Suiyuan Tong Zhi Gao 綏遠通志稿 
(Comprehensive Draft Gazetteer of Suiyuan) also contain useful information about the 
implementation of xinzheng at different Mongolian cities, towns, or districts. Last but 
not least, newspapers and magazines published during the period, such as Shen Pao 申
報 (Shanghai News) and Dong Fang Zazhi 東方雜誌 (The Eastern Miscellanies), 
Minbao 民報 (People’s News) are also valuable sources of materials for their reports 
on important issues, public opinions on such issues, as well as government 
pronouncements. 
 Understandably, the above works mainly reflect the views of the Qing court and 
the Chinese literati of the time. To counterbalance these imperialist or nationalist 
narratives of Mongolian history, I have had to draw upon non-Chinese sources. In this 
regard, I consulted a number of travel accounts and missionary reports authored by 
Russians and other Europeans who journeyed the Mongolian frontier during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Examples of this travel literature include A.M. 
Pozdneyev’s Mongolia and the Mongols, James Gilmour’s Among the Mongols, and 
Elizabeth K. Kendall’s A Wayfarer in China: Impressions of a Trip across West China 
and Mongolia.35 Finally, as discussed in the above, the translation and publication of 
                                                      
35 Alexeĭ Matveevich Pozdneyev, Mongolia and the Mongols. Edited by John R. Krueger et al., translated 
22 
 
Mongolian materials in English in recent years has given me valuable Mongolian and 
Russian perspectives on Qing China’s New Policies in Mongolia. For example, in 
Bogdo Jebtsundamba Khutuktu: The Last King of Mongolia, Mongolian historian E. O. 
Batsaikhan has provided a wealth of Mongolian and Russian archival materials that 
have not been published in English works. 
 
Main Arguments 
 My main arguments are as follows: 
(a) Thanks to their different geographical proximity to China proper and different 
history of association with the Qing empire, Inner and Outer Mongolia had achieved 
different levels of development in terms of economy, society, and political system 
by late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries. These differences in turn would affect 
their elites’ response towards the New Policies; 
(b) The major reforms introduced in Mongolia during the xinzheng decade, such as land 
reclamation by Han Chinese farmers, the imposition of Chinese style administrative 
units, etc., were nothing new. They had been introduced into Mongolia on a 
piecemeal basis during the Kangxi, Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns with a view to 
meeting certain practical needs. The xinzheng reforms merely institutionalized these 
temporary measures into permanent ones; 
(c) The main goals of the reforms were to tackle the dual challenges of the debt and the 
threat faced by the Qing since mid-nineteenth century, that is, to raise additional 
revenue to meet the huge debts resultant from war repatriations and foreign loans, 
and to counter the growing foreign (mainly Russian) presence in the region;  
                                                      
by John Roger Shaw and Dale Plank, 1892 (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1971); James 
Gilmour, Among the Mongols, 1883 (reprinted New York: Praeger, 1970); Elizabeth K. Kendall, A 




(d) The introduction of xinzheng reforms also coincided with the ascendency of Han 
Chinese officials in late Qing politics. As a result, the reforms were also a 
manifestation of Han Chinese thinking (such as agriculturally based economy). In 
addition to modernizing Mongolia, these reforms also sought to “Sinicize” the 
region. In the end, the reforms initiated by the Manchu court served to advance Han 
Chinese interest in the region; 
(e) The xinzheng reforms further aggravated the differences in outlook between the 
Inner and Outer Mongolian elites and their relationship with the Qing and its 
successor state the Republic of China. This explains why the Inner and Outer 
Mongolian elites would eventually part ways during the Pan-Mongolian movement 
in the early twentieth century. 
 
Organization 
 Apart from the Introduction and the Conclusion, the main body of this thesis is 
divided into seven chapters. Chapter one presents the historical background of the 
Mongols’ subjugation to the Manchus in the seventeenth century, early Qing policy 
towards the Mongols, and its imperial administration in the region. Chapter two 
examines changes to the Mongolian region brought about by Qing rule from its heyday 
up to the nineteenth century, in particular the penetration of Han Chinese influence in 
the region, and the growing pauperization of the Mongols resultant from Han Chinese 
moneylending and economic exploitation. Chapter three traces Tsarist Russia’s growing 
expansion and presence in Mongolia since the seventeenth century, culminating in the 
Sino-Russian rivalry in the region in the nineteenth century. Chapters four and five 
investigate the implementation of New Administration in Inner Mongolia, where the 
reforms were carried out most rigorously and hence their impact was most explicit. This 
served as a warning to the Khalkha Mongols, and strengthened their aspiration for 
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nationhood. Chapter six deals with the Outer Mongols’ declaration of independence in 
1911. It shows that, despite the Khalkhas’ pinpointing the New Policy as their greatest 
grievance against Qing China, the xinzheng reforms merely functioned as a catalyst for 
their independence endeavor, since evidence suggested that the Khalkhas had repeatedly 
approached Russia for assistance well before 1911. Chapter seven examines the 
wrangling between Republican China and the Khalkha Mongols over the loyalty of 
Inner Mongolian elites and investigates why the Inner Mongols chose to remain in the 































Mongolia in the Early Qing Period 
 
Subjugation of Mongolia 
 In the early seventeenth century, the lands nomadized by the Mongolian peoples 
across the Inner Asian steppe were roughly divided by the Gobi Desert into two regions: 
Eastern Mongolia and Western Mongolia. Eastern Mongolia, which is the subject of this 
study, could be further sub-divided into two areas, depending on their location relative 
to the Gobi Desert/Chinese heartland: Southern/Inner Mongolia and Northern/Outer 
Mongolia. Qing Inner Mongolia comprises today’s Autonomous Region of Inner 
Mongolia in the People’s Republic of China, whilst Outer (“Khalkha” in Mongolian) 
Mongolia consists of the present-day Republic of Mongolia. 
Except for the brief interludes of unification under the rules of Chinggis Khan and 
Dayan Khan in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries respectively, the Mongolian 
peoples were, in the words of Owen Lattimore, a collection of tribes rather than a 
people and, as typical of all tribal politics, they were at chronic war with each other.36  
Therefore, to informed contemporaries of Ming China, such as Xiao Daheng and Ye 
Xianggao, the Mongols were groups of people living north of the Great Wall with a 
complex variety of cultures (held together by intelligible dialects) and a variety of 
economic milieux (most of which were nomadic but others agricultural).37  
 Prior to the Eastern Mongols’ subjugation by the Manchus in the seventeenth 
century, Ligdan Khan (a descendant of Chinggis Khan) of the Chahar Mongols in Inner 
Mongolia attempted to unify the multitude of independent tribes of Eastern Mongolia in 
                                                      
36 Lattimore and Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, p. 6. 
37 Pamela K. Crossley, “Making Mongols,” in Pamela K. Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton 
eds., Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), p. 64. 
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the imperial tradition of Yuan rulership. However, his efforts failed as most of the 
Mongolian chieftains would not recognize his leadership nor could any of them provide 
such leadership. As Charles R. Bawden observes, the disunity of the Eastern Mongols, 
their fatal tendency to allow Ligdan’s imperial power to be challenged and contested by 
other powerful chieftains meant that the Manchus, in the course of their gradual 
expansion and consolidation southwards towards China, were able to subdue, or acquire 
as allies, piecemeal, incoherent groups of Mongols.38  
 
(a) Subjugation of Inner Mongolia 
It took the Manchus nearly 100 years to subjugate the whole of Eastern Mongolia. 
And it was the tribes of Inner Mongolia, which were lying astride and alongside the 
path of Manchu expansion into Ming China, which were the first to lose independence 
to Manchu rule. 
 The Manchu-Mongol alliance started under Nurgaci, founder of the Latter Jin 
state (which claimed to succeed the Jurchen Jin empire (1121-1234), and was the 
predecessor of the Qing empire). For the Manchus, an emerging power in the northeast 
of Ming China, the elimination of independence of the Inner Mongolian tribes was not 
so much ridding themselves of direct or potential rivals as acquiring allies in their 
struggle against, first the Ligdan Khan (who had been coopted by Ming China to ward 
off the Manchus) and then against the Ming. As Hung Taiji, Nurgaci’s son and 
successor, remarked, “To conquer Yanjing (an ancient name for Ming capital city 
Beijing) is like felling a huge tree, we must first hack it on both sides, and the tree will 
then fall by itself.” 39  
                                                      
38 Charles R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (London; New York: Kegan Paul International, 
1989), p. 39. 
39 Da Qing lichao Taizong shilu 大淸歷朝(太宗)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the 
Qing dynasty—Taizong reign] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1985-87), vol. 62, p. 853. 
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As early as 1594, the chieftains of the Horqin and Khalkha tribes of Inner 
Mongolia sent ambassadors to the Manchus to propose the establishment of friendly 
relations. Taking advantage of the constant feuding among the Mongolian chieftains, the 
Manchus subjugated them either by sealing military or marital alliances with them, or 
by defeating them militarily. In 1606, these Mongolian princes presented Nurgaci the 
title Kundulun khan (the Revered Khan).40 In 1634, Hung Taiji and his Southern 
Mongolian allies defeated the Ligdan Khan decisively. The formal end of the Inner 
Mongolian tribes’ independence may be dated 1636 when Hung Taiji elevated himself 
to emperor and adopted the name of Qing for the new Manchu dynasty at a grand 
celebration attended by the 49 princes of Inner Mongolian banners. 
 
(b) Subjugation of Outer Mongolia 
 Between 1636 and 1691, Outer (Khalkha) Mongolia was the only part of Eastern 
Mongolia that remained independent of Manchu rule. Seventeenth-century Khalkha was 
divided into three hereditary khanates: Tiisiyetii Khanate, Sechen Khanate and Jasaghtu 
Khanate.41 Though these khanates remained independent in name, they had to offer 
periodic tribute of “Nine Whites” (eight white horses and one white camel) to the 
Manchu Qing emperor as early as 1637.42 This could be interpreted as a sign that the 
Qing emperor exercised quasi-suzerainty over these khanates. 
                                                      
40 According to Sin Chung-il, an emissary sent by Korea’s Yi court to Nurgaci’s headquarters at Fe Alai 
in 1595-1596, Nurgaci referred to himself as the Jurchen state’s ejen (lord), the same word as in 
Mongolian, thereby establishing the monarchical term of self-reference among the Jurchens that 
would become an expression of the Qing link to the Mongolian Great Khans—see Pamela K. 
Crossley, The Manchus (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 61. 
41 A fourth khanate—the Sayin Noyan Khanate—was created by the Yongzheng emperor in 1725 in 
recognition of the loyalty of the Borjigids (a lineage of Chingissid direct descendants) to the Qing 
court. 
42 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 59. 
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In early 1688, the Zunghars, a tribal confederation of Western Mongols, invaded 
Khalkha Mongolia under the leadership of Galdan Bosogtu Khan on the pretext that the 
first Jebtsundamba Khutuktu (Head of the Lamaist faith in Outer Mongolia) was 
disrespectful towards the Dalai Lama. Galdan decisively defeated the Khalkha forces 
led by the Tiisiyetii Khan. The Khan and the Khutuktu (who also was the Khan’s 
brother) fled south and sought refuge on the borders of Inner Mongolia. A debate among 
the Khalkha leaders ensued as to their future: whether they should seek help from the 
Russians (with whom the Khalkhas had trade and diplomatic exchanges since the early 
seventeenth century), or should turn to the Manchus for protection. It was said that the 
Khalkhas finally chose to submit to the Manchus because of the Khutuktu’s insistence. 
The Khutuktu reportedly said to the Khalkha leaders: 
“The Russians never worship the Buddha. Their customs are different from ours. 
Their language and manner of clothing are different from ours. Submission to Russia 
will not be in our long-term interest. Rather, we should move inside (southward) and 
submit to the Great Emperor (of the Qing), as this will bring us permanent good 
fortunes.”43    
In the summer of 1688, the Khutuktu wrote to the Kangxi emperor: 
“If I could live in the protection of the Holy Emperor, my desires would be satisfied. 
I beg the Holy Emperor to allot me with an area with good water and pasture, so as to 
show mercy on me. I also ask for the restoration of my temples.”44  
Under pressure of the Zunghars, other Khalkha noblemen and people also fled to 
Inner Mongolia for refuge. In 1690, the Kangxi emperor decisively defeated the 
Zunghars in the battle of Ulanbudang. In the following year, the emperor convened a 
                                                      
43 Zhang Mu 張穆, Menggu youmu ji 蒙古游牧記 [Record of nomad life in Mongolia], 1867 
(reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1965), vol. 7, p. 5. 
44 Quoted in Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 77. 
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great convention at Dolon Nor in Inner Mongolia, which was attended by the khans, the 
Khutuktu, and some 550 Khalkha nobles as well as the princes of 49 Inner Mongolian 
banners. The emperor announced to the Khalkha khans and princes,  
“You will be treated in the same manner as the 49 banners (of Inner Mongolia). Your 
names and titles will be the same as those of the 49 banners. This shows that I treat you 
all impartially without any discrimination.”45  
The convention thus marked the formal incorporation of Khalkha Mongolia into the 
Qing empire. Before the Dolon Nor Convention, the nomad peoples roaming north to 
China had constantly posed threats to the country’s agricultural civilization, resulting in 
constant confrontations between the two for almost two millennia. As the Yongzheng 
emperor remarked, “A day of unrest outside the borders is a day without rest [for the 
people] inside the borders.”46 Following the subjugation of the Mongols of both Inner 
and Outer Mongolia, the military threat was now largely eliminated. As the Kangxi 
emperor proudly observed, 
 “From reading classics and histories I note that the Mongols beyond the Great Wall 
had often contended with the Middle Kingdom. No dynasties, from Han, Tang, Song to 
Ming, were immune from the havocs wrought by the Mongols. None of them was able 
to exert authority in Mongolia and turn its people into loyal subjects as we have 
done.”47  
From 1691 till 1911, Eastern Mongolia was no longer any independent political 
entity. The hereditary khans and princes were now formally bound to the Manchu royal 
house by hierarchical ranks and titles, by salaries and rewards, and by marriage 
                                                      
45 Zhang, Menggu youmu ji, vol. 7, p. 6. 
46 Da Qing lichao Shizong shilu 大淸歷朝(世宗)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the 
Qing dynasty—Yongzheng reign], vol. 105, p. 389.  
47 Da Qing lichao Shengzu shilu 大淸歷朝(聖祖)實錄 [Veritable records of the successive reigns of the 
Qing dynasty—Kangxi reign], vol. 180, p. 931.   
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alliances. The Khutuktu (who had been elevated to be the head of Lamaist faith of the 
land at an assembly of Khalkha Mongol khans and noblemen in 1639) was formally 
appointed by specific imperial command in 1718 to head the Lamaists of Northern 
Mongolia.48 Whereas the khans could trade with Russia, and negotiate with the latter 
on more or less equal terms before 1691, they were now cut off from Russia as far as 
practicable.   
The above discussion shows that: 
(a) Inner Mongolia’s relationship with China was closer than that of Outer Mongolia, in 
terms of its geographical location and history of association with the Manchus; 
(b) Outer Mongolia’s subjugation to the Manchus was the result of an external threat, 
not a spontaneous demand among the Khalkhas. As such, there were internal 
divisions over to whom they should submit, Qing China or Tsarist Russia. At least 
to some Khalkhas, Russia could be a counterweight to China;  
(c) National security had long been a major factor in Qing-Mongolian relationship and, 
as subsequent discussions would show, this factor was a dominating consideration 
in the xinzheng reforms. 
 
Mongolian Influence on Qing Formation 
Owen Lattimore et al. once observed,  
“The Manchus favored the Mongols because, in the tradition of a conquering 
dynasty of barbarian origin, they began their rule by trying to maintain, at the edge of 
the conquered territory, a ‘reservoir’ of tribal auxiliaries who were, by definition, to be 
well treated in order to keep them loyal to the house ruling over China but, equally by 
definition, were to be exhorted to keep up the ancient barbarian military virtues and 
                                                      
48 Zhao Yuntian 趙雲田, Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu 淸代蒙古政教制度 [The Political and 
Religious Systems of Qing Mongolia] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1989), p. 272. 
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prevented, by positive laws and regulations, from becoming assimilated to the 
Chinese.”49   
In my opinion, Lattimore’s observation, though apt, is at the same time an 
oversimplified statement as it has under-estimated the Mongolian influence on the 
Manchu political culture, in particular during the early period of Qing formation. As the 
following discussion will show, the Mongols’ contributions to the Qing scheme were 
much more than that of military. Indeed, the Mongolian influence on the Manchu state 
was so pervasive that Taiwanese scholar Lin Shih-hsuan argues that Mongolia was 
omnipresent in the Manchu political culture.50  
Commenting on the Qianlong emperor’s grand commemoration of the return of the 
Torgots51 to the Qing fold in 1771, James A. Millward argues the Qing formation was 
just one of the “reimperialization” processes that were played out across much of 
Central Eurasia from 1500 through the eighteenth century. He notes that one of the 
characteristics of the new political formations that emerged from this process was that 
they continued many Mongolian imperial institutions, especially in their military and in 
the Mongolian system of legitimization by decent from Chinggis Khan.52  
Indeed, both Nurgaci and Hung Taiji had co-opted, apart from Chinese elements, 
many Mongolian elements in their nation-building efforts. According to David M. 
Farquhar, Mongolian institutions of the sixteenth century and before were the source of 
                                                      
49 Lattimore and Onon, Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, p. 15. 
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51 A Western Mongol tribe that had fled westward to Russia in the early seventeenth century to escape 
the growing power of the Zunghars. 
52 James A. Millward, “The Qing Formation, the Mongol Legacy, and the ‘End of History’ in Early 
Modern Central Eurasia,” in Lynn A. Struve ed., The Qing formation in world-historical time 
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many of the most important Manchu innovations related to their later conquest.53 A 
good example was that the Baqi 八旗 (Eight Banner) organization had strong 
Mongolian roots. Ideologically, many of the concepts of the Qing imperial rule, such as 
“ruler”, “emperor”, “tax” were derived not from the Chinese but from Mongolian 
sources. The ideal of a universal ruler, which was derived from the Buddhist 
chakravarti-raja (wheel-turning king), had been transmitted through Tibet to Mongolia 
in Yuan times. Also, the concept of “Heavenly Destiny” 天命, the first reign title of 
Nurgaci declared in 1616, was transmitted to the Manchus from the Mongols. Further, 
Peter C. Perdue considers that the Mongolian script was the greatest gift of the Mongols 
to the Manchus as it provided the basis for the creation of the new Manchu national 
language.54 He sums up the Mongolian influence on the Manchu state as follows: 
“In short, the Mongols contributed a great deal to the early Manchu state. They 
provided military allies, horses, and a tradition of legitimation reaching back to 
Chinggis Khan. Along with the Yuan seal came the concept of a universal empire 
encompassing many peoples, an ideal of rulership that vastly transcended either the 
state of the Manchus’ ancestors, the Jurchen or Jin, or that of the Ming. Personal 
connections through kinship and the literary connections through the script bound the 
two peoples together.”55  
Apart from co-option of Mongolian elements in the process of Qing formation, 
Hung Taiji went to great length to prove his Mongol-Chinggisid credentials by 
promoting the story that he had received the Yuan seal from Ligdan’s son.56 This was 
                                                      
53 David M. Farquhar, “Mongolian versus Chinese Elements in the Early Manchu State,” Ch’ing shih 
wen-t’i 清史問題 3 (1971), p. 11.   
54 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 126. 
55 Perdue, China Marches West, p. 127. 
56 Mongolian popular tradition denies that the seal ever came into the possession of the Manchus at all. 
See Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 47. 
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important because, for the Mongols, the system of political legitimacy rested on, in 
addition to Buddhism, the cult of Chinggis Khan since, as Johan Elverskog notes, the 
Chinggis Khan was transformed after his death from founder of the empire to the 
sanctified holder of the right to rule.57  
 
Qing Policy towards Mongolia 
Given the important contributions of the Mongols towards Qing formation and its 
rule of over two and a half centuries in China, it is necessary to examine how the 
Manchus managed to ensure the loyalty of the Mongols. The Manchu success can be 
attributed to the Manchu-Mongol kinship, its patronage of Lamaism, and administration 
in Mongolia. 
(a) Manchu-Mongol Kinship 
Manchu-Mongol kinship was one of the central pillars of the early Qing regime. 
This was mainly created through intermarriages between the noble families of the two 
peoples. Through intermarriage and other techniques, the Manchus successfully made 
many Mongolian noblemen members of the ruling family, and thus reliable military 
allies in their campaigns against Ming China and the Zunghars during the period of 
Qing formation, and in the suppression of uprisings in China proper during the later 
Qing rule. As a consequence, the intermarriage program of the Manchus was a highly 
regulated, large-scale and long-term arrangement.   
The first Manchu-Mongolian marriage alliance was sealed in 1612, when Nurgaci 
himself married the daughter of the chief of the Horqin Mongols. In his campaign 
against the Ligdan Khan, Hung Taiji used marriage ties to cement alliances with the 
Southern Mongolian tribes and, as a result, the number of such allies rose from four in 
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Nurgaci’s time to 21.58 During the reigns of the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors, the 
intermarriage program became even more systematized and regulated, as other 
techniques—gifts, stipends, tax exemption, education, access to official posts—were 
introduced to win the hearts of the Mongolian nobility. For example, annual salaries 
ranging from 2,500 silver taels and 40 bolts of silk to 100 silver taels and 4 bolts of silk 
were awarded to the Mongolian nobility of different ranks.59 In 1662, the Kangxi 
emperor decreed that sons born to Mongolian consorts would be granted high ranks 
equivalent to those for the sons of Manchu noblemen.60 Young Mongolian boys were 
selected as consorts for Qing princesses, and were brought to Beijing for education in 
Manchu and Chinese culture, before they were sent back to their tribes. In 1789, the 
Qianlong emperor decreed that special subsidies of silver (ranging from 40 to 300 taels) 
and silk (ranging from four to 10 bolts) would be granted to the efu 額駙 (consorts for 
Qing princesses) of different ranks annually.61 Elaborate funerals were held upon the 
death of Qing princesses and their consorts. The Manchu-Mongolian kinship was so 
close that the Qianlong emperor once boasted, in a poem he wrote, that all the 
Mongolian noblemen who attended a royal banquet were his sons and grandsons.62  
 Through inter-marriage, the Mongolian nobles constituted an important component 
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of the Manchu royal house, and would play an important role in late Qing politics. 
However, being a close ally of the Manchus, the Mongols also became a target for 
discrimination by Han nationalists during the final years of the Qing rule.  
(b) Patronage of Tibetan Buddhism 
Joseph Fletcher remarked that the Tibetan Buddhist “Yellow” Church was one of 
the three important factors in the taming of the once terrible Mongols.63 The Tibetan 
Buddhist faith, also known as dGe-lugs-pa or the “Yellow Church” or simply Lamaism, 
was re-introduced to Mongolia during the reign of Altan Khan in the sixteenth century. 
Altan Khan was so powerful that he was able to invite the third Dalai Lama of Tibet to 
visit Mongolia in 1577, thereby reviving the Mongolian tradition of an alliance of the 
Buddhist Church with a secular power.64  
For the Khalkhas, the elevation of the first Jebtsundamba Khutuktu was of primary 
significance as it gave them for the first time in Mongolian history an indigenous 
religious leader. Through the combination of political and religious power, Tibetan 
Buddhism began to grow substantially in Outer Mongolia. After the Khalkhas submitted 
to the Qing court in 1691, the Buddhist Church also fell under Manchu control. In 1718, 
the Kangxi emperor confirmed the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu as the paramount religious 
leader for all the Khalkhas. However, in the eyes of the Khalkha Mongols, the Khutuktu 
ranked third in the Lamaist Church, after the Dalai and Panchen Lamas of Tibet.65 As 
history would show, this factor was of utmost importance in the Mongolian 
Independence Movement in 1911, when the eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu became the 
rallying figure of the Mongolian world in their struggle to break away from Manchu 
rule. 
                                                      
63 Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c.1800,” in John K. Fairbank ed., The Cambridge History of 
China, vol. 10, Late Ch’ing, 1900-1911 Part I (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 
1978), p. 52. 
64 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 29. 
65 Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c.1800,” p. 52. 
36 
 
In Inner Mongolia, the Janggiya Khutuktu, a reincarnating lama and the abbot of the 
monastery Koke Sume erected in Dolon Nor, was made by the Qing court the 
ecclesiastical head of the land in 1701. The Qing government, anxious to prevent the 
development of a single Mongolian church that might serve as a rallying point for 
Mongolian unity, had been careful to build up the standing of the Janggiya Khutuktu as 
a counterweight to the Jebtsundamba's influence, and it also tried subtly to maintain an 
equilibrium of power in Mongolia between the Dalai Lama and the two Mongolian 
primates.66 Also, to prevent an alliance between the lay aristocracy and the lamaist 
church, the Qing government discouraged the finding of reincarnations of Khutuktus in 
noble families. Following the death of the second Jebtsundamba Khutuktu in 1758, the 
Qianlong emperor decreed that future incarnations of the Khutuktu had to be found in 
Tibet.  
 Chinese sources seem to suggest that the Qing court’s patronage of Tibetan 
Buddhism was for strategic purposes: by promoting Tibetan Buddhism the Manchus 
were able to ensure the loyalty of their Mongolian subjects. A much quoted proof was a 
1792 stele inscription entitled Lama shuo (On Lamas), found in the Yonghe gong, a 
Tibetan Buddhist temple in Beijing: 
“As the Yellow Church inside and outside (of China proper) is under the supreme 
rule of these two men (the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama), all the Mongol tribes bear 
allegiance to them. By patronizing the Yellow Church we maintain peace among the 
Mongols. This being an important task we cannot but protect this religion.”67  
Lending weight to this claim were the occasional derogatory remarks made by 
Qing emperors about the lamas in official records. For instance, the Kangxi emperor 
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“The Mongols by their nature deeply believe in deceitful words. Whenever they 
hear of lamas, Khutuktus, or bierhan, they, without checking its truthfulness, kowtow 
wholeheartedly and donate their livestock and properties, thinking they would thus be 
blessed and live forever. They do not mind even if they are thus reduced to poverty and 
ruined.”68  
 Prince Li, a member of the Qing imperial clan and author of Xiao ting za lu, also 
writes, “That the State has shown special favor to monks of the Yellow Church, is not 
because it worships the religion to pray for good fortune and luck. It is because all the 
Mongolian tribes have worshipped the Yellow faith for a long time. The State therefore 
makes a fetish of the faith in order to win the hearts of these people, so that they will 
submit to us loyally and serve as a screen for our security.”69  
 However, by using contemporary Tibetan and Mongolian sources, modern scholars 
have arrived at a different conclusion. For instance, having examined the biographies of 
Jang gya Rolpai Dorje70 and the third Panchen Lama, Tibetan histories of Buddhism, 
portraits, and the tomb of Qianlong, Elisabeth Benard concludes that the Qianlong 
emperor was deeply involved with Tibetan Buddhism and maintained sustained 
relationships with important lamas.71  
No matter what was the real motive that lay behind the Manchu patronage of the 
religion, the Lamaist church grew rapidly during Qing rule in terms of the number of 
monasteries, power, wealth, and influence. Besides promoting the two Khutuktus as 
religious leaders, the Manchu court also ordered the construction in Mongolia of 
monasteries, such as the Shira Sume in Dolon Nor, Amur-Bayaskhulangtu Keyid in 
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Urga, as well as other imperial monasteries. By and large, each reincarnation had his 
own monastery. According to some statistics, the numbers of monasteries in Qing Inner 
Mongolia and Outer Mongolia were over 1000 and 740 respectively.72  
Most of the monasteries were built and financially supported by the Mongols 
themselves. Under the Qing rule, the monasteries and lamas were exempt from taxes 
and services and enjoyed many privileges. Apart from royal patronage, the jasak (ruler) 
of each banner also donated the monasteries with shabis (bondsmen), and large areas of 
pastureland for the monasteries’ livestock. The monks also constantly solicited 
contributions from the banner subjects for lamaist rituals (such as making Buddha 
images out of butter), and ordinary herdsmen dared not refuse. Since the government 
exempted monasteries and their shabis from taxation, the tax burden fell all the more 
heavily upon the Mongolian commoners. Meanwhile the monasteries used their wealth 
for all kinds of business transactions, including usury. 
Moreover, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, increasing numbers 
of Mongolian young men took vows and became monks. With more and more 
adolescents entering the monasteries, and increasing amounts of Mongolia's 
pasturelands and produce going towards the payment of monastic ceremonial expenses 
rather than to feed the people, serious consequences for the Mongolian economy and 
society ensued. As this would have implications upon the development of Mongolia in 
the nineteenth century, the issue will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
  
(c) Qing Administration in Mongolia 
Before the nineteenth century, the Qing administrative system in the Inner Asian 
frontiers was different from that in China proper and other frontier regions, in that the 
Manchus, not unlike other multiethnic empires of the time, exercised indirect rule in 
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these territories. As Charles Tilly observes, indirect rule has two major elements: (a) 
retention of particular, distinct compacts for the government of each segment; and (b) 
exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their 
own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute and military collaboration 
with the centre.73  
That the Qing exercised indirect rule in its Inner Asian frontiers could be attributed 
to the vastness of these territories and their fragmented political organizations. Nicola 
Di Cosmo notes that the Qing administrative system in its Inner Asian frontiers could be 
divided into three components: the Lifanyuan 理藩院 in the metropolis, the imperial 
residents and the native elites in the periphery.74 The following paragraphs will 
examine these three components individually. 
(i) Lifanyuan 
Lifanyuan was the institution established by the Manchus at the centre specifically 
to handle Inner Asian affairs. It was also the first of its kind in the history of imperial 
China. Ning Chia notes that there is a linguistic difference between the Chinese and 
Manchu names of this imperial institution: whereas the Chinese name 理藩院 means 
“Barbarian Control Office” or “Court of Colonial Affairs”, its Manchu name, Tulergi 
golo be dasara jurgan, should be translated as the “Ministry Ruling the Outer 
Provinces”. She argues that this difference reveals the different concepts between the 
Chinese and Manchus about Inner Asia and its peoples: whereas the Chinese name 
contains a strong cultural conception of the “civilized” versus the “barbarous”, its 
Manchu counterpart merely indicates that Inner Asia was a province away from the 
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centre.75 This could be regarded as a manifestation of the Qing imperial ideology, 
whereby the five major peoples of the empire (Manchus, Hans, Mongols, Huis and 
Tibetans) were five components with equal status, with the royal house at the centre of 
the scheme.   
 The Lifanyuan was set up by Hung Taiji in 1638 on the basis of the monggo 
jurgan or menggu yamen 蒙古衙門 (bureau of Mongolian affairs), a government 
agency that had been established two years earlier to manage Manchu relations with the 
Southern Mongols. Following Qing conquests of other Inner Asian regions, such as 
Northern Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, functions of the Lifanyuan also expanded 
accordingly. By 1760, the Lifanyuan was composed of a chancery, six si 司 (bureau) 
and subordinate agencies. For most of the Qing period, the Lifanyuan was the preserve 
of Manchu and Mongol administrators. It was not until the final years of the Qing that 
Han Chinese officials were appointed to positions in this organization.  
 As a result of Qing expansion into Inner Asia during the following century, the 
number of bureaus of the Lifanyuan increased from four to six by the mid-eighteenth 
century. These bureaus were: 
(a) qijisi 旗籍司 (the Inner Mongolian bureau), in charge of affairs relating to the 
leagues and banners of Inner Mongolia;  
(b) wanghuisi 王會司 (the Inner Mongolian reception bureau), responsible for the 
management of chaojin 朝覲 (pilgrimage to the Qing emperor), weilie 圍獵 (imperial 
hunt) and chaogong 朝貢 (tribute) rituals of Inner Mongolian princes. ; 
(c) dianshusi 典屬司 (the Outer Mongolian bureau), similar to the qijisi for Inner 
Mongolian affairs, this bureau was responsible for the administrative affairs relating to 
the Khalkha Mongols, Zunghars, and Tibetans; 
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(d) rouyuansi 柔遠司 (the Outer Mongolian reception bureau), similar to the 
wanghuisi for Inner Mongolian affairs, this bureau handled the reception of Outer 
Mongolian chieftains; 
(e) laiyuansi 徠遠司 (the Eastern Turkestan bureau), responsible for relations 
with Xinjiang; and 
(f) lixingsi 理刑司 (the judicial bureau), responsible for judicial matters 
throughout the Inner Asian frontiers. 
The Lifanyuan zeli 理藩院則例 (Lifanyuan regulations) provided the legal basis 
for the governing of the empire’s Inner Asian frontiers. First compiled in 1696 by order 
of the Kangxi emperor, the zeli was subsequently revised in 1727, 1817 and 1826 
respectively. The Regulations prescribed the treatment of local elites, in particular the 
Mongolian aristocracy, and the powers to be granted to them. Ranks, posts, promotions 
and demotions, salaries, visits to court, ceremonies, banquets, and funerals were all 
meticulously regulated. The Regulations also dealt with the appointment of officials, 
rewards and punishments, military matters, political gatherings of the Mongolian chiefs, 
and, in general, the functions of the military and civil administration. It also fixed the 
punishments for crimes such as robbery, theft, and murder. 
Ning Chia argues that, through its management of Inner Asian rituals of chaojin, 
weilie, and chaogong, the Lifanyuan had redefined the political, cultural and economic 
connections between China proper and Inner Asian societies and these new connections 
had turned the Inner Asian peoples into direct imperial subjects.76 As evidenced by the 
strong support the Mongolian nobles gave the Manchu ruling house and the relatively 
peace in the Mongolian region during most of the Qing rule, the Lifanyuan had indeed 
served as an important and effective link between the Manchus and Mongols. 
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Before 1906, the organization and operations of the Lifanyuan basically reflected 
the imperial ideology of segregating the five peoples of the empire. However, all these 
would have to be changed during the xinzheng period as the major function of its 
successor agent Lifanbu would be the encouragement of large-scale migration of Han 
Chinese commoners to the frontiers. 
(ii) Imperial Residents  
Below the Lifanyuan was a network of imperial residents created by the Manchu 
state in its Inner Asian borderlands, responsible for enforcing Qing policy in their 
jurisdiction. To this end, the Qing created a form of self-government in these regions 
within an imperial judicial and administrative framework without committing large 
numbers of troops or spending large sums of money.77  
In Mongolia, the imperial residents were high officials of the Manchu banners or 
high members of the Mongolian aristocracy. Delegated with military and civilian 
powers, these imperial residents-- jiangjun 將軍 (military governor), dutong 都統 
(lieutenant governor) and dachen 大臣 (amban/official)-- were appointed to supervise 
the banners within their jurisdiction; control Qing garrisons (composed of Manchu, 
Mongol and Han Chinese baqi 八旗 (Eight Banners) units); raise taxes to pay for the 
frontier administration; manage foreign (mainly Russian) relations; and control the 
movement of people across the frontier. 
In Inner Mongolia, Qing administration was placed under the supervision of four 
imperial residents: the jiangjun of Suiyuan, and the dutongs of Hulun Buir, Chahar, and 
Jehol. Technically, the entire territory of Outer Mongolia came under the jurisdiction of 
the jiangjun of Uliastai. In practice, however, by 1800 the amban at Urga--banshi 
dachen 辦事大臣--had general supervision over the eastern part of the territory, while 
the jiangjun of Uliastai was in charge of the western part. In order to strengthen Qing 
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presence in the territory formerly ruled by the Zunghars, another senior official, canzan 
dachen 參贊大臣 was created in 1762 in the region around Kobdo in westernmost 
Outer Mongolia, which had originally been under Uliastai. 
(iii) Banner System 
Like other multiethnic empires, the Qing co-opted the native elites into the local 
administration of its Inner Asian frontiers. In Mongolia, the Qing ruled primarily 
through co-opting the Mongolian elites into the banners, a system that Joseph Fletcher 
argues was another of the three main factors that combined to reinforce the decline of 
the Mongols' once-glorious military power and the decay of the nomadic economy.78 
However, instead of modeling Mongolia’s administration on that of Chinese heartland, 
the banner institutions created by the Manchus managed to preserve many of 
Mongolia’s political, social, and economic traditions. By applying the principle of the 
so-called yin su er zhi 因俗而治 (govern in accordance with customs), the Manchu 
court was able to command the loyalty and support of the Mongolian elites for 
centuries.  
First created by Hung Taiji in 1635 in Inner Mongolia, the banner (qosighus) 
system was a population based political-military organization, which later came to be 
applied to all parts of the Mongolian world that became subjects to the Qing rule.79 The 
system seemed to have worked well with the Mongols, as David M. Farquar observes, 
“there seems to have been virtually no difficulty in establishing the banner system of 
government among them (Mongols), and at no time does Mongolian dissatisfaction with 
Manchu control seem to have derived from this system itself.”80  
                                                      
78 Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c.1800,” p. 51. 
79 David M. Farquhar, “The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” in John K. Fairbank ed., The 
Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), p. 204. 
80 Farquhar, “The Origins of the Manchus’ Mongolian Policy,” p. 204. 
44 
 
  Appointed by the Lifanyuan to rule a banner, the jasak was the central figure in 
the Qing system of indirect rule in Mongolia. Without exception, a jasak was always of 
the lineage of Chinggis Khan or one of his brothers. With his position hereditary, a jasak 
enjoyed, theoretically, almost complete autonomy to act within the boundaries of the 
regulations fixed by the Lifanyuan. His civil responsibilities included the 
recommendation of bannermen for appointment to high office (subject to the 
Lifanyuan’s ratification); the appointment of junior officials, mainly his military and 
civilian assistants (tusalaghci); the supervision of the banner census (which determined 
the number of recruits, taxes, and corvée the banner must supply to the imperial 
government); the collection of tax (rate fixed by the Lifanyuan); the decision (subject to 
appeal to higher authority and the Lifanyuan) in family and criminal law cases; the 
supervision of trade and the property of foreigners (essentially Russians); the 
participation in the league’s triennial assemblies; and the enforcement of the 
observances of the Lamaist church. He also kept watch on movement across the 
borders, maintained the relay stations, and provided horses for travelling officials. His 
military duties included the command of the banner's troops, and the maintenance of 
their weapons and training camps. Naturally, his most important duty was to ensure that 
no seditious activities occurred, for which he would be held responsible and liable for 
punishment. 
 Under Manchu suzerainty, the domains of the banners were redesigned according 
to the strategic interests of the Qing. Also, the Qing court had started a process of 
weakening the Mongols by steadily increasing the number of banners, with each of 
them theoretically of equal standing. As a consequence, powerful aimags (tribes) that 
had once obeyed a single tribal leader now consisted of several separate banners, such 
as the three banners of Kharachin Right, Kharachin Middle, and Kharachin Left. Each 
of the banners had a jasak with autonomy in his own banner and direct responsibility to 
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the Imperial government. For instance, the number of banners in Inner Mongolia during 
the reign of Hung Taiji was eleven, and it grew to forty-nine in Kangxi’s time. In Outer 
Mongolia, the number of banners also increased progressively, as illustrated by the 
following table: 
 





 (Source: Zhao, Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu, p. 81)81 
 Above the banners were leagues (chighulghan or meng), which were formed by 
grouping a number of banners under their jurisdiction. During Qing rule, there were six 
leagues in Inner Mongolia and four leagues in Outer Mongolia (which coincided with 
the four tribes of the region). Each of the leagues bore the name of the place in which it 
held its triennial meetings. The number of banners that composed of a league varied. 
League chiefs (captain generals) were appointed by the emperor from among the 
noblemen of the league upon the recommendation of the Lifanyuan. Traditionally, the 
league chiefs of Outer Mongolia were filled by the four khans of the region. The 
nobility of each league met at their triennial meetings to regulate inter-banner disputes 
and decide criminal cases. The banners were not supposed to communicate with the 
Lifanyuan direct and their submissions had to route through the league chiefs.  
In addition to the ten leagues, there were large areas in Inner and Outer Mongolia, 
such as Dariganga, Chahar, the Alashan territories, the Kobdo frontier and the guard 
post zone (kharagbul-un nutugh) along the Russian border, that were outside the banner 
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system described above, and were known as superintendent banners (bugude darugha) 
or Nei shu Menggu 內屬蒙古 (Court Mongolia)82 For historical reasons, the banners 
of Nei shu Menggu were not ruled by their own hereditary jasak-princes but by imperial 
appointees and, consequently, imperial orders were executed with less opposition in 
these banners. 
The banner system differed widely from the frontier management strategies of 
former dynasties. For instance, under the tributary system of the Ming, the Court could 
not claim to supervise the Mongolian chieftains, nor could it enforce its regulations 
governing taxation and criminal law in the Mongolian land. In contrast, the Qing court, 
through the Lifanyuan, exercised supervision and control over the Mongolian chieftains. 
For one thing, the jasak’s position, though hereditary, had to be approved by the 
emperor upon the recommendation of the Lifanyuan. As a consequence, the social 
position of the jasaks changed decisively because their authority no longer rested on 
traditional canons of legitimacy but on their appointment or recognition by the Manchu 
court. Moreover, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, a jasak had to rule his banner 
within the confines of regulations set by the Lifanyuan. Any abuse of power on the part 
of the jasak would be dealt with harshly by the Qing authorities, who might dismiss him 
outright and strip him of his titles, no matter how august his lineage. In 1800, for 
example, the Qing court dismissed the Sechen Khan Sangjayidorji, a descendant of 
Chinggis Khan, from his position as league chief and deprived him and his descendants 
of their khanship. 
 In contrast to the relatively open (and economically more productive) grazing 
conditions of pre-Qing Mongolia, the Manchus had defined the domain of each banner, 
and carefully fixed and delimited its pasture lands. The purpose of the demarcation was 
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to restrict the Mongols’ freedom of migration, thereby preventing them from expanding 
their power into neighboring banners. (On the other hand, the demarcation could also be 
used to prevent conflicts between banners over pasture lands). By a ruling of 1632, any 
jasak who had exceeded his legal jurisdiction would be liable to a fine. Also, according 
to a regulation made during the Kangxi reign, if any jasak pronounced a death sentence 
without consulting his counterparts of the neighboring banners, he himself would be 
punishable for murder. The judicial powers of individual jasak were further reduced by 
the introduction of the Chinese system of reviewing legal cases at various 
administrative levels. For instance, capital cases had to be referred to the Lifanyuan. By 
the end of the eighteenth century, Mongolian noblemen could make decisions only in 
minor cases; their provisional rulings in more serious cases had to be confirmed at 
higher levels.83  
 As can be seen from the above discussion, the Qing court applied the traditional 
fen er zhi zhi 分而治之 (divide-and-rule) strategy in Mongolia, with its chief aim 
being to prevent the Mongols from re-uniting under a nobleman or a religious figure. 
And this strategy appears to have worked very well since Mongolia remained under 
Qing rule till the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911.  
      
Conclusion  
 From the above discussion, it was clear that Mongolia constituted a key component 
in the Manchu scheme of empire. Politically, Mongolian nobility was part of the Qing 
ruling family. Culturally, Mongolian influence was prevalent in the Manchu imperial 
ideology and institutions, and this was particularly visible during the early period of 
Qing formation. Militarily, the Mongols played an important role in the Manchu 
                                                      
83 Dorothea Heuschert, “Legal Pluralism in the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislation for the Mongols,” The 
International History Review 20, no. 2 (1998), p. 321. 
48 
 
conquest of China proper, and the subsequent suppression of uprisings that broke out in 
China proper. Moreover, the Mongolian region was an important bulwark of the Qing 
empire against external threats from the north.  
 No doubt, the changes brought about by the Qing rule in Mongolia had economic 
as well as social implications. This is one of the issues on which Chinese and Western 
historians have conflicting views. Western and Mongolian historians usually take a 
negative view of the Qing legacy in Mongolia. For instance, Joseph Fletcher argues that 
the nomadic society of Mongolia was in decline in the nineteenth century with many 
Mongols being pauperized.84 M. Sandorj also maintains that Chinese moneylending, 
which flourished under Manchu dominion of Mongolia, ruined the Mongols’ 
subsistence economy and retarded the development of the nation’s productive forces.85 
On the other hand, modern Chinese historians generally take a more benevolent view 
about the impact of Manchu rule on Mongolia, in particular during the early period. 
Zhao Yuntian, for example, argues that the long period of peace and stability brought 
about by the Qing rule in Mongolia promoted the economic and social development of 
the land.86 Clearly, this issue requires further examination and will form the subject of 
the following chapter. 
Finally, Robert A. Rupen observes that “the identical policies proclaimed by the 
Qing court particularly for both Inner and Outer Mongolia often differed in practical 
results.”87 Clearly, the New Policies implemented by the Qing court in the early 
                                                      
84 Joseph Fletcher, “The Heyday of the Ch’ing Order in Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet,” in John K. 
Fairbank ed., The Cambridge History of China, vol. 10, Late Ch’ing, 1900-1911 Part I (Cambridge, 
Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 351.   
85 Sanjdorj, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern Mongolia, p. xiii. 
86 Zhao, Qingdai Menggu Zhengjiao Zhidu, p. 286. 





twentieth century fits Rupen’s observation neatly considering the fact that Outer 
Mongolia attempted to break away from the Manchus as a result, whilst Inner Mongolia 
has continued to remain in China’s fold until today. Precisely how this did happen is the 

























Chapter 2  
Decay of Mongolia in the Nineteenth Century 
 
During the early period of Qing rule in Mongolia, the peace and stability brought 
about by “Pax Manjurica” was conducive to economic recovery in this war-torn region. 
As a result, nomadism began to thrive again in the Mongolian region. In 1705, the 
Kangxi emperor told his ministers, “During my last tour beyond the Great Wall, I saw 
that the mountains and valleys were swamped with livestock. I toured on for eight days 
and herds of livestock seemed endless.”88 Another sign of the revival was that, between 
1728 and 1731, the Qing court was able to requisition a total of 81,000 camels, 148,600 
horses, and 475,000 sheep from Khalkha Mongolia.89  
 However, nomadism was in decline again in Mongolia in the nineteenth century, 
resulting in among others the pauperization of many Mongols. The decline can be 
ascribed to a multitude of factors, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Spread of Agriculture 
Bawden argues that agriculture was an innovation that the conservative Qing court 
pushed in Mongolia for the purpose of supplying its armies and avoiding the long haul 
out of China.90 In fact, historical records show that some Mongols had engaged in 
agriculture on their lands since the Ming period, and that the Mongols living several 
hundred miles northeast of Beijing came to trade with the Chinese for plows and 
seeds.91 In fact, the effect of the Qing subjugation of Mongolia was that, by removing 
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the long-term hostilities between China proper and Mongolia, it further facilitated the 
expansion of agriculture into the region, in particular in Inner Mongolia in the xinzheng 
decade.   
 In addition to supplying the Manchu garrisons stationed in Mongolia as noted by 
Bawden, the Qing court’s promotion of agriculture in the region had other strategic 
considerations. For instance, in the winter of 1698, the Kangxi emperor dispatched 
officials to the banners of Aohan, Naiman and Baarin in eastern Inner Mongolia to 
instruct their people on agrarian matters. He decreed:  
“The lands of the banners of Aohan, Naiman and others are very suitable for 
cultivation of all sorts of grain. At times of harvest, the landless people around the 
Khingan Range can buy grains nearby without the trouble of coming into the borders 
for grains.”92  
No matter what the Qing motive was, agriculture spread in Mongolia during the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, especially in Inner Mongolia. For instance, 
following a 1691 tour of the borderlands, the Kangxi emperor observed, 
 “For the Mongols, agriculture was not their livelihood of subsistence. Now that 
peace has been extant for such a long time, everywhere I visited I could see that they 
(the Mongols) had transformed the hillsides into farmlands. After sowing seeds they 
would go elsewhere to pasture their animals and come back in autumn for the 
harvest.”93  
Actually, the Qing court seemed to recognize the merits of cross-border cultivation. 
For instance, in 1712, the Kangxi emperor remarked,  
“Now that land is scarce and the population is dense, many people from different 
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places have moved across the borders for accommodation and cultivation. In recent 
years, there have been good harvests (beyond the borders). All the people in the Capital 
city and nearby areas, who also rely on these grains, are thus greatly benefitted.”94  
Apart from teaching the Mongols cultivation, the Qing court also, from time to 
time, acquiesced in Han Chinese farmers tilling on the Mongolian lands. Nevertheless, 
cross-border cultivation was in contradiction to the traditional Manchu policy, which 
could be dated as early as 1655, that sought to restrict the contact between the Mongols 
and Han Chinese, in particular the prevention of large scale Han Chinese migration to 
the Mongolian region. However, deviations from and abandonment of the established 
policy, I would argue, were inevitable because of several factors at work. First among 
these factors was the steady growth of Han Chinese population in the heartland, which 
eventually led to outward migration to the borderlands. As the Kangxi emperor noted in 
1716,  
“Now that peace has been in existence for a long time, the population has 
continued to grow, yet there has been no increase in the area of farmlands (in the 
heartland)….Some suggest that more lands should be reclaimed for cultivation, but they 
do not realize that there is no reclaimable land in the heartland. Today, there are many 
people who make their living by tilling lands beyond the Pass.”95  
In the years that followed, the population growth continued steadily. According to 
the Qianlong emperor’s estimate, the population of China proper had grown over 15-
fold from the Kangxi reign up to his time, from 23,312,200 people as at 1710 to 
3,007,467,000 people as at 1782.96 The trend remained unabated since then. According 
to another estimate, during the 100-odd years from 1741 up to 1850, the empire’s 
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population had grown from 0.14 billion to 0.43 billion.97 With the spectacular growth in 
population in China proper whilst the increase of farmlands failed to catch up, the only 
logical development was the outward expansion of Han Chinese to the frontier regions, 
including Mongolia in the north.  
Another factor that further contributed to the migration of Han Chinese farmers to 
Mongolia was the frequent outbreak of natural disasters in northern China. Historical 
records showed that, throughout the Qing rule, natural disasters and famines erupted 
incessantly in the northern provinces of Zhili, Henan, and Shandong. As the Qianlong 
emperor observed, “On the occasion of famines, the common people would have 
nothing to rely on. They either move to the Yangzi and Huaihe rivers in the south, or 
journeyed beyond the Pass in the north.”98 In the event of natural disasters and famines, 
the State would, as a stopgap measure, turned a blind eye when Han Chinese farmers 
who lost their lands and livelihood in the affected areas migrated to the Mongolian lands 
to make a living. For example, when the Yellow River inundated Beijing and the Zhili 
province in 1723, the Yongzheng emperor ordered that victims of the flood be allowed 
to cultivate on Mongolian lands, and the Court asked the Mongolian banners to shelter 
these victims.99 This policy shift, known as jiediyangmin 借地養民 (Feeding the 
people on borrowed lands) in history, was regarded as a landmark in the State’s 
utilization of Mongolian resources to resolve crises in the heartland. In 1743, when a 
drought hit Tianjin, Shandong, and Henan, the Qianlong emperor ordered the officials at 
the border check-points to relax their control by allowing Han Chinese farmers to make 
a living in Mongolia, fearing that social unrest might arise if the restriction was 
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vigorously enforced.100  
At the same time, some Mongols also welcomed cross-border cultivation by Han 
Chinese farmers with a view to boosting their incomes. For example, in 1732, the 
Mongols of famine-stricken Ordos petitioned the Court to allow them to lease their 
lands to Han Chinese farmers so that they could collect rents in return. Moreover, in 
order to increase their revenue to cover their growing expenditure, those Mongolian 
princes whose territories were favorably situated began to set aside part of their lands 
and arrange for Han Chinese tenants to cultivate them.101 By the year of 1749, there 
were tens of thousands of Han Chinese farmers in the three Kharachin Banners in Inner 
Mongolia.102 As the Jiaqing emperor aptly remarked, 
“Had those (Mongolian) princes and dukes not recruited the (Han Chinese) farmers 
and provided them with lands for tilling, they (the farmers) would have nothing to live 
on, and would not have remained in the frontiers for long. Therefore, the existence of 
large numbers of drifters who had journeyed beyond the Pass was caused by those 
princes’ and dukes’ recruitment of farmers for land cultivation.”103  
The spread of agriculture and Han Chinese settlements were not confined to Inner 
Mongolia only. Han Chinese agricultural settlements could also be found in Khalkha 
Mongolia, even in the areas bordering Russia. A.M. Pozdneyev, who journeyed to Outer 
Mongolia in 1892, noted in his diary the following: 
“As we approached Mt. Bain-ulaan (the westernmost part of Outer Mongolia), 
which is also called Bain-khangai, we began to see the fields of the Chinese, and 
beyond them we came upon their settlements. According to the accounts of the local 
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Mongols, there are, generally speaking, a large number of Chinese farmers living in the 
valley of Kharaa River, and they sow wheat extensively, renting their land from the 
Mongol hoshuns (banners). The Chinese engage very little in tilling the soil, and all 
operations on their fields are done by Mongols.”104  
Despite the above deviations, the Court’s basic policy towards Han Chinese 
immigration and cultivation in Mongolia remained negative, culminating in an order by 
the Qianlong emperor in 1748 that prohibited further cultivation in the region. The 
emperor decreed, 
“Under the old Mongolian customs, its people would search for lands with water 
and grass for livestock breeding, unlike the people of the heartland who rely on tilling 
the fields. During the Kangxi years, the jasaks of Kharachin and other banners, because 
of the vastness of their lands, often enlisted farmers (from the heartland) to till their 
lands. These farmers would exit through kouwai 口外 (beyond Zhangjiakou) in spring 
to till the lands and would be sent back home in winter. As a consequence, the Mongols, 
desiring the profits incurred from rents, allowed the outsiders to stay, and the latter’s 
number has reached tens of thousands by now. The Mongols gradually rented out their 
lands cheaply, resulting in the loss of pasturelands and that of their livelihood of 
subsistence.”105  
Apparently, the jasaks in question were more interested in boosting their income 
from renting out their land than protecting pasturelands for their subjects. The emperor 
therefore dispatched officials to the banners in question to arrange for redemption of the 
lands that had been rented out to Han Chinese farmers, and then repatriated the latter 
home. Similar prohibitions were repeatedly issued in subsequent reigns. However, 
history shows that the repatriation policy was not consistently executed, probably out of 
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practical consideration. For example, in 1806, the Jiaqing emperor decreed, 
“Over the past few years, refugees have continued to go there (Gorlos Banners) to 
open lands for cultivation, and their number has grown to over 7,000. If we expel all of 
them now, these unemployed people will lose their means of living immediately and 
end up in a miserable state. I therefore decide that they be permitted to remain there.”106  
With State connivance and inconsistent enforcement actions, the number of Han 
Chinese agricultural settlements, legal or otherwise, grew steadily in the Mongolian 
region. An indication of the proliferation of Chinese settlers was that, in 1791, the jasak 
of Gorlos petitioned the Qing government to legalize the status of the numerous 
Shandong and Zhili peasants who had already settled there. In 1799, the State had 
finally accepted what had by then become an accomplished fact by creating a sub-
prefecture to administer the settlers under the civil jurisdiction. 
  As the Qianlong emperor rightly observed, the expansion of agricultural 
settlements was made at the expense of the grazing areas for the Mongols’ livestock. 
For example, in the Josotu league of Inner Mongolia alone, the total area of land that 
had been leased to Han Chinese farmers for cultivation had increased from 36046.71 
qing 頃107 in 1760 to 40293.05 qing in 1813.108 By the end of the nineteenth century, 
the primary economic form of most banners in Juu Uda and Josotu leagues had changed 
from animal husbandry to agriculture, half of the banners in the Jirem league were 
cultivated. In Chahar, Tumed and the two leagues of Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab, the role of 
agriculture also became increasingly important.109 
   Naturally, the reduction of pasturelands would substantially affect Mongolia's 
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traditional nomadism. With Han Chinese farmers taking up the better grazing fields for 
cultivation, Mongolian herdsmen would be forced to move their animals to inferior 
pastures and their livelihood was thus affected. As a result, impoverished Mongols who 
could no longer make a living as herdsmen became tenant farmers, renting farmlands 
from their banner princes or from Han Chinese merchant landlords.  
 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, one of the important reforms of the late Qing 
xinzheng was the extensive opening of potential agrarian lands in the Mongolian region 
for Han Chinese settlers. This not only represented an official change to the earlier 
policy of protecting Mongolia from Han Chinese penetration, but also threatened to 
substantially change the nomadism of the region, and encroached upon the vested 
interest of many Mongolian landlords. As a consequence, the reform alienated many 
Mongols, and would eventually lead to uprisings in Inner Mongolia and the declaration 
of independence by Outer Mongolia.   
 
Penetration of Han Chinese Trade  
 As noted in the previous chapter, Joseph Fletcher argues that many Mongols 
became pauperized in the nineteenth century under the Qing rule. In this connection, 
Sanjdorj argues that it was Chinese moneylending, spreading simultaneously with the 
penetration of Chinese trade in the region, which gripped the Mongolian economy and 
retarded the development of the region’s productive force.110 
 For the nomadic Mongols, trade with neighboring China was quite indispensable 
as the latter was a source for flour, tobacco, tea, and handicraft products, all of which 
the Mongols could not produce by themselves. During the Ming and early Qing periods, 
Mongolian trade missions would seek permission from Chinese rulers to come down 
into China, either in the frontiers (known as Biankouhushi 邊口互市) or sometimes to 
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Beijing (known as Jingshihushi 京師互市), to exchange their horses for Chinese 
agricultural and handicraft products. However, a different trading relation emerged 
thereafter, whereby the Mongols no longer brought their animals down into China but 
traded with Han Chinese traders, known as Bianshang 邊商 or Lumengshang 旅蒙商, 
who had traveled from China proper to Mongolia to conduct business.  
The change first occurred in Inner Mongolia, following its subjugation by the 
Manchus in 1636. In order to win over the Inner Mongolian elites, the imperial court 
allowed Han Chinese traders to trade with Mongols at the border town of Zhangjiakou, 
or towns like Guihua, and Dolon Nor in Inner Mongolia since the early Qing period. For 
lack of source materials, it is impossible to determine exactly when similar change took 
place in Outer Mongolia. In this regard, I would subscribe to the views put forth by 
Bawden and Sanjdorj, who surmised that Han Chinese traders probably first entered 
Khalkha Mongolia in the wake of the Qing forces sent in 1696 by the Kangxi emperor 
to bring about the final defeat of Galdan.111 This could be collaborated by an order 
issued by the Kangxi emperor, who said, “The traders who followed the army are 
indispensable….and should be allowed to trade (with the Mongols on the way).”112  
During the early years, most of the Han Chinese traders were seasonal, and they 
traded around the bigger population centres in Mongolia, such as the monasteries and 
the Manchu army camps, before returning to the Chinese heartland. By the eighteenth 
century, the presence of Han Chinese merchants in Mongolia was so conspicuous that it 
started to attract official attention. For example, Sanjdorj reckoned that there were over 
1,000 Han Chinese traders in Urga alone in the middle of the century.113 In the towns of 
Guihua and Suiyuan in 1776, the number Han Chinese shops amounted to 140 and 80 
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respectively.114 Similar to its handling of Han Chinese farmers tilling on Mongolian 
lands, the state sought to manage and control the outflow of Han Chinese traders to 
Mongolia by means of, among others, a permit system. 
The permit system was first implemented in Inner Mongolia before the turn of the 
eighteenth century and was extended to Outer Mongolia around 1720.115 Under the 
system, a Han Chinese trader had to apply to the Lifanyuan, through the offices at 
Chahar, Dolon Nor, or Suiyuan, for a piao 票 (permit) before he could trade at 
designated places in Mongolia. The number of traders and hired hands (maximum ten 
men), the goods to be imported and their quantity (maximum 20 cart-loads), and their 
destinations were specified on the permits in Manchu, Han, and Mongolian languages. 
The import of certain items (such as cast-iron kettles, needles, scissors, knives, etc.) that 
the Mongols might convert into weapons was forbidden. Before a year was up, the 
traders had to leave Mongolia and return their permits to the issuing offices. If a trader 
obeyed the regulations, he could get a new permit and go to Mongolia again. If he was 
found to have violated any of the regulations, the permit would be rescinded and he 
would be punished. 
The Han Chinese traders were under strict control once inside Mongolia. They 
were not allowed to marry Mongolian women. They could not stay overnight in 
Mongolian tents, or even make long visits during the day. They were not allowed to 
erect permanent buildings outside the trade town. When trading in the banners they 
were only allowed to live in a cloth tent, not a felt tent.    
 Obviously, the permit system was aimed at preventing Han Chinese traders from 
establishing close relationships inside Mongolia, or remained in the region for a long 
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time. However, there were so many opportunities for evasion that it had no lasting 
effect on the penetration of Han Chinese trade in Mongolia. As early as 1725, the first 
permanent Chinese shop was established in Urga, whilst periodic checks disclosed large 
numbers of illicit traders in the region. In 1792 there were, for instance, 214 permits due 
at Dolon Nor that had not been returned. Permits were specifically checked in the years 
from 1775 to 1781 and many Han Chinese expelled, but by 1800 a register of Han 
Chinese trading in Mongolia not only showed that they were there in large numbers—as 
many as two hundred in one banner—but that a high percentage had never bothered to 
get a permit at all. Ten out of twenty-seven in one banner were trading without permits, 
and so were thirty-three out of sixty-six shops.116  
 Similarly, the regulations forbidding mixed marriages were often evaded. In 1805, 
the general of Uliastai decreed that those traders who were to be expelled from 
Mongolia for trading without a permit and who were married might take their families 
with them if they wished. Otherwise, the families were to return to their original 
banners. From this it is perfectly clear that Mongolian wives and mixed children were 
involved, and that a blind eye was usually turned to the situation.117  
 
Management of Han Chinese migrants 
 With the continuous inflow of Han Chinese farmers and traders, Chinese 
settlements began to grow in the Mongolian region, in particular in eastern Inner 
Mongolia. In the circumstances, it became increasingly necessary for the State to 
appoint officials at such spots to manage these Han Chinese migrants, who were 
different from the Mongols ethnically and culturally, and subject to a different judicial 
system from the latter. In 1719, in response to an enquiry from a Kharachin prince, the 
                                                      
116 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, pp. 96-97. 
117 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 98. 
61 
 
Lifanyuan, for the first time in Qing history, posted one lishi siyuan 理事司員 
(executive) at each of the three Kharachin Banners and the two Tumed Banners, and 
they were tasked with managing the Han Chinese farmers and traders at those 
banners.118 In addition, these lishi siyuan were also responsible for collecting and 
distributing levies and rents, and deciding disputes between Mongols and Han Chinese. 
Similar appointments of executives were made in Urga and other important towns in 
Outer Mongolia, such as Kyakhta and Uliastai in the 1720s. In 1723, the first ting 廳 
(sub-prefecture), under the direct supervision of the state, was established in Jehol in 
eastern Inner Mongolia as an administrative jurisdiction for Han Chinese migrants. In 
the years that followed, other levels of administrative jurisdiction that prevailed in 
China proper, namely fu 府 (prefecture), zhou 州 (department) and xian 縣 (county) 
were also set up in Inner Mongolia. All told, the State had established three fu, one 
zhou, eleven ting, and eight xian in Inner Mongolia up to the eve of the xinzhing 
period.119   
  The above measures were small innovations introduced to meet practical needs of 
the time. However, as Chapter 4 will show, these inventions would evolve into major 
reform measures during the xinzheng period. And these measures also had serious 
implication upon the Qing governance of Mongolia. For one thing, these lishi siyuan, by 
their nature of duties, were open to bribery and corruption. As such, they were highly 
profitable and could be sold at high prices in Beijing, ranging from 5,000 to 200,000 
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taels of silver.120 As a consequence, corruption was rampant in the Qing administration 
of Mongolia, thus causing serious dissatisfactions among the Mongols with the Qing 
rule. Moreover, the dual management system in Mongolian lands led to tussles between 
local officials of the State and Mongolian banner chiefs because each of them would 
shield the subjects under their respective jurisdiction, thereby “impeding the conduct of 
official business.”121 As Chapter 4 will show, the expansion of Chinese style 
administration in Mongolia during the xinzheng period further undermined the power 
bases of the Mongolian jasaks and princes, and led to the fragmentation of the affected 
leagues’ and banners’ territories. 
 
Han Chinese Moneylending and Mongolian Poverty  
From the above discussion, it is clear that the Qing court’s control measures failed 
to restrict and control the penetration of Han Chinese trade into the region. As a 
consequence, Han Chinese trade and moneylending spread from the trading towns to the 
banners in the late eighteenth century. In this regard, Sanjdorj argued that it was the 
protection, encouragement and participation of Manchu high-ranking officials and 
Mongol feudal lords (who had investments in the stock of Chinese shops or were in debt 
to Chinese moneylenders) that greatly developed and strengthened Chinese 
moneylending in Mongolia.122  
 Moneylending, which was prevalent in nineteenth century Mongolia, was already 
known in the eighteenth century. The flourishing of moneylending was, in part, resultant 
from the standard business practice between the Mongols and Han Chinese traders, i.e. 
credit trading, that had existed since the seventeenth century. The Mongols sold their 
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livestock and by-products (e.g. meat, wool, and furs) to Han Chinese traders in 
exchange for necessities (such as flour, grain, and clothing, etc.) and other manufactured 
goods. However, the supply of their livestock and products were seasonally-fluctuating 
and the Mongols were usually keen to unload their goods as quickly as possible, 
whereas their demands for necessities were regular and immediate. As a result, the 
Mongols often had to buy their necessities first on credit and then pay back later in raw 
materials. However, more often than not, a Mongol who had thus got into debt used 
most of the raw materials he produced to pay his old debts and had no choice but to 
incur a new debt in order to buy the necessities of life. As the jiangjun of Uliastai 
Tsevdenjav noted in a letter to the Lifanyuan in 1757, 
 “The (Han Chinese) traders sold on credits to the Mongols and the Mongols took 
advantage of not having to pay ready cash and livestock, and disregarded the high 
prices. Later on, when the debtors collected their debts, the Mongols had to pay with all 
their property…”123  
 Yet, it was the Mongols’ heavy obligation to pay taxes, or to find money to 
commute their corvées that involved them most heavily in debt. On the face of it, the 
Manchus did not demand heavy taxes from the Mongols. Theoretically, the rate of taxes, 
which were firstly paid in kind but later in silver, was not high and most of what was 
extracted from the Mongols was destined for expenses incurred in supporting the 
Manchu administration in Mongolia. However, the taxes and corvées, if commuted, cost 
far more than their true rate and thus became heavy and burdensome on the Mongols, as 
well as a drag on Mongolia’s economic development. For example, one of the taxes to 
be levied was the “Nine Whites” that the four khans and the Khutuktu of Outer 
Mongolia had to present to the emperor annually. In reality, the actual tribute consisted 
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of much more than the notional nine animals since they had to offer groups of animals, 
together with all sorts of precious gifts and rarities (silver Buddhas, scriptures written in 
gold, etc.). What was more burdensome than the gifts themselves was the expense of 
getting the tribute missions to Beijing, maintaining them there and bribing the 
officialdom, which could run up to half a million taels of silver and the services of 
1,500 men.124  
Corvées included all types of official duties the Mongols had to perform for the 
Manchu administration in Mongolia, such as providing the Manchu army with 
provisions and transport for its goods and its soldiers, manning the postal relay stations 
and financing the frontier watch posts, and providing the expenses of the Manchus 
officers in Mongolia. These corvées, whose number increased and scope extended over 
time, became very heavy demands on Mongolia’s resources. According to one estimate, 
the main imperial relays and the services within each individual banner accounted for as 
many as three million head of animals in a year.125 The Mongols, who were often short 
of ready cash, horses, livestock and provisions for executing such duties, had to turn to 
the Han Chinese traders for assistance as the latter operated an elementary banking 
system in the region. On occasions, competitions among Han Chinese traders for 
Mongolian clients would lead to the former making minor concessions (e.g. reduction 
of goods prices relative to other shops or slight extension of interest-free periods of 
loans, etc.) to the latter. For example, a relay office of the Tiisiyetii Khan aimag 
petitioned the league chief in 1803 for permission to sever its clientship with the Han 
Chinese trader Dashengkui 大盛魁 one of the most important Chinese trading firms 
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with Outer Mongolia, in favour of another Chinese shop Badar because of the goods 
prices differential between the two shops: 
“When in aimag settlements we were unable to make deliveries on time to the 
army bases in Uliastai, we bought the extra, urgently-needed horses, camels and other 
items from Dashengkui in accordance with the “clientship” contract. But we found that 
their weights were unjust, and too often they rejected the silver as being unpure. As for 
charging interest, they did not even delay one day but wanted to start charging 
immediately. Therefore, we talked with the Chinese Vanchin and Banyandorj of the 
shop Badar, of which we were once ‘clients’, about establishing a new ‘clientship’…We 
will wait for your instructions on whether or not we may establish a ‘clientship’ with 
Badar.”126  
 According to Manchu laws and regulations, the interest on loans could not exceed 
3 per cent per month or 36 per cent annually, and that it could not in total exceed the 
original loan. Consequently, the duration of loan repayment should not exceed three 
years. If a debtor, either private or official, could not pay a debt within three years, the 
interest would be added to the original debt, the total would become a new debt and the 
repayment period would be extended. If the debtor could not repay during this extended 
period, the interest would again be added to the original debt to be rolled over into 
another new debt agreement, with the repayment period extended. Thus, year after year 
the interest on one debt multiplied, and the interest became a loan which also drew 
interest. If one could not pay off a debt within a given time, the interest on the interest 
multiplied and became almost impossible to repay. For example, in 1810, a Mongolian 
prince Tserennamjil took a loan of 600 taels of silver at 36 per cent interest per year. 
After a year, his loan plus interest totaled 816 taels, of which he paid 290 taels and left 
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526 owning. By 1816, with the growth of interest, these 526 taels had become 1,871.127  
Therefore, no Mongolian debtors, whether private or official, were able to pay their 
debts on time and consequently became endless debtors to the Han Chinese traders by 
taking new loans when their debts were still unpaid. Scattered records give us a glimpse 
of the magnitude of private debts in Qing Mongolia: In 1802, the private debts of a 
certain banner in the Tiisiyetii Khanate amounted to three horses, 219 cows, 36 sheep 
and goats, 828 squirrel furs, 5,689 qian (equal to 5 grams) of grain, 509 qian of flour, 
21,272 bricks of tea, and 165 pieces of raw hide.128 Similarly, official debts also grew 
dramatically during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1757, the outstanding 
official debts of the four khanates in Outer Mongolia reached 150,000 taels of silver; by 
1775, it had reached 200,000 taels. In 1855, the official debt of Tiisiyetii Khanate alone 
was 727,000; in 1884, Tiisiyetii Khanate and Sechen Khanate each had debts of over 
960,000 taels, whilst the debts of Sayin Noyan Khanate amounted to 300,000 taels.129 
In 1911, the average debt for each banner was 11 million taels. By 1912, Dashengkui 
took away 500,000 sheep and 70,000 horses from Outer Mongolia yearly as interest 
alone.130 No wonder that Mongolian scholars like Sanjdorj consider that Chinese trade 
and moneylending not only ruined the Mongols’ subsistence economy, but also slowed 
down the development of the region’s productive force.   
While many Mongolian noblemen were in debt to Han Chinese traders, it was the 
commoners who bore the blunt of the financial burdens. Since the subjugation of 
Mongolia to the Manchus, the commoners, in addition to traditional service and taxes 
owed to their lords, had to support their lords’ frequent and expensive trips to Beijing 
and Chengde, and finance their extravagant lifestyle in the Capital, etc. Furthermore, it 
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was also commonplace that many noblemen exacted illegally from their subjects and 
asked the latter to pay their private debts. For example, one jasak of Tiisiyetii Khanate 
took one sheep in ten (the official rate was one sheep in twenty annually) from the 
people of his banner, and levied taxes in tea on herds smaller than this. In three years at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, his exaction in kind could be calculated at over 
6,700 taels of silver, while he also exacted over 21,000 taels to pay his private debts to 
the Chinese shops.131 Many commoners were impoverished as a result and were led to 
vagrancy since they were unable to pay taxes or even make a living in the banner 
territories. No doubt, the hefty financial burdens imposed the Mongolian commoners 
led to their resentments against Han Chinese traders, their Mongolian lords, and finally 
the Manchu rule. 
 
Growth of Monastic Establishment and Wealth 
 Douglas Carruthers, who journeyed to Mongolia in 1910, opined that the influence 
of Lamaism was, among others, the chief cause of the poverty-stricken state of the 
Mongolian nomad tribes.132 Similarly, Bawden argued, rather provocatively, that 
Lamaism, morally and materially, the curse of Mongolia.133 In the following 
paragraphs, I will concentrate on the material impact of the growth of Lamaism during 
the nineteenth century upon Mongolian economy and society. 
 As noted in Chapter 1, the influence of Lamaism grew rapidly under Qing 
patronage. Increase in the number of monasteries aside, the growth was also manifest in 
the lama population. Wu Luzhen, who joined Prince Su’s entourage during the latter’s 
investigation trip to Eastern Inner Mongolia in 1906, observed,  
                                                      
131 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 150. 
132 Douglas Carruthers, Unknown Mongolia: A Record of Travel and Exploration in North-West 
Mongolia and Dzungaria, 1914 (reprinted New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1994), p. 314. 
133 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 160. 
68 
 
“Lamaism was prosperous. There are monasteries in every banner. Every banner 
has 4-5 monasteries, and countless temples. The number of lamas (in different temples) 
varies, ranging from around 700 on the high side, to some 400 on the low side. 
Generally speaking, there are over 1,000 lamas in each banner, or one quarter of its 
male population.”134   On the number of lamas, James Gilmour, a Scottish missionary 
who spent 12 years in Mongolia during the nineteenth century, was inclined to think 
that 60 % of the Mongolian male population was quite a moderate estimate.135  In the 
monastery of Amur-Bayasqulangtu in Khalkha Mongolia alone, Pozdneyev reckoned 
that the total number of lamas stood at two thousand or more.136 While all the above 
figures were based on personal impression and hence lacked any scientific basis, it was 
nevertheless beyond doubt that the lama population in Mongolia was huge and it 
continued to grow so that, in 1918, there were 84,268 lamas and novices out of 207,227 
males in the four khanates of Outer Mongolia, or nearly 41% of the male population.137 
Though some scholars such as Bawden would argue that the monasteries in nineteenth 
century Mongolia offered the only alternative way of life to absorb the surplus 
manpower no longer needed in the region’s cattle-rearing economy,138 that such a large 
proportion of the male population had been withdrawn from productive labor was 
undoubtedly a drag on the region’s economy. 
In Qing Mongolia, every family would try to send one of its sons into a monastery, 
thus providing a constant source for lamas. This could be ascribed to the Mongols’ piety 
as well as their poverty (since the material conditions for lamas were generally better 
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than for laymen). Moreover, a monastery was the only place where a commoner could 
receive education and, given the very nature of the church as a celibate society, it 
provided a certain measure of social mobility for talented young men. Lastly, as Wu 
Luzhen noted, “once a man was registered as a lama, he would be exempted from 
corvées (and taxes).”139 As a result of these factors, the number of lamas continued to 
grow steadily.  
 Exemption from state taxes and corvées aside, a lama was also eligible to receive 
stipends from the state. The Qing court stipulated that all registered lamas would 
receive stipends from the local banners regularly. However, there was great disparity in 
the value of the stipend that a lama would receive, subject not only to his rank in the 
monastic hierarchy but also to the financial condition of the banner from which he 
came. For instance, according to the record of the Koke Sume of Dolon Nor in 1878, the 
stipends paid to the lamas varied from sixty-two taels to thirty-four taels annually.140 
The difference continued to widen throughout the nineteenth century and, in the end, 
low-ranking monks often found that they could not survive on what they received, and 
had to rely on family support (if the monastery he served was close to his home) or 
resort to begging or theft to stay alive. 
 The Lamaist monasteries’ property, most of which came from donations from 
noblemen and commoners alike, mainly consisted of shabinar or shabis, animals and 
land. Shabis were mainly donated to a monastery by Mongolian noblemen. Like the 
lamas, shabis would be exempted from most state taxes and corvées. Similarly, the 
number of shabis increased steadily. In Outer Mongolia, the total number of shabis 
increased from 30,000 in 1750 to 50,000 in 1810, to 70,000 in 1862, and to about 
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100,000 in 1911.141 
 Through labor and taxation the shabis provided the economic base of the church. 
They herded the monastery cattle and provided various regular services for the church, 
such as the repair of temples, financing religious services, etc. Apart from regular 
obligations, the shabis had to cope with the many periodic demands that were made on 
them, such as shouldering the greater part of the cost of the obsequies of a deceased 
Khutuktu, and that of the escort of a new Khutuktu from Tibet to Urga, etc.142 The 
growth of these services became a heavy burden on the shabis. As far back as 1785, 
there were nearly 4,000 shabi-families without cattle of their own, amounting to almost 
22 thousand individuals.143 Performing services aside, the affluent shabis were also 
required to pay direct taxes to the church. With the sharp rise in taxation towards the 
end of the nineteenth century and its inflated computation in terms of silver, the burden 
on the shabis was no lighter than the rest of the commoners.  
 Animals constituted another important component of the church’s property. Since 
the church was exempted from taxation, the number of the church’s animals increased 
steadily though they were subject to the same natural hazards and calamities as those of 
the ordinary people. For instance, in 1918 in Outer Mongolia, the number of animals 
owned by the monasteries was as follows: 
 Horses Camels Cattle Sheep/Goats 
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(Source: Maiskii, Mongolia on the Eve of the Revolution, pp. 302-303)144  
The above figures did not include the large number of herds owned by the high lamas 
personally. In 1918, while the average number of animals owned by one monastery or 
temple was 662, it was 2370.7 for the household of a high lama, and only 60 for a 
commoner household.145  
 Lands provided the monasteries with another source of revenue. According to Wu 
Luzhen’s report, “(The monasteries) have purchased plenty of lands near the (Chinese) 
border. The temples in the banners of Horqin and Aohan own lands as far as the banners 
of Jasaghtu and Gorlos. Uncultivated areas are turned to pasturelands for profits.”146 As 
for arable lands, the monasteries would either rent them out to Chinese farmers or 
cultivate them with their own shabis. 
 Following the penetration of Han Chinese trade and development of commerce 
into Mongolia, the monasteries became involved in various commercial activities (such 
as trading in livestock, renting out farmlands and pasturelands, running caravans, etc.) 
and even engaged in usurious lending. With the transition to a money economy in the 
nineteenth century, usury became a much more important feature of the monasteries’ 
financial activities. Surviving accounts show that Urga was engaging officially in usury 
by the end of the eighteenth century. For instance, a monastery fund in Urga collected 
9,556 bricks of tea as interest alone on items sold earlier on credit, and in 1882 it 
collected 12,665 bricks.147 During the early period, a comparatively modest rate of 
interest was being charged: in 1799, for instance, a rate of one per cent per month on a 
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loan of one thousand taels. The rates rose as silver became more sought after, as much 
as one hundred per cent per annum, and in some cases a rate of two hundred per cent.148  
 
Conclusion 
 The early Qing policy towards Mongolia was basically conservative, in that the 
Court not only discouraged the Mongols from intermingling with the Chinese from the 
heartland, but it also strove to maintain the Mongolian economy and society intact. One 
of the examples was the so-called Gold Watch-posts that were set up within Mongolia 
to prevent the exploitation of the region’s rich mineral resources. However, as the above 
discussion shows, the policy failed to achieve its goals. Instead, we witness economic 
and social decay of Mongolia during the nineteenth century, mainly as a result of 
oppressive taxation, Chinese settlement, shrinkage of pasturelands, unpayable debts and 
abuses of banner princes’ authority. 
 The following conversation between the tuslagch (second-ranking official) of the 
Tserendondov banner and Pozdneyev vividly describes the financial burdens of a 
Mongolian banner under Qing rule in the nineteenth century: 
 “Our khushuu (banner) now has to supply over 1,000 taels of silver, and goods for 
military provisions and other needs worth 13,000 bricks of tea, to the regular rotation 
service office attached to the office of the chief of the aimag (tribe). We also have to 
supply eight geldings and one camel for official transport for the office of the league 
and the office of the Imperial Resident in Khuree (Urga). People from our khushuu also 
serve at the twenty Khalkha relay stations. Our khushuu supplies 100 soldiers attached 
to the Khiagt (Kyakhta) judge’s office. Our khushuu has actually borrowed over 10,000 
taels of silver with interest for official use from over seventy Chinese traders such as 
Tumenjargal, Buyant, Ta Sheng-k’uei (Dashengkui), Puntsag, and Dash from Peking 
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(Beijing), Khuree (Urga), Uliasutai (Uliastai), and Khiagt (Kyakhta), and from some 
Mongols as well. Our khushuu also borrowed over 10,000 taels of silver from other 
khushuus in this aimag for official use. Even if we sell the clothes off our backs and go 
naked, we shall never be able to pay all the debts and official taxes.”149  
The conversation is quoted at some length as it shows the real condition of a 
banner under onerous state taxation and corvées. Besides, the general indebtedness of 
the Mongols to foreign traders allowed the latter to take enormous quantities of wealth, 
mainly livestock and by-products, out of Mongolia annually. According to one official 
document, nine Chinese shops alone took 270,000 sheep, 6,700 horses, 1,000 cows, and 
6,000 camels, as well as wool and furs from Mongolia. Shishmarev, the Russian consul 
in Urga, estimated that Chinese traders took about 25,000 horses, 10,000 cows and 
250,000 sheep from the area of Urga alone every year.150 Since livestock was the main 
source of wealth of Mongolia, the removal of large quantities of livestock naturally 
ruined the Mongols’ livelihood and retarded the growth of the region’s economy. 
 It was the ordinary people, namely the commoners, shabis and low-ranking lamas, 
who were most affected by the deterioration of social and economic conditions. For one 
thing, there was little they could do to protect themselves against the exorbitant 
taxation, levies and exactions imposed by banner princes or the monasteries. Besides, 
they were ultimately made responsible for the arduous burden of debts, whether it was 
their personal debts, the personal debts of their lords, or official debts incurred on behalf 
of the banner as a whole. By 1855, it was calculated that there were 32,000 paupers in 
Tiisiyetii Khan aimag, with some five thousand people on the verge of death by 
starvation, out of a total population not much over half a million in Mongolia. By 1884 
or 1885 the number of paupers in Tiisiyetii Khan aimag and Sechen Khan aimag 
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together had risen to nearly 71,000. In 1896 the office of one banner in Sechen Khan 
aimag reported to the League that people were so destitute, taijis and commoners alike, 
that they had nothing to live on, let alone anything with which to pay their taxes, debt-
interest, and corvée-substitute.151 Those unable to subsist in the banners or the 
monasteries took flight to the growing trade-monastery-garrison centres, such as the 
frontier cities of Inner Mongolia, as well as Urga, Uliastai, Kobdo, and Kyakhta in 
Outer Mongolia, where they became a kind of semi-criminal working class who lived 
by primitive skilled or unskilled labour, prostitution, begging, and robbery. 
  As a consequence, popular resentment against Chinese traders and settlers began to 
emerge. Such sentiment sometimes boiled over, as in Outer Mongolia in 1829 and 1887, 
when lamas at temple dances beat up Chinese spectators and soldiers. Sentiments 
against Qing rule and greedy Mongolian noblemen also boiled over in the late 
nineteenth century. Some primary sources released in the 1970s point to the occurrence 
of insurrections in Inner Mongolia in 1861, 1864, 1870, 1890, 1899 and 1901.152 
However, as these uprisings were short-lived and localized, they failed to form a 
nationwide movement against the Qing rule—evidence of the success of the Manchus’ 
divide-and-rule policy.  
 For historical and geographical reasons, Inner Mongolia’s relationship with the 
Manchu ruling house and China was closer than that of Outer Mongolia. Qing control in 
Inner Mongolia was tighter than that in Outer Mongolia. Penetration of Han Chinese 
influence in Inner Mongolia advanced more quickly than was the case north of the 
Gobi. All these had implications upon the developments in the two areas during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Mongolian history, leading to the suggestion that 
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it was Inner Mongolia that showed the way and that it was Outer Mongolia that 
followed. This pattern will be examined more closely in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 In the following chapter, I will briefly survey the Russian presence in Mongolia 
since the early seventeenth century, and how it evolved into a threat to the Qing 
empire’s northern border in the nineteenth century, thereby affecting the implementation 























Chapter 3  
Growing Russian Presence in Mongolia 
 
 This chapter will examine the growing Russian presence in Mongolia during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the security threat the Russian 
presence posed to Qing China. Admittedly, Russia was not the only foreign power that 
sought to expand its influence in the areas north of the Great Wall. However, only 
Russia was closely involved in the independence movement of Outer Mongolia in 1911. 
As such, this chapter will focus on the Russian activities in the region. 
  
Russian extension to Mongolia before Mid-nineteenth Century 
 From the late sixteenth century onwards, Tsarist Russia began to extend eastward 
to Siberia, and the expansion eventually brought it into contact with Mongolia and 
China. As early as 1604, Russian settlers came into contact with the Khalkha Mongols 
for the first time.153 Judging from the debate among Outer Mongolian princes and 
noblemen over who they should turn to for protection—the Russians or the Manchus—
in the face of the Zunghars invasion in 1688, I would argue that Russia was, at least in 
the minds of some Mongolian leaders, an effective counterweight to the Manchus, 
especially on occasions when they ran into trouble with the latter.  
Thanks to its geographical location wedged between the Qing and Russian empires 
and the special role occupied by the Mongolian noblemen in the Manchu regime, 
Mongolia had played an indispensable role in the Qing-Russian relationship before the 
mid-nineteenth century. Before direct contact was established between Tsarist Russia 
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and Qing China, Mongolia was Russia’s principal source of information about China. 
Mongolian noblemen had played an important role in the Qing-Russian negotiations of 
the Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kyakhta (1727), which delimited the boundaries of 
the two countries and regulated their cross-border trade.  
 
Russian Presence in Mongolia during Mid-nineteenth Century  
  The relations between Qing China and Tsarist Russia during the 150 years 
preceding the signing of the Treaty of Aigun were characterized by stability and relative 
harmony. However, as a result of the signing of the Treaties of Aigun (1858), Beijing 
(1860), and Tarbagatai (1864), Russia had acquired over 665,000 square miles of land 
from China, mainly in Manchuria and northwestern Xinjiang. What had prompted 
Russia to take such expansionist actions in northern Asia during the mid-nineteenth 
century was Qing China’s defeat by Britain in the First Opium War in 1840-1842 and 
the consequential loss of Russian overland trade with China to maritime trade 
dominated by Britain, as well as Russia’s growing concern about a possible 
encirclement by Britain of its vulnerable Asian frontiers. Beset by internal rebellions, 
Qing China was not in a position to resist Russian actions, and its weakness presented 
the Russian empire opportunities to secure vast territories for itself.154  
Throughout the nineteenth century, Mongolia was basically a side-issue for Russia 
since its main object in the region at the time was Manchuria.155 Yet, Russian 
representatives in Mongolia continued to make attempts to instigate Mongolian princes 
and noblemen to shift their allegiance from Beijing to Moscow. For instance, in 1852, 
Governor General Muraviev of Eastern Siberia dispatched his agent Zenovick to 
                                                      
154 S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia and Their Disputed Frontier (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996), pp. 28- 29.  
155 Gerard M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
Press, 1949), p. 46. 
78 
 
persuade some Mongolian noblemen to seek protection from Moscow on the excuse of 
the imminent collapse of the Qing dynasty amid the Taiping Rebellion. In 1854, 
Muraviev suggested that the Tsar should proclaim Mongolia a Russian Protectorate, on 
the ground that: 
 “In case the Manchu dynasty fell and decided to retreat into its homeland, we 
should act at once to take steps to prevent a new Chinese government in Peking 
(Beijing) from extending its authority over Mongolia, which in such an event could be 
proclaimed our protectorate.”156  
 However, Muraviev’s plans were not adopted by the Russian government, which 
considered it more appropriate to win the understandings of the Khutuktu and maintain 
a friendly bond with the important Mongolian noblemen.157 This showed that, during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Tsarist Russia’s policy towards Mongolia 
was to use it as a “buffer zone” against China, rather than absorbing it into the Russian 
empire.  
Nevertheless, Russian diplomats continued to stir up trouble in Mongolia, as 
evidenced by the comment made by the amban of Urga Zhang Tingyue 張廷岳 on the 
alleged collusion of the Russian consulate (set up in 1861) with local bandits, “The 
Russians’ trick is to cause trouble at every opportunity, taking advantage by exploiting 
other people.”158  
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Zhang’s view was later echoed by many Chinese politicians and scholars, who 
invariably blamed Russia for inciting Outer Mongols to declare independence in 1911. 
However, according to contemporary Russian sources, the Khalkhas had long harbored 
resentment against the Manchu rule and Han Chinese exploitation, and their 
independence movement was chiefly the outcome of their grievances, whilst Russian 
instigation only played a secondary role. As Yakov Shishmarev, a Russian diplomat 
who spent some 50 years of his life in Mongolia, noted in 1885: 
“The Mongols remember their history. They have not forgotten the struggle that 
they had led for centuries against the Chinese and for their independence experience. 
The Mongols do not like to see themselves oppressed. Moreover, the Manchu 
authorities’ arrogant attitude towards Mongols and the latter oppression by Chinese 
officials and merchants become intolerable for the Mongols and strengthen their 
resolution towards independence.”159 Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that, as 
early as 1895, the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu sent his personal envoy Da Lama Badamdorj 
to St. Petersburg secretly to seek Russian assistance to free Mongolia from the Manchu 
yoke, and Da Lama Badamdorj presented the following requests to the Tsar’s agent: 
a) Mongolia, from ancient times up to the period of Enh Amogalan (Kangxi 
emperor) had had its own territory and managed its own affairs. Accordingly, 
it was now time to declare independence of the Qing state and (for Mongols) 
to set up its own state. If there were a rising for that purpose, would Russia 
provide aid?160 
                                                      
of Great State Council Memorials], 4 Aug. 1870. 
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b) If at the time the Qing troops should invade, would (Russia) provide arms and, 
if Mongol strength were inadequate, send troops to the aid (of Mongols)? 
c) Would Russia tell the Manchu state that it was proper for Mongolia to become 
an independent state, and get prompt agreement to this? and 
d) May we be allowed to rule the whole of the ancient Mongol territory, making 
the White Wall (Great Wall) stand as the frontier of Mongol territory?161  
I listed the Mongols’ requests of this unsuccessful mission at some length because 
they show that the Khalkhas’ ambitions, especially those relating to their independence 
and territory, were quite consistent with their requests submitted to Russia in July 1911. 
In other words, the Khalkhas’ quest for independence was not triggered by the Qing 
court’s xinzheng, and the latter merely acted as a catalyst for the independence 
movement. 
  Due to Moscow’s cautious approach towards Mongolia, the country’s interest 
towards the region during the nineteenth century was basically restricted to economic 
and trading issues. At the end of the nineteenth century, Russia started to require special 
railway rights in Mongolia and Manchuria. In June 1896, Russia obtained from China 
the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railway linking Russia and Manchuria, thus 
enabling it to establish control in North Asia. By a diplomatic note exchanged between 
Russia and Britain in April 1899, Russia obtained a British promise to refrain from 
competing for railway concessions in the regions north of the Great Wall, and Russia in 
return agreed not to interfere with British interests in the Yangtze basin. In June of the 
same year, Russia secured from China an agreement that “if railroads are in future built 
from Peking (Beijing) to the north or to the northeast towards the Russian frontier,” 
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China, if not built them itself, would reserve the right of construction for the Russian 
Government or a Russian syndicate.162 In other words, Russia sought to turn the part of 
China north of the Great Wall into its sphere of influence. Also, Russia’s special 
railway rights in Mongolia would handicap the Qing government’s plan to develop the 
railroad network in Mongolia during the xinzheng decade.  
In addition, the Russo-Chinese Bank was closely concerned with the foundation of 
a syndicate, with a capital of 500,000 rubles, for research into the mining resources in 
China. The syndicate, in its turn, created in early 1900 a limited company Mongolor, 
with a capital of three million rubles, to exploit the concessions for mining gold in the 
territories of Tiisiyetii Khanate and Sechen Khanate. As Chapter 4 will show, the 
Mongolor was a successful example of mining enterprises in late Qing as it had 
generated much needed revenue for the cash-strapped government. 
Nevertheless, Russian trade in Mongolia during the second half of the nineteenth 
century led a hopeless existence due to lack of capital.163 For one thing, the Russian 
traders were small merchants from Siberian towns, and were no match for the Chinese 
merchants who had established themselves in Mongolia long before their arrival.  The 
Chinese merchants were numerically superior to their Russian counterparts—for six 
Russian shops there were as many as seventy-four Chinese.164 Moreover, the Russian 
cloth was no match for the American and English cloth traded by Chinese merchants in 
terms of price and popularity. As a consequence, the nature of Russian trade in 
Mongolia did not appear impressive in the second half of the 19th century.165  
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164 Friters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position, p. 52. 
165 Tang, Russian and Soviet policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, p. 288. 
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Sino-Russian Rivalry in Mongolia 
 Russia’s continued expansion into Manchuria brought her into direct conflict with 
Japan. The rival ambitions of these two countries over Manchuria and Korea finally led 
to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, resulting in the humiliating defeat 
of Russia and the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in the following year. By this 
treaty, Russia recognized Korea as part of Japan’s sphere of influence and agreed to 
evacuate Manchuria. 
In 1907 and 1910, Russia and Japan signed two pairs of treaty respectively, each 
composing of one public treaty and one secret treaty. The public treaties confirmed, 
among other things, the territorial integrity of China. However, the secret treaties 
divided Manchuria and Mongolia into two spheres of interest, with Russia in the north 
and Japan in the south. Outer Mongolia thus fell into Russia’s sphere.  
Following the loss of Manchuria, the Russian Government started to focus its 
attention on Mongolia. On 29 January 1905, Count I.I. Ignatiev sent the following 
dispatch to the Tsar: 
“Mongolia is becoming a key in our policy towards Inner China, Tibet, Hymalyan 
Mountains, India and Central Asia. The situation in Mongolia requires that we pay a 
special attention to every development in this neighboring land linked to Russia through 
historical, political and economic interests. The issue of Mongolia is of a special 
importance for us despite the war with Japan. There should be no other option for 
Mongolia except becoming an autonomy and a buffer zone between Russia and China. 
She is certain to become in future a platform against China and a sphere of Russian 
interest.”166  
As subsequent events show, the above view constituted the basis for the Russian 
policy towards Mongolia. In line with this view, Russian politicians immediately began 
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83 
 
a determined campaign to solve the “Mongolian question”; “official circles, 
representatives of commerce and industry, the press, various societies, all set to 
work”167 on a new programme that would compensate for the Port Arthur-Mukden 
failures. 
A Russian consulate was opened at Uliastai in 1905 and another at Kobdo in 1911. 
Large Russian companies started to see opportunities in doing business in Mongolia 
since 1908. In the Ministry of Trade and Industry, a special Departmental Committee 
was established in 1909 to collect information on the Mongolian market.168 In 1910, a 
committee was set up in Irkutsk to strengthen and boost trade with Mongolia. There was 
a scheme afoot to connect Mongolia with the Trans-Siberian Railway.169 Finally, a 
number of trade voyages were dispatched for Mongolia. All of the above activities, 
while apparently commercial, could not obscure the political interest of the Russian 
empire. Members of the voyages advocated the establishment of a Russian commercial 
bank in Mongolia, in part to aid the Russian merchants but also to “compete” with the 
Chinese credit system then in force all over Mongolia.170 According to a Russian 
estimate, in the year of 1907, the Russian commodities exported to Mongolia via 
Kyakhta were estimated at 5,000,000 rubles, and those via Maimaicheng 買賣城 
(known as Altanbulag today) amounted to 3,253,500 rubles, and most of the pelage 
processed by the most renowned tannery in Russia was imported from Mongolia.171  
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Diplomatically, the Russians continued to cultivate the friendly bond with the 
Khutuktu and important Mongolian noblemen. In a confidential telegram to Tsar 
Nicholas II, Russian privy counselor Lessar wrote in January 1905,  
“There are no signs that the Mongols are being attracted and becoming loyal to any 
of the sides (Russia or China). To attract the Mongols it is desirable to…. establish ties 
with Mongol princes and offer them presents, while giving them time to think 
over…”172  
For example, a Russian official presented the Khutuktu (who was fond of Western 
toys, photograph, and motor cars) with a motor car, and brought it to Urga at vast 
expenditure of effort and money despite the fact that there were no roads in the city.173 
In addition, the Russians also built for Khalkha princes and nobility Russian style 
houses, and taught them how to buy and use machines for cheese-making. They also 
built a Russian hospital at Urga which treated no less than 6,000 Mongols every year.174 




Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, Mongolia was an international backwater 
functioning mainly as an intermediary between its two giant neighbors: the Qing and 
Russian empires. In the second half of the nineteenth century, an ever changing balance 
of power between the two empires not only had re-drawn their mutual boundaries in 
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Russia’s favor, but had also turned Mongolia from a diplomatic side issue into a subject 
of competition between them. For the Russians, who had demonstrated a tendency to 
continuously expand outwards to acquire buffer zones for the protection of their 
vulnerable centre, Qing China’s weakness was too tempting a target not to exploit. As a 
consequence, Russia continued to extend in China’s northern frontiers and its eastward 
expansion brought its presence to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria (and even Korea). 
Russia’s expansion into East Asia was aided in no small measure by its railway 
construction projects, such as the Chinese Eastern and the Trans-Siberian Railways. In 
the early twentieth century, the major re-alignment of the balance of power in the Far 
East brought about by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, though succeeding in 
checking Russian ambitions in Manchuria (and Korea), further enhanced Mongolia’s 
importance in Russia’s quest for sphere of influence, thereby heightening the tensions 
between Qing China and Tsarist Russia in Outer Mongolia.  
Undoubtedly, the growing Russian presence in Mongolia posed a serious threat to 
the Qing court, who had, since the reign of Kangxi, regarded the region as an important 
screen for China proper against security threats from the north. (And such perspective 
remained prevalent among Chinese intellectuals during early Republican period.) As 
Wu Luzhen observed,   
“Manchuria is our Dynasty’s birthplace. Beijing is our Central Government’s pivot. 
Mongolia borders Manchuria on its east, and guards Beijing on its south. Should 
Mongolia be lost one day, not only would the recovery of Manchuria’s sovereignty 
become hopeless, the three frontier provinces would become the battle ground for the 
foreign powers. These foreign powers can move forward to storm Beijing, and harass 
Shandong and Hebei. (Should this happen) there would be no peace on the lands north 
of the Yellow River.”175  
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From the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese, who had been suffering their own 
brand of humiliation at the hands of Western powers since the mid-nineteenth century, 
perceived a strategic lesson: that the militarily humiliated Russia was a paper tiger 
unable to sustain military operations in Asia. Consequently, the Chinese moved to 
consolidate their control in Outer Mongolia.176 As the following chapters will show, the 
consolidation was to be achieved by the implementation of xinzheng reforms in the 
Mongolian region. However, the reforms led to the humiliation of the Mongols, and 
they turned to the humiliated Russians for relief from the humiliated Chinese.177 That 
the Mongols would turn to Russia for assistance should not come as a surprise since, as 
stated in the preceding paragraphs, Russia had long been considered by the Mongols as 
an effective counterweight against China. How the xinzheng reforms would affect the 
Mongolian region and why they would lead to the Khalkhas’ declaration of 
independence in 1911 will be discussed in the following chapters. 
In the next chapter, I would examine how the factor of national defense against 
Russia would inform the New Policies introduced in Inner Mongolia, namely by 
boosting the migration of large numbers of Han Chinese into the region, and by 
establishing Chinese-style administrative units in the region to tighten the state’s 
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Chapter 4 Xinzheng in Inner Mongolia (I) 
 
 On 29 January 1901, while taking refuge in Xi’an in northwestern China following 
the occupation of Beijing by the expeditionary forces of the Eight-Nation Alliance 
(comprising Germany, Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, United States of 
America, and Japan), Empress Dowager Cixi issued, in the name of Guangxu emperor, 
a Reform Edict, which stated: 
  “Since the removal of the court (to Xi’an in August 1901), the Empress Dowager 
has been consumed with anxiety night and day, and the Court is filled with remorse as it 
reflects upon how the accumulated and continued abuses and our excessive attention to 
empty formalities over the past several decades have contributed to the present 
calamitous situation. 
Now that peace negotiations have commenced, all affairs of government must be 
thoroughly overhauled, in hopes of gradually achieving real wealth and power. …. 
We therefore call upon the members of the Grand Council, the Grand Secretaries, Six 
Boards and Nine Ministries, our Ministers abroad, and the Governors General and 
Governors of provinces to reflect carefully on our present sad state of affairs, and to 
scrutinize Chinese and Western governmental systems with regard to all dynastic 
regulations, national administration, official affairs, matters related to people’s 
livelihood, modern schools, systems of examination, military organization, and financial 
administration. ….By every available means of knowledge and observation, seek out 
how to renew our national strength, how to produce men of real talent, how to expand 
state revenues, and how to revitalize the military…..”178  
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With this remarkable shangyu上諭 (royal edict), the Court launched the era of 
xinzheng that lasted from 1901 till the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911. The edict is 
quoted at some length because it has highlighted several central features of this, also the 
last of the Qing state’s reform endeavor, which was also known as New Policy or New 
Administration in history.  
First, xinzheng was introduced at a time when the Qing dynasty was on the verge 
of collapse. The imperial court was forced to flee to Xi’an after the capital city of 
Beijing had been occupied by the international expeditionary forces. Large portions of 
the empire’s territory had been taken up by these foreign powers as “concessions”: with 
France established itself in Guangzhou Bay and the Southwest China; Russia in 
Liaodong; Britain in the Yangzi region; Germany in Shandong; and Japan in Fujian. 
Domestic revolutionary movements were breaking out with increasing frequency, 
threatening not only the survival of the Qing dynasty but also that of the imperial 
system. Fiscally, the imperial treasury was broke as a result of the needs to suppress 
internal uprisings and to fight external wars with Western powers and Japan that 
plagued the empire since the mid-nineteenth century. The war reparations of 
450,000,000 taels of silver that were imposed by the victorious powers for the loss 
caused by the Boxer Uprising dealt a further blow to the cash-strapped Court. As a 
consequence, China had to mortgage its custom income and salt tax as guarantee of the 
reparations. It was estimated that China’s foreign debts had totaled 1,232,702,316 taels 
as a result.179  
Second, xinzheng would go beyond the Self-Strengthening Movement of the 
1860s. Whilst the Self-Strengthening Movement was in essence an institutional reform 
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confined to economic and military modernization, xinzheng would seek to transform the 
basic social, political, and ideational structures of the empire. 
Third, the overall aim of xinzheng was to renew national strength, and this was to 
be realized through producing men of real talent, expanding the state revenues, and 
revitalizing the military. 
Finally, unlike the Self-Strengthening Movement in which reforms were conducted 
within the confines of China proper, xinzheng was to be extended to every corner of the 
empire, including its frontier regions, which were basically left untouched during the 
Self-Strengthening Movement. 
 
Rise of Han Chinese Officials and Xinzheng 
On 21 April 1901, Cixi created a new organization Duban Zhengwu Chu 督辦政
務處 (Bureau of Government Affairs) at the centre with the responsibility being to 
coordinate the planning and implementation of all the reform proposals. Headed by the 
powerful Prince Qing, this bureau included leading Manchu aristocrats, such as Ronglu 
榮祿, Kungang 昆岡, and influential Han Chinese officials, such as Li Hongzhang 李
鴻章 (to be succeeded by Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 upon his death), Wang Wenshao 壬文
韶, Lu Chuanlin 陸傳霖 as duban 督辦 (superintendents), as well as powerful 
governors-general Liu Kunyi 劉坤一 and Zhang Zhidong 張之洞 as yaowei canyu 
遙為參預 (consulting members in absentia).180 The composition of the bureau was 
noteworthy for its inclusion of a high proportion of Han officials, and many of them, 
such as Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunyi, and Yuan Shikai, were leading 
reformists during the late Qing period. This also signified the rise of Han Chinese 
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officials in the decision-making process of state policies following the suppression of 
Taiping Rebellion (1850-1871), in which Han officials played a significant role in 
defeating the rebels.  
On 12, 19 and 20 July of the same year, Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong submitted a 
series of three joint memorials to the Throne, offering various suggestions about the 
reform programme, the reorganization of the Government system, and the adoption of 
Western methods in the reforms. These memorials were to serve as the blueprint for the 
xinzheng reforms. Of particular relevance to our present discussion was the importance 
they attached to the promotion of agriculture:  
“China is an agricultural country. In terms of vastness of land and mildness of 
climate, China is much superior to Europe. China is most suitable for agriculture, and 
no countries could surpass China, where all kinds of plants can grow. There is a Chinese 
saying that all the great benefits in the world go to farmers. The essence of enriching the 
people and the country lies in producing more goods from the soil. Without agriculture 
as foundation, there will be neither industry nor commerce.”181 
 As the following discussion will show, this agriculture oriented philosophy was to 
guide the State’s plan in the opening and development of the Mongolian region. As a 
consequence, opening Mongolian lands to agriculture and the attending migration of 
Han settlers would become the principal reforms in Inner Mongolia, as well as the 
major source of income for the State to finance the various new reform proposals.  
Due to reasons of geographical proximity and different political and societal 
developments between Inner and Outer Mongolia, the reforms for the Mongolian region 
started in Inner Mongolia, and the scale of the reforms in Inner Mongolia was much 
more intensive and extensive than its counterpart north of the Gobi. And this would 
widen the gap between Inner and Outer Mongolia, and impact upon their relationship 
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with China during the early Republican period. 
 
Debt and Threat 
Implementation of xinzheng in Mongolia could be generally divided into two 
phases: the first phase was from 1901 to 1906, and the second from 1906 till the 
collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911. The reforms introduced during the first phase 
were meant, in the main, to counter the twin challenges posed by, in the words of James 
Reardon-Anderson, the debt and the threat.182 In other words, the reform measures were 
aimed at raising money and strengthening the empire’s frontiers against Russia’s 
intrusion.  
As noted above, the Qing court was on the verge of financial bankruptcy resultant 
from internal and external conflicts, war reparations, and foreign debts. In order to raise 
adequate money to pay for the war reparations and debts as well as to finance the 
reforms, the Court decreed in May 1901 that the state’s financial burden would be 
shared out among all provinces within the empire, regardless of their respective 
financial conditions. This imposed serious burdens on all provincial governments, in 
particular to poor provinces such as Shanxi, whose share of war reparations reached 
millions of silver taels each year.183 In order to meet the heavy financial obligations, it 
was only logical for officials in Shanxi (and other poor frontier regions) to look beyond 
the border to Inner Mongolia (where land and natural resources were abundant) as a 
new source of income. Therefore, reclaiming Mongolian lands became an attractive 
target for the provinces adjacent to Inner Mongolia. 
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On the other hand, following Russia’s intrusion into China’s Inner Asian frontiers 
since the nineteenth century, some senior Qing officials regarded Tsarist Russia as the 
most serious of China’s foreign threats. In 1875, Ding Baozhen 丁寶楨, the Governor 
of Shandong, memorialized the Court: 
“What worries me most is Russia, to be followed by Japan. Though China is 
accessible to other foreign nations by sea, it is not accessible to them on land, since 
these nations are tens of thousands of li (里=16 km) away. Although Japan is close to us 
by sea, the land passage is still blocked. Only Russia can access China by sea and on 
land, and is closer to us than other nations. Land wise, Russia is connected with us at 
Heilongjiang in the northeast and Xinjiang in the northwest; the situation is very 
perilous…..In my opinion, the threats caused by other nations are illness of the limbs, 
which are distant and light. The Russian threat is a disease at the heart, which is near 
and serious….” 184     
It is against these two challenges that Qing China started to implement various 
reforms in Inner Mongolia. And it is the purpose of this and the following chapters to 
investigate how these reforms were undertaken and how they impacted upon the Inner 
Mongols. 
 
A. Fangken Mengdi 放墾蒙地 (Reclaiming Mongolian Lands for Agriculture) 
One Chinese scholar Tian Feng considers that fangken mengdi was, of all xinzheng 
reforms implemented in Inner Mongolia, the one that the Qing state had pursued most 
vigorously and that its results were the most noteworthy.185 As the following 
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paragraphs will show, judging from the Qing state’s reclamation efforts, the total area of 
lands reportedly opened in Inner Mongolia, and the revenue collected therefrom during 
the xinzheng decade, I consider Tian’s statement a reasonable assessment. 
Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing state’s finance became more and more 
hard pressed as a result of frequent internal uprisings and external conflicts. Amid the 
State’s fervent quest for new sources of income, some court and frontier officials argued 
that reclaiming Mongolian lands, which were in their views ample and under-utilized, 
would be the quickest and most effective instrument to raise revenues for the central and 
local governments’ coffers. For example, in 1897, Hu Pinzhi 胡聘之, the governor of 
Shanxi, noted,  
“The reclaimable land (in western Inner Mongolia contiguous with Shanxi) is no 
less than 300,000 qing. Should all the lands be opened, after deducting the rents payable 
to the Mongols and all the necessary fees, the state would still collect government rents 
amounting to two to three million silver taels each year.”186  
Hu’s view was echoed by a court official Huang Siyong 黄思永, who submitted in 
the same year,  
“In the two Inner Mongolian leagues of Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab, there are flat and 
fertile pasturelands with an area of several thousand li in length and breadth. The land 
on the east and west sides of Hetao 河套187 is particularly fertile. …As most of the 
lands are now cultivated by (Han) commoners privately, it would be better if the State 
take over the management (from the Mongol landowners).”188  
In the eastern part of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, similar requests were also 
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raised by frontier officials who were under acute shortage of funds because their 
principal sources of funding, namely fiscal provisions from Beijing and other provinces, 
were frequently interrupted by the internal turmoil that broke out in China during this 
period. For example, the arrears of funds due to Heilongjiang amounted to 1,206,900 
silver taels between 1854-1868.189 In1898, Enze 恩澤, the general-in-chief of 
Heilongjiang, memorialized the Court for opening the land under his purview to 
agriculture, for the purposes of, among others, raising revenue and meeting local 
demands for grains.190 Specifically, Enze put forth in his memorial an important 
justification for subsequent reclamation activities in Inner Mongolia, namely: 
  “The greatest profit in the world derives from the promotion of agriculture. It is 
therefore most appropriate to open lands in important frontier areas. This is because 
land reclamation will lead to concentration of people, and concentration of people will 
place us in a strong position (against Russia). This is an important way to consolidate 
the frontier, and to generate profits.”191 
Put simply, land reclamation in the borderlands was considered by these officials 
as an important measure to counter the twin challenges of the debt and the threat.  
 From the 1880s up to 1902 when reclamation of Mongol land formally started, 
frontier officials’ requests for opening Mongolia are summarized as follows: 
 
Year Office Name Areas Requested for reclamation 
1883 Shanxi Governor Zhang Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues, Tumed 
                                                      
189 First Historical Archives 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing), 30-20, ‘Qing sujie Heilongjiang yukuan 
zhe’ 請速解黑龍江餘款摺 [Memorial seeking to expedite delivery of outstanding funding for 
Heilongjiang], Heilongjiang Jiangjun yamen dangan 黑龍江將軍衙門檔案 [Heilongjiang General-
in-Chief's Office Archives], 20 Sep. 1868. 
190 Zhu comp, Guangxuchao donghualu, p. 4478. 
191 Zhu comp, Guangxuchao donghualu, p. 4478. 
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Zhidong and Chahar banners 
1886 Shanxi Governor Gangyi Dalat, Hanggin, Urad Banners 
1887 Heilongjiang 
General-in-Chief 




Zengqi Hulan etc. 
1896 Heilongjiang 
General-in-Chief 
Enze Hulan, etc. 
1897 Shanxi Governor  Wu 
Pingzhi 
Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues 
1899 Heilongjiang 
General-in-Chief 
Enze Jalait, Durbet and Gorlos RearBanners 
1900 Heilongjiang 
Lieutenant General 
Shoushan Jalait, Durbet and Gorlos RearBanners 
1901 Suiyuan Town 
General 
Xinge Guihua and Tumed Banners, etc. 
1901 Heilongjiang 
General-in-Chief 
Sabao Butha and Jalait Banner 
 (Source: Hao Weimin 郝維民 and Jakhadaied Chimeddorji 齊木德道爾吉 ed., Neimenggu tongshi 
內蒙古通史 [A General History of Inner Mongolia], vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (II), pp. 
606-607)192 
Notwithstanding these appeals, the Court had so far been very cautious in granting 
requests for opening the pasturelands of Mongolian banners to agriculture, fearing this 
                                                      
192 Hao Weimin 郝維民 and Jakhadaied Chimeddorji 齊木德道爾吉 ed., Neimenggu tongshi 內蒙古
通史 [A General History of Inner Mongolia], vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (II) 
(Beijing: People’s Press, 2012), pp. 606-607. 
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would affect Mongolian livelihood and lead to trouble. It was not until the era of 
xinzheng when large-scale reclamation of the lands in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia 
formally became the State’s policy. On the basis of the discussion in Chapter 2, this 
“new” policy represents a drastic departure from the segregation policy that the State 
had practiced, albeit inconsistently, in the regions above the Great Wall since the 
Manchus’ occupation of China proper in the seventeenth century. What prompted the 
Qing court to change its mind was a memorial submitted by Cen Chunxuan 岑春煊, the 
governor of the Shanxi province, in 1901, which stated, 
 “In my opinion, the current political situation is difficult, the national finance is 
destitute, and the enormous amount of war reparations is unprecedented.….  
In order to tackle insolvency, people have put forth proposals to downsize the State’s 
manpower establishment or to revive (the country’s) industry and commerce. However, 
reducing the number of soldiers and officials does not save much, whilst mining and 
manufacturing does not generate instant profits. Now that we are spending money like 
river sand yet we are seeking to raise revenue only by trivial amounts. Though these 
measures are commonsense approaches of financial management, they cannot meet our 
desperate needs.  
I note that the lands of the 13 banners of the Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues 
contiguous with the northwestern part of Jin 晉 (Shanxi province) are the most open 
and flat in the northern frontiers. The Ordos and other banners of Yeke Juu are 
surrounded by large rivers and hence easy to irrigate. ….In terms of size, these banners 
are no less than three to four thousand li in length and width. If we reclaim three to four 
tenths of their lands, we should be able to make available hundreds of thousands of qing 
of cultivable land. Twenty-five years ago, former jiangjun of Heilongjiang Enze 
petitioned for the opening of the uncultivated land of the Jalait Banner, where receipts 
from the huangjia 荒價 (land contract fee) of half of the reclaimed land was estimated 
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to be 400,000 to 500,000 taels of silver. As for today’s Ordos and the banners adjacent 
to Jin frontier, even if we reclaim half of their lands, the receipt will be three to four 
times as much…It will really benefit the State.”193  
Clearly, challenge of the debt was one of the most important considerations that 
made the cash-strapped Qing court to abandon the previous policy ambiguities and 
embrace Cen’s proposal wholeheartedly. However, as discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs, Cen’s request was nothing new. Since the 1870s, successive Shanxi 
governors such as Zhang Zhidong, Gangyi 剛毅, and Wu Pingzhi had memorialized the 
Court for opening the “Mongolian wastelands” adjacent to the Province to agriculture. 
The reasons for their appeal can be summarized as follows: 
(i)Official recognition of the fact that some Mongolian lands had already been 
rented out privately and that the rent arising therefrom was an important source of 
income to Mongols. As Wu Pingzhi noted, “Mongol livelihood (now) comes from rent 
rather than from herding”;194 
(ii) Maintenance of Law and order in the borderlands. The illegal influx of Han 
immigrants had turned the border area lawless and uncontrollable. As a consequence, 
the area became vulnerable and insecure; 
(iii) Consolidating the frontier against external threat. As Enze noted in the above, 
there was a need to move Han immigrants to the frontier to strengthen its defense 
against the Russian threats to the frontiers; and 
(iv) Raising additional revenues to meet Shanxi’s heavy financial burden. Since the 
early twentieth century, Shanxi had been beset with compensation cases over damages 
to the properties of foreign missionaries in the Province during the Boxer turmoil. In 
May 1901, the Qing court in exile demanded large financial contributions from all 
                                                      
193 Yu zhe huicun, vol. 19, p. 2407. 
194 Yu zhe huicun, vol. 16, p. 1810. 
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provinces to meet demands for war reparations, saying 
“The amount of reparations is too enormous this time…We are now in extreme 
difficulties and must try our utmost to raise the money……All the Governors General 
and Governors of provinces must overhaul the local situations and do away all 
unnecessary expenses……As to how this could be achieved, (all Governors Generals 
and Governors) must plan very carefully and do their utmost to raise the money. …They 
must not use “no money could be raised” as an excuse and shirk their responsibility.”195  
This Court’s demand was the last straw for Cen, who had grave difficulties making 
both ends meet. It was against this background that Cen submitted the above-quoted 
memorial in 1901. 
   In the following years, large scale fangken was carried out in the western and 
eastern parts of Inner Mongolia respectively, leading to far-reaching impact upon the 
region. In the following paragraphs, I will first give an account of how fangken was 
carried out in these two parts of Inner Mongolia and then examine its impact. 
 
(i) Western Inner Mongolia 
   In January 1902, in response to Cen’s proposal, the Court decreed, 
“In the thirteen Mongol banners of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues on the northwestern 
border of Jin, there are plenty of uncultivated and fertile lands. We should immediately 
open these lands to fill up the frontier’s coffer. This would also be beneficial to the 
livelihood of the Mongols and Han commoners.”196  
                                                      
195 Palace Museum Ming-Qing Archives Department 故宮博物院明淸檔案部 ed., Yi he tuan dang an 
shi liao 義和團檔案史料 [Archival Materials on the Boxers], (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Co., 1979), 
vol. 2, pp. 1805-1806. 
196 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 433-1, Qin chai 
kenwu dachen dangan 欽差墾務大臣檔案 [Imperial Commissioner of Reclamation Affairs 
Archives], 8 Jan 1902. 
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At the same time, the Court appointed Yigu 貽穀, a vice minister of the Board of 
War, to take charge of the reclamation affairs in western Inner Mongolia, with the 
avowed goals being “to provide for Mongols’ livelihood, to increase the country’s 
military funding, up from securing the borders, down to expanding the agricultural 
sector.”197 As the qin ming duban Meng qi kenwu dachen 欽命督辦蒙旗墾務大臣 
(Imperial Commissioner for Reclamation Affairs in Mongol Banners), Yigu was 
responsible for opening the lands of the 13 jasak banners belonging to the region’s two 
westernmost leagues of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu, the lands of the central Tumed plain 
around Guihua (designated as the Guihua Town, Tumed left and right banners) and the 
lands of the Chahar banners. Unlike the jasak banner of the two leagues, both the 
Tumed and Chahar banners were classified as “Court Mongolia” or Nei shu Menggu 內
屬蒙古 because, for historical reasons, they were not ruled by their own hereditary 
jasak-princes but by imperial appointees. As a result, imperial orders were executed 
with less opposition in these banners. 
Yigu set up his headquarters, subsequently known as kenwuzongju 墾務總局 
(general bureau of reclamation affairs) in Guihua city, to be underpinned by several 
reclamation bureaus and sub-bureaus in different places of western Inner Mongolia, 
with each being responsible for opening the lands under its respective jurisdiction.  
According to Yigu’s original plan, reclamation work would start with the jasak banners 
of the Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu Leagues, where the amount of reclaimable lands was 
more substantial. However, he met strong opposition from the Mongols of these two 
leagues. As a matter of fact, back in 1897, the banner princes of these two leagues had 
jointly foiled Hu Pinzhi’s attempt to open their lands to agriculture on strength of a 
royal edict issued by Emperor Daoguang in 1835, which banned the reclamation of 
                                                      
197 Yigu 貽穀, Yigu kenwuzouyi 貽穀墾務奏議 [Yigu’s Memorials on Reclamation], 1908 (reprinted 
Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1974), p. 17. 
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Mongolian lands by Han Chinese commoners. The grounds of their opposition, as stated 
in their petition to the Court, were worth quoting as they represented the standard 
arguments employed by the Mongols against state reclamation attempts. Their grounds 
were: 
“Since then (1835), all our jasak banners have strictly abided by the Edit (of 
Emperor Daoguang). We dare not rent out our pasturelands privately, and we continue 
to make our living by herding rather than farming…..Should the Shanxi Governor’s 
proposal be adopted, all the pasturelands would be transformed into farmlands, which is 
a practice now prohibited under the law, and the pasturelands would be occupied by 
Han commoners; the Mongols would not be able to make a living by raising herds and 
their livelihood would become difficult. Though someone says that rents would be 
payable to us, we cannot rule out that disputes would arise after some time…”198  
However, judging from Huang Siyong’s submission quoted above, some 
Mongolian lands of these leagues had already been rented out to Han Chinese 
commoners for tilling, despite the jasaks’ denial. Also, considering the close proximity 
of these two leagues to Shanxi (where lots of Han farmers had already crossed the 
borders to farm on Mongolian lands), I find it difficult to believe the jasaks’ claim. 
  In any event, confronted with strong opposition from the two leagues, Yigu had to 
change his plan by first opening the lands of the eight banners of Chahar, where 
substantial areas of lands had already been rented out to Chinese farmers privately even 
before Yigu’s arrival. Yigu established a kenwugongsi 墾務公司 (reclamation affairs 
corporation) in Zhangjiakou to handle the work, and the capital of the corporation was 
shared equally between the State and merchants.199  
                                                      
198 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 511-79, Zhungeer 
Qi Zhasake yamen dangan 准格爾旗札薩克衙門檔案 [Jungar Banner Jasak's Office Archives], 12 
Sep. 1897. 
199 Another kenwugongsi was set up in Baotou to take charge of the reclamation work in the Ulan Qab 
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The first step in the reclamation process was the drawing up of a specific series of 
“zhangcheng” 章程 (regulations). Each of the reclamation offices set up by the 
General Bureau of Reclamation Affairs was to proceed in accordance with these 
regulations, which were devised to reflect the particular land relations of the area under 
its jurisdiction. These regulations specified the proportions of the proceeds of land sales 
to be allocated to the original Mongolian landholders, and covered various other 
provisions, such as eradication of profiteering and prevention of Mongolian 
impoverishment, etc. However, considering the widespread and strong opposition from 
the Mongols to the State’s reclamation activities, it was obvious that these regulations 
failed to appease them. 
Once the regulations were proclaimed, the next step was “quanken” 勸墾, which 
was to persuade, extort, or pressure Mongolian authorities with control over land (such 
as jasak, princes, head lamas of monasteries, etc.) to baoken 報墾, or report land for 
reclamation. This could be a lengthy process as it involved negotiations with the 
relevant Mongolian parties, surveying of potential land, accurate delineation of 
boundaries, and resolving competing land rights claims between different banners. In 
theory, a range of options could be worked out depending on the strength or weakness 
of the banner’s position and established precedents. However, in most cases, the process 
would formally remove land from banner, temple, or individual Mongolian ownership 
and control and place it in the hands of the State to be sold off as virgin land.200    
The next step following baoken was the establishment of a dimu ju 地畝局 
(agricultural land office) in the area yielded by the banner, monastery, or individual 
Mongolian landowner for reclamation. This office was tasked with measuring and 
                                                      
and Yeke Juu Leagues. 
200 Justin Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan: the politics of northwestern territory and development in early 
twentieth-century China (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 108. 
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assessing the agricultural quality of the reported land, and the disposal of the land-- a 
process known as zhangfang 丈放 (measure and dispose of land). The land would then 
be sold and the proceeds arising therefrom would be divided between the State and the 
relinquishing Mongolian party, who would also be entitled to proportions of the future 
land tax collected from the land. 
In the case of lands that had already been rented out to Han tillers, the reclamation 
process would be much more complex and often involved qingli 清理, meaning to 
straighten out property rights and accurately measure acreage totals. This process was 
particularly resisted by both Mongolian landowners and Han tenants, as it represented 
an unwelcome intrusion into de facto system of property rights which had existed up to 
the time without state involvement. Mongols opposed it as it directly challenged their 
ownership of land or their customary rights to control the land, and Han tenants opposed 
it because, should they be unable to prove legal ownership, they would have to pay a 
second price for the land to continue using it, and such instances were many.201   
Reclaiming Mongolian lands would bring in two kinds of revenue for the State’s 
coffer : yahuangyin, 押荒銀 (land contract fee) and shengkeyin 升科銀 (annual land 
taxes). The former, also known as huangjiayin 荒價銀, was levied on a cultivator when 
he contracted a piece of shengdi 生地 (uncultivated land) for cultivation. Normally, he 
would pay yahuangyin for tilling the land for three years during which period he was 
exempted from paying any land tax. After the third year, the land was considered a piece 
of shudi 熟地 (mature land) and would be shengke 升科 (entered onto the tax 
register) upon which the cultivator would be required to pay shengkeyin to the state at a 
fixed rate annually thereafter.  
In western Inner Mongolia, the basic unit of land measurement was gong 弓 
(bow, equals to five chi 尺; one chi equals to 1/3metre). Three hundred and sixty gong 
                                                      
201 Tighe, Constructing Suiyuan, p. 109. 
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equaled to one mu 畝. One hundred mu equaled to one qing 頃. Five qing equaled to 
one hao 號. The contract fee was three qian 錢 per mu, with one third of which being 
set aside for administrative expenses. Of the administrative expenses, six fen 分 
(equals to 0.1 qian) was given to the kenwuju and the remaining four fen to the banners. 
As for the shengkeyin, the annual rate was initially fixed at 1.4 fen per mu. Each time 
when land tax was collected, a sum of 0.5 qian was levied per silver tael as meltage fee. 
With the unfolding of reclamation works in other parts of Inner Mongolia, variations to 
the rates arose in accordance with the practical situations of the different locations. For 
example, in the Otog Banner in southwestern Inner Mongolia, the contract fee was rated 
at four levels, ranging from one to four qian, depending on the quality of the land in 
question.202  
The reclamation in Chahar went off smoothly and was more or less completed by 
1905. According to Yigu’s reports, by late 1904, the land reclaimed and leased in the 
right four banners of Chahar amounted to 13,447 qing, with revenues totaling 268,941 
taels.203 By late 1905, the lands reclaimed in the left four banners of Chahar and the 
revenue collected therefrom were 18,053 qing and 361,075 taels respectively. 204 From 
1906 till early 1907, over 627 qing of lands were further opened, bringing in additional 
revenues of 879 taels.205  
 As stated above, the league chiefs and jasaks of the Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu 
vehemently opposed Yigu’s plan to reclaim their lands. Lhavangnorbu and Arbinbayar, 
the respective chiefs of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu, refused to journey to Guihua to meet 
with Yigu to discuss the State’s reclamation plan in spite of the latter’s invitation. They 
also petitioned the Suiyuan general-in-chief and the Lifanyuan against the inclusion of 
                                                      
202 Yigu, Yigu kenwuzouyi, p. 424. 
203 Yigu, Yigu kenwuzouyi, p. 467. 
204 Yigu, Yigu kenwuzouyi, p. 472. 
205 Yigu, Yigu kenwuzouyi, p. 510. 
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their lands into the official reclamation plan, arguing that “should the commoners from 
the Heartland be permitted to intermingle with the natives on the pasturelands, the 
Mongols’ livelihood would be affected and disputes would inevitably arise.”206 
 I would argue that the Mongols of Ulan Qab and Yeke Juu did not oppose 
cultivation per se, because cultivation of their lands by Han Chinese tenants had been 
practiced in some banners of these two leagues for a long time.207 What had caused 
their opposition was that that State’s reclamation plan would affect their income from 
leasing their lands to tenant farmers privately since they could no longer manipulate the 
rents as they liked. In order to win over the Mongols’ support, Yigu had offered to 
equally split the land taxes between the State and the concerned Mongolian banners, but 
the offer was rejected by the latter. 208  
More importantly, as discussed above, the acceptance of the State’s involvement 
would effectively mean that ownership or customary control rights of the banner lands 
would henceforth be transferred from the banners to the State. Since land ownership had 
long constituted the foundation of the Mongolian banner system, the two leagues’ 
opposition to the State’s reclamation proposal was, arguably, an act in defense of the 
system.209  
Similarly, the existing Han Chinese cultivators also worried that, under the State’s 
ownership, they would be required to pay more than they did. They were also suspicious 
                                                      
206 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Archives 內蒙古自治區檔案館 (Hohhot), 511-84, Zhungeer 
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April 1902.  
207 According to Yigu’s later confession, half of the “reclaimed” lands in Yeke Juu were in fact shudi; 
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[Depositions on Cultivation Affairs of Mongolia], quoted by Tian, Qingmo neimenggu ‘xin zheng’ ji 
qi shehui ying xiang, p. 10. 
208 Yigu, Yigu kenwuzouyi, p. 424. 




that the State would take their lands away and lease them to others who were willing to 
pay more for tilling the land. Subsequent developments proved that their worries and 
suspicions were not entirely groundless. This explains why some Han Chinese would 
join the Mongols in their uprisings against the State reclamation actions.  
 In the face of strong opposition from the two leagues, the Qing court granted Yigu 
the title of shangshu 尚書 (board president) of Lifanyuan in September 1902, and 
appointed him to double up as the Suiyuan general-in-chief (who in theory 
superintended the two leagues) in the following year, with a view to facilitating his 
work in these two leagues. Yet the opposition remained. Finally, at the behest of Yigu, 
the Court dismissed Arbinbayar from the post of league chief of Yeke Juu in December 
1903. Other banners of the league rebelled against the reclamation but they were 
suppressed by Yigu with military force. Upon clearance of all the obstacles, the State 
started to open the lands of Yeke Juu and the reclamation work was basically completed 
by 1908, bringing in a total of 22,000 qing of land and 764,600 silver taels of revenue. 
The reclamation of the lands of Ulan Qab also started in 1906 after the strong 
intervention of the board president of Lifanyuan Prince Zhu, and a total area of 7,840 
qing was opened by the spring of 1908.  
 Apart from reclaiming the lands of Chahar, Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab, Yigu also 
opened the horse farms of the Eight Banner troops stationed at Suiyuan (3,700 qing), 
the lands of Tumed Banners (9,985 qing), and the lands under the management of the 
Shahukou relay station (1,383 qing). According to some incomplete statistics, during the 
xinzheng period, the state had opened a total of 88,700 qing of lands in western Inner 
Mongolia and the yahuangyin collected therefrom amounted to 2,730,000 taels.210  
 In 1908, Yigu was dismissed and impeached on a series of charges including 
                                                      
210 Hao Weimin 郝維民 ed., Neimenggu jindai jianshi 內蒙古近代簡史 [A Brief History of Modern 
Inner Mongolia] (Hohhot: Inner Mongolia University Press, 1990), p. 23. 
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corruption and other misconduct. His downfall virtually brought the reclamation 
activities in western Inner Mongolia to a halt. Yet, the land reclamation process that 
Yigu created was to remain the basis for the further development of land reclamation in 
Republican Suiyuan.211   
(ii) Eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria 
 Discussion of reclamation activities in eastern Inner Mongolia would inevitably 
touch upon Manchuria, which included fringes of the Mongolian steppe and was 
technically part of Inner Mongolia and vice versa. Since 1902 land reclamation had also 
started in earnest in Manchuria and three (Josotu, Juu Uda and Jirem) of the four 
leaguesof eastern Inner Mongolia. Unlike the operations in western Inner Mongolia, 
there was no central organization to take charge of the opening of lands in this area. 
Instead, reclamation work was undertaken individually by the imperial residents in the 
areas under their respective purview. 
  Private leasing of land for cultivation by Han Chinese farmers long existed in this 
area, especially in some banners of Josotu and Juu Uda Leagues, as evidenced by a 
memorial submitted by Zengqi 增祺, the general-in-chief of Shengjing, in 1904:    
 “Of late, with nomadism among the banners being in decline, it has become general 
knowledge that farming is profitable. As a result, Mongols often privately invite Han 
Chinese commoners to till their lands without following the rules, leading to the 
gathering of numerous Han Chinese commoners, and the secret reclamation of lands. 
When the Mongolian landlords’ demands are not met, they will try to evict the Han 
Chinese farmers. However, the Han Chinese tenants are reluctant to leave and will 
gather together to cause disturbances. In recent years, lawsuits (over land disputes) have 
multiplied and they are very difficult to deal with.”212  
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  Unlike their western counterparts, the jasaks of eastern league banners were 
generally more cooperative with the State in the latter’s reclamation operations. As a 
consequence, the reclamation process was relatively more peaceful and smooth. For the 
period from 1902 to 1905, some 490,940 shang 垧 (equals to fifteen mu) of lands were 
reclaimed at the Jalait Banner of Heilongjiang, representing four tenths of the whole 
banner’s land.213 By 1908, a total of 632,540 shang of lands were reclaimed in the 
Gorlos Rear Banner, or one fifth of its land.214 Between the years of 1904 and 1906, the 
State had opened 386,250 shang of lands in the Durbert Banner, or three tenth of its 
land.215 In Jilin, the State had reclaimed some 300,280 shang of lands in the Gorlos 
Front Banner. According to some incomplete estimate, the State had reclaimed over 
3,300,000 shang plus 16,000 qing of lands from the two leagues of Jirem and Juu Uda 
alone.216   
 According to some estimate, over 100,000 qing of lands were reclaimed in Inner 
Mongolia during the xinzheng decade, and the amount of yahuangyin collected 
exceeded 8,000,000 taels of silver.217 
(iii) Assessment 
 On the face of it, the volume of lands that had been opened in Inner Mongolia (and 
Manchuria) during the ten years of xinzheng appeared quite impressive. However, as the 
following discussion will show, this figure was grossly inflated. One of the reasons for 
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this was that some of the “reclaimed” lands were in fact shudi that were already under 
cultivation at the time of opening. For lack of comprehensive statistics, it would be 
impossible to ascertain its actual extent. However, the following table on the opening of 
lands in some of the banners of Jirem League between 1902 and 1911 should give us an 
idea of the magnitude of the problem: 
 
Banner Reclaimed Land (shang)  Shudi (shang) 
Jalait 578,062 29,690 
Gorlos Rear 632,540. 946 1,204.73 
Durbet 389,245.946 1,690 
Horqin Right Front 993,088.464 42,899.9966 
Horqin Right Rear 437,062.2 22,228.76 
(Source: Jusaghal, 18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu, p. 94)218 
  The same problem also existed in the banners of western Inner Mongolia. Yigu’s 
explanation for the existence of shudi in “reclaimed” lands was as follows:  
 “Half of the lands reported by the banners for opening were privately leased shudi. If 
we did not open shudi, there would not be much land for us to reclaim. That the 
Mongols would report shudi as uncultivated land was because they dared not confess to 
having leased their lands privately……Private leasing (of lands) suited the interests of 
both the Mongol multitude and Han Chinese households. The Mongols would lodge 
complaints when we proceeded to open their lands. The Han Chinese households would 
also lodge complaints once we started to charge them for land contract fees. This was 
inevitable.”219  
 The opening of shudi by the state undoubtedly caused strong resentment among the 
                                                      
218 Jusaghal, 18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu, p. 94. 
219 Yigu, Mengken chenshu gongzhuang, quoted by Tian, Qingmo neimenggu ‘xin zheng’ ji qi shehui ying 
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Mongols and Han Chinese farmers alike since this would inflict heavy losses on both 
parties. As Yao Xiguang 姚鍚光, who had twice been dispatched by the Court to tour 
eastern Inner Mongolia in 1905 and 1906 respectively, commented on the reclamation 
work, 
  “To my knowledge, in the eastern and western parts (of Inner Mongolia), the 
authorities always proceeded from extorting yahuangyin from cultivated lands. In 
reality, very few of the reclaimed lands were bona fide barren lands. (As a result of the 
State’s reclamation program), the tenant farmers first had to pay the Mongols (i.e. 
landlords), and then the State authorities. The tenant farmers therefore suffered heavy 
losses. As for the Mongols, their rental income from lands prior to the payment of 
huangjiayin was surely high. The rental income would certainly be reduced once 
yahuangyin was levied on their land. The Mongols also suffered heavy losses as a 
result. As such, the reclamation operation currently under way can only be characterized 
as shudilefei 熟地勒費 (extorting fees from cultivated lands), not huangdi yahuang 荒
地押荒 (levying land contract fees from barren lands). Therefore, whenever the 
Mongols and Han farmers heard of land reclamation, they turned pale as if they were 
talking of a tiger. This is why the reclamation operation has achieved very few results; 
conversely, it has caused harsh hardships (for the people), and this in turn gives rise to 
enormous resistances.”220  
 That the authorities concerned would focus on shudi was because their primary 
concern was to make quick profits. As Xu Shichang 徐世昌, the governor-general of 
the Northeast Provinces (Manchuria) remarked in 1907,  
 “For the managers (of Mongolian land reclamation), money-raising was their 
principal concern. As a consequence, once a piece of land was measured up and a price 
was put on it, they did nothing else to follow up. They might even bully the Mongols 
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and embezzle the money……As to whether the reclamation would succeed or fail, or 
whether the Mongols would support or oppose (the reclamation), or whether the terrain 
(of a particular location) was hazardous or flat, these were none of the concerns that the 
authorities would seriously look into.”221  
 Historical records show that the same problem persisted till the end of Qing dynasty 
as evidenced by a memorial submitted by a court official Dai Hongci 戴鴻慈 in 1908, 
which reads, “That the reclamation work has not improved is because the reclaiming 
authorities only concerned themselves with huangjia, not the success or failure of the 
reclamation.”222  
 Furthermore, officials of the reclamation authorities often colluded with local lantou 
攬頭 (speculators or monopolists) or land merchants in their pursuit of quick money. 
The former often sold the latter vast tracts of land at a low price, and the latter in turn 
subdivided the land and re-sold it to tenant farmers at a much higher price, thus making 
a handsome profit in the process. There were cases whereby a piece of land was re-sold 
for several times, each time fetching a higher price than before. The kenwugongsi set up 
by Yigu in western Inner Mongolia were made up of lantou and land merchants who 
were notorious for making profits through these means. For example, the kenwugongsi 
in Zhangjiakou would “re-sell a piece of land at an increased price after paying the 
specified yahuangyin, and the rate of increase ranged from two to three fen per mu to 
one tael and six to seven qian; in some cases, the rate of increase was as high as three 
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tael and several qian per mu.”223  
 Since the authorities’ sole concern was profit-making, they did not bother to take 
follow-up action to ensure that the lands reported for reclamation were actually taken up 
by farmers for cultivation. As a consequence, a lot of reclaimed lands remained barren 
many years after they had been measured and released for cultivation. For instance, of 
the 630,000 shang of lands in the Gorlos Rear Banner that had been reported for 
opening in 1908, less than 200,000 shang were actually under cultivation by 1910. At 
the end of the Qing dynasty, some 250,000 shang of lands were reported to have been 
reclaimed in the Durbet Banner, but the amount of shudi was merely some 150,000 
shang several years into the Republican era. Similarly, of the 800,000 shang of 
“reclaimed” lands in the Horqin Right Front Banner, less than 200,000 shang had been 
converted into shudi during the early years of the Republican era. As for the 600,000 
“reclaimed” lands of Horqin Right Rear Banner at the end of the Qing period, only 
80,000 shang were shudi.224  
 Apart from lethargy on the part of the reclamation authorities, other factors such as 
soil quality, transport condition, and public security, etc. also affected the success or 
failure of a particular project. For example, a site 200 li south of Taonan Fu in Jilin 
remained uninhabited three years after it had been released for cultivation because its 
soil was poor and that the place was frequented by bandits.225  
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225 Xu Shichang 徐世昌, Dongsansheng zhenglue 東三省政略 [The Political Strategy for the Three 
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(iv) Armed Resistance 
 Given the widespread opposition from Inner Mongols to the State’s reclamation 
activities, the authorities had to resort to coercion in order to implement the program. As 
Yigu pointed out, “Measurement work had to be backed up by military force. This 
would speed up the process of reclamation and ensure peace at the local level.”226 
However, coercion did not prevent the occurrence of sporadic uprisings from 1902 
onwards in different parts of Inner Mongolia against the State’s reclamation work. A 
summary of these uprisings is tabulated below: 
 
Period Location 
1902-1905 Uxin Banner 
1904 Jungar Banner; Ordos Left Centre Banner 
1905 Hanggin Banner 
1906-1909 Gorlos Front Banner 
1907 Salaqi ting (county); Horinger ting; 
Hanggin and Dalad Banners 
1907-1908 Jalait Banner 
1907-1908 Horqin Right Front Banner 
(Source: Tian, Qingmo neimenggu ‘xin zheng’ ji qi shehui ying xiang, p. 12) 227  
 Apart from the Mongols affected by the land reclamation, some Han Chinese, 
probably tenant farmers, also joined the revolts in the Uxin Banner, Salaqi ting and 
Horinger ting. The disparate geographic locations of the trouble spots suggested that 
discontent was widespread in Inner Mongolia, though they had not evolved into a 
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region-wide movement that would threaten the Manchu rule in Inner Mongolia. 
(v) Impact 
 An important impact of the ten-year fangken mengdi programme was the large-scale 
expansion of agriculture in Inner Mongolia. In western Inner Mongolia, the lands in the 
southern and central parts of Chahar banners were wholly converted into farmlands. The 
same occurred in the southern and central parts of the Yeke Juu League. In eastern Inner 
Mongolia, the seven banners in the northern part of Jirem League were also transformed 
into farmlands. In short, a strip of land starting from the Gorlos Front Banner of the 
Jirem League in the east, along the Willow Palisade and the Great Wall in the South, up 
to Hetao in the west became an area of intensive agricultural production.228  
 The expansion of agriculture and the attendant arrival of Han immigrants also led to 
rise of commerce and trade in Inner Mongolia. However, the agricultural expansion was 
achieved at the expense of nomadism, as more and more pasturelands were converted 
into farmlands. This led to further decline of nomadism in Inner Mongolia. As a 
consequence, livestock breeding ceased to be its sole subsistence economy, whilst 
agriculture assumed growing importance in the region’s economic activities.  
 Moreover, with the rights to own and control land transferred from Mongol 
authorities (such as jasak, princes, head lamas of monasteries, individual landowners, 
etc.) to the State (who then sold the land to Chinese land merchants and tillers), the 
economic power base of Mongols was further eroded. This further undermined the 
authority of Mongol ruling elites (e.g. jasaks and princes) vis-à-vis the State.  
 As shown in the above quoted memorials by Qing frontier officials, large scale 
reclamation of Mongol lands was intended, apart from raising revenues, to encourage 
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Mongolia during the Qing Era] Ethno-National Studies 民族研究 1 (1985), pp. 46-53. 
114 
 
large numbers of Han Chinese to migrate to the borderland, with a view to 
strengthening the frontier defense against Russian intrusion-- a process known as yimin 
shibian 移民實邊. While Mongol-Chinese historian Bayilduyci 白拉都格其 argues 
that the Qing government never executed yimin shibian as a Court policy despite 
appeals from frontier officials’ and the press, the fact remained that migration of Han 
Chinese settlers to the northern frontiers accelerated since the late-nineteenth century. 
229
 Continued migration of Han Chinese into Inner Mongolia led to growth in 
population and Han Chinese settlements in Inner Mongolia, and changed the region’s 
demographic composition. During his journey to eastern Inner Mongolia in 1906, Chen 
Zushan 陳祖善 noticed on his way the existence of many Chinese settlements and that 
they were “mostly populated by natives of Shandong, with some of them having settled 
here for several generations, whilst others just came here scores of years ago.”230 
 The steady growth of Han Chinese immigrants was matched by a steady decline in 
the Mongolian population in Inner Mongolia. The following table on the number of  
Mongolian zhuangding 壯丁 (able-bodied man) in many of the banners in eastern 
Inner Mongolia between 1769 and 1911 should give a picture, though incomplete, of the 
decline of Mongolian population:  
  
League No. of Able-bodied Men 
(1769) 
No. of Able-bodied Men 
(1911) 
Horqin Left Centre 5,322 4,864 
Horqin Left Front 237 620 
Horqin Left Rear 3,636 3,807 
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Horqin Right Centre 3,152 (in 1771) 1,055 
Horqin Right Front 1,518 1,030 
Horqin Right Rear 1,385 330 
Jalait 1,432 416 
Dubert 1,978 479 
Gorlos Front 1,837 1,233 
Gorlos Rear 2,570 757 
(Source: Jusaghal, 18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu, pp. 260-261)231 
 As a consequence of the steady decline of Mongolian population and large influx of 
Han Chinese immigrants, the demographic composition of Inner Mongolia was 
drastically transformed in that the Mongols had now become the minority ethnic group 
in some parts of the region, as illustrated by the following comparative table of the two 
ethnic groups in the three leagues of eastern Inner Mongolia during the early 
Republican era:  
 







Jirem 193,000 7.7 2,300,000 92.3 2,493,000 
Josotu 209,955 21.6 760,000 78.4 969,955 
Juu Uda 116,741 16.7 583,000 83.3 699,741 
Total  519,696 12.5 3,643,000 87.5 4,162,696 
(Source: Jusaghal, 18-20 shi ji chu dong bu Nei Menggu nong geng cun luo hua yan jiu, p. 268)232 
 The above changes not only had far-reaching impact upon the Mongols south of the 
Gobi, but they also caused alarm among their kinsmen north of Desert. These should 
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help explain in part why the Mongols of Outer Mongolia would react so vehemently to 
the state’s implementation of xinzheng on their lands, and this will be the subject of 
chapter 6. 
B. Expansion of jun xian zhi 郡縣制 (Chinese-style Administration) 
 Closely related to the State’s land reclamation programme in Inner Mongolia was the 
further expansion of jun xian zhi in the region. This was because, apart from the 
practical need to govern the growing Han Chinese settlements beyond the Great Wall, 
expansion of jun xian zhi was considered an effective system to exert central control 
over the borderlands. As Yao Xiguang noted, “Feng jian 封建 (feudalism) suits a 
nomadic society but not a unified one. Jun xian is suitable for governing an agricultural 
society as it facilitates the concentration of power in the centre.”233 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, with the continuing migration of Han Chinese farmers to 
Mongolia since the early Qing period, the state found it necessary to set up Chinese 
style administrative units, namely fu 府 (prefecture), ting 廳 (sub-prefecture), zhou 
州 (department) and xian 縣 (county), in the settlement areas to manage and control 
these migrants. In theory, administrators of these units, known as lishi 理事 (director 
or executive) , who were of relatively low ranking, were only responsible for governing 
the Chinese settlers under their jurisdiction, and were not allowed to meddle in the 
internal affairs of the banners.  
 Records show that the first of such Chinese-style administrative units in eastern Inner 
Mongolia—namely, two ting—were set up during the reign of the Yongzheng emperor, 
in Jehol (1723) and Kharachin (1729) respectively.234 The network of jun xian 
continued to expand following the spreading of agriculture and Han Chinese settlements 
to different parts of the region. By the eve of xinzheng implementation, three fu, one 
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zhou, eleven ting and eight xian were created in the Mongolian region.235  
 In addition to increase in the number of jun xian, the State also found it necessary to 
reform the management of these kouwai 口外 (beyond the pass) administrative units, 
with a view to enhancing the State’s control over them. In October 1882, Shanxi 
governor Zhang Zhidong memorialized the Court, urging an overhaul of the 
administration of the Province’s seven ting236 beyond the pass:  
 “Guihua is the leader of the seven…Its land is fertile; its aspect is immense and 
magnificent. Civilians and Mongols lived side by side throughout the area, customs are 
rude, and official affairs are troublesome. Salaqi makes up the extreme northwestern 
borderlands of Shanxi….These two ting (Guihua and Salaqi) now experience matters 
involving foreign trade and churches……Fengzhen…is ringed with pastoral farms and 
crowded with liumin 流民 (transient); there are also many matters related to foreign 
churches…Land reclamation in Ningyuan increases by the day….. Tuoketuo is bounded 
by the Yellow River (on one side) where the boats of merchants from beyond the 
borders are driven downstream. It is the strategic throat of the waterway to ports in 
Shanxi…. Horinger is mountainous and customs are rough, the majority of grain 
growers in this area evade taxes. It is also the northern route to Guihua and Salaqi. (The 
boundary of ) Qingshuihe follows the Great Wall, the people are disorderly….”237  
 In short, Zhang urged administrative reforms in these seven kouwai sub-prefectures 
with a view to tackling a host of problems arising from the presence of Han immigrants 
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and foreigners, such as lawlessness, incompetent bureaucrats, ethnic tensions, illegal 
renting of land, tax evasion, and security concerns posed by foreigners.  
 Of the different reforms proposed by Zhang, a significant one was his proposal to 
register the local Han population as native inhabitants, or ru ji 入籍. He pointed out 
that  
  “Although these people (Han immigrants) have lived (in this area) for several 
generations….they have no fixed names or official provenance.” This led to law and 
order problems as “the good and the bad live side by side.” He argued that official 
recognition of the Han immigrants as belonging to these sub-prefectures (by registering 
them as natives) would help revitalize the area’s administration and tighten the 
government control over them, including proper collection of tax.238  
 Zhang proposed that the Han people living within the boundaries of these sub-
prefectures should be classified into three categories: liang hu 糧戶 (grain tax payers), 
ye hu 業戶 (property holders) and ji hu 寄戶 (transients). The first two categories 
should be automatically registered as natives, whilst the third category should also be 
registered as natives provided that they had lived in the area for a long time and that 
they were willing to be so registered. Han living outside the boundaries of these ting on 
the adjacent Mongolian banner lands should be monitored and registered once a year.239   
 Zhang’s reform proposals were subsequently approved by the Court despite 
oppositions from the Mongolian banners. In my opinion, the significances of Zhang’s 
“nativisation” proposal were twofold. First, this was an official recognition of the 
changed status of Han Chinese migrants in the borderlands from one of “sojourners” 
(who stay in the borderlands for a short period of time to earn money and then return to 
home in China proper) to that of permanent settlers. Second, this was the first attempt of 
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the State to “domesticate” the extramural administrative units and turn them into jun 
xian of China proper.     
 Since 1902, provincial officials such as Cen Chunxuan, Zhao Erxun 趙爾巽, and Wu 
Tingbin 吳廷斌 repeatedly petitioned the Court for establishment of jun xian in the 
borderlands for better management and control of the Chinese settlements on the 
reclaimed lands. As Zhao Erxun memorialized in 1902,  
 “The addition or merging of jun xian has always been made in response to changes 
of the prevailing situation. Now that combating the crimes in different ting is of utmost 
importance, and that the number of lawsuits has grown several times over the normal, 
my proposals regarding the demerging of the ting and re-deploying of the administrators 
are therefore appropriate measures in light of the prevailing times and situations.”240  
 In response to the appeals of these provincial officials, the Court approved the 
establishment of new jun xian in different areas of the Chahar banners, the Ulan Qab 
and the Yeke Juu Leagues. For the same reason, the jun xian zhi was also spread to the 
Eastern Mongolia to the banner lands within the leagues of Josotu, Juu Uda and Jirem. 
Unlike the pre-xinzheng jun xian (which were set up after the establishment of Chinese 
settlements), the jun xian of the xinzheng period were set up at the same time as, or even 
before, land reclamation activities began 241 All told, the state had set up three dao 道 
(circuit), two fu, ten ting and thirteen xian during the period of xinzheng.242  
 Inevitably, the establishment of Han Chinese settlements in the midst of the 
Mongolian banners would lead to tensions between the two ethnic groups. However, the 
setting up of Chinese style administrative units in the settlement areas failed to solve the 
problems, in particular regarding the lawsuits that involved the two peoples. As Wu 
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  “If a lawsuit is dealt with in the zhou-xian, the authorities will show partiality for the 
Han Chinese. If the case is tried in the Mongolian banners, the authorities will side with 
the Mongols.”243   
 Moreover, the existence of these Chinese style administrative units among the 
banners greatly reduced and fragmentized the territories of the affected leagues and 
banners. As a consequence, the administrative powers of the Mongolian princes and 
nobles were significantly weakened. There were even cases whereby Qing officials 
overruled the decisions made by Mongolian princes, as the latter were often held at low 
esteem by the former. For example, the prince of Kharachin planned to connect Chifeng 
and Chaoyang with telegraphic lines. He approached the Beiyang direct for assistance 
without first consulting the dutong concerned because he considered the latter stubborn. 
However, in the end, the dutong stopped the work from proceeding on the ground that 
the prince was nothing better than a member of local gentry and, therefore, should not 
meddle in external affairs.244  
 In short, the expansion of jun xian zhi in Inner Mongolia undermined the powers of 
jasak princes, thus further eroded the Banner System, and paved the way for the 
provincehood of the region. 
 
C. Choumeng gaizhi 籌蒙改制 (Reforming Mongolian Institutions) 
 In this section, I would discuss the institutional reforms introduced by the Qing state, 
at central and local levels, for the management of Mongol affairs during the xinzheng 
decade. These included proposals to provincialize the Mongolian region, and 
replacement of Lifanyuan by Lifanbu 理藩部. 
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(i)  Provincehood for Mongolia 
 Commenting on the Qing court’s provincialization of Xinjiang and Taiwan (two of 
the empire’s frontier regions that were under threat from Russia and Japan respectively) 
in 1884 and 1887, James A. Millward argues that provincialization of the frontier, with 
the concomitant promotion of Han migration and implementation of Chinese 
institutions in areas with sizable non-Han populations, was part of the beleaguered Qing 
dynasty’s attempt to shore up its position on all frontiers.245 Considering the fact that, in 
addition to the eighteen provinces in China proper, a total of five new provinces were 
created by the Qing state between 1884 and 1911, I think Millward’s argument was well 
justified. And it comes as no surprise that the Court, in the face of Russian (and 
Japanese) intrusions into the Mongolian region, would explore provincializing the 
region as part of its xinzheng reforms. 
 Commencing 1903, the Qing court and frontier officials were involved in a heated 
debate whether Inner and Outer Mongolia should be turned into provinces of the 
empire, in the manner of their inland counterparts. Surely, this was a logical 
development following the expansion of jun xian zhi in the region, in Inner Mongolia in 
particular. The successful provincialization of Xinjiang in 1884 should also have 
positive impact upon the thinking of the proposal’s proponents.  
 The debate was initiated by Zhao Erxun, the governor of Hunan province (formerly 
general-in-chief of Shengjing), who memorialized the Throne in 1903, arguing for 
provincializing the Mongolian region as a means to enhance effective control of the 
frontiers beyond the Great Wall. By comparing the different frontier administrations in 
Inner Asia between Han and Tang dynasties, Zhao argued that jun xian 郡縣 was 
superior to jun fu 軍府 (imperial residency), in that the jun xian established by the 
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former continued to exist up to the Qing time whilst the jun fu set up by the latter had 
lost long ago. He then made reference to Zuo Zongtang’s 左宗棠 provincialization of 
Xinjiang and argued that both Inner and Outer Mongolia should be made provinces.246
  In view of the proposal’s immense political and financial implications, the Court 
disseminated Zhao’s memorial to various frontier officials for deliberation and 
recommendation. The proposal met with strong opposition from the frontier officials in 
Outer Mongolia, in particular the imperial residents of Urga, Uliastai, and Kobdo, on 
the grounds that provincialization of the region would be unworkable, and that this 
would contradict with the Qing traditional frontier policy of yinsuerzhi 因俗而治 that 
is, tailoring the frontier policy to suit local circumstances, local people, local customs 
and the occasion. For example, Ruixun 瑞洵, the imperial resident of Kobdo, 
memorialized the Court in the same year,  
 “Mongolia on the north route is a nomadic area. Making it a province will bring 
nothing but harm. First, the place is secluded. Second, the measure would cause 
disturbance. Third, the measure would give rise to suspicion and fear among the 
Mongols. Fourth, its implementation would be exacting and tiring”.247 The proposal 
should therefore not be pursued further. 
 Considering the little progress that had been made in Outer Mongolia in terms of 
land reclamation and implementation of Chinese-style administration, I would argue 
that Rui Xun’s opposition to provincialization was realistic and justified. In any event, 
confronted with strong opposition from the imperial residents at the Mongolian 
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frontiers, the Court temporarily shelved the proposal.  
 However, the proposal was revived again two years later and with much more 
intensity. The revival had much to do with the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, which was 
fought mainly on Chinese soil, with China being reduced to a helpless bystander 
throughout the whole episode. As Yao Xiguang noted in a submission in September 
1905, 
 “The whole situation in the eastern and northern frontiers has changed since Russia’s 
completion of the Siberian Railway. Since Japan and Russia squabbled, their victory or 
defeat, and their war or peace, have been of grave concern to us. And the whole 
situation changed again. …The four eastern Mongolian leagues are situated between the 
Capital City, Fengtian, and Jilin, just like the part of human body between the waist and 
arm. So, this (the Russian intrusion) was really a danger to the heartland, not a threat at 
the frontier…In the present circumstances, we should rouse ourselves to catch up; we 
should no longer dither and thus lose the opportunity (to strengthen the border 
security)…”  
 He then put forth his proposal to divide Inner Mongolia into two provinces (east and 
west), and Outer Mongolia into three provinces (east, west and north). Yao even 
optimistically envisaged that, within five years of the proposed provincialization, all the 
territories south of the Gobi would become prosperous and vibrant.248 
 In the same year, a court official Zuo Shaozuo 左紹佐 also memorialized the 
Throne: 
 “Under the old system, governors and governors-general managed the local 
administrative units (beyond the pass) whilst generals-in-chief and lieutenant generals 
managed Mongolian banners. Mongols and Hans could be at peace with each other 
when there was no communication between them. Now that Mongols and Hans are in 
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contact with each other, and transactions between them are numerous. …. Dao, fu, zhou 
and xian deal with lawsuits but Mongols refuse to abide by their rulings. Generals-in-
chief and lieutenant generals control the Mongolian banners but the local administrative 
units refuse to follow their orders. …..Should any mishap occur, the consequences 
would be too ghastly to contemplate….All this was caused by the lack of unity of 
authority……In my opinion, if we are to manage the Mongolian banners, unifying all 
the authorities would be of the topmost priority. In order to unify the authorities, the 
most important instrument is provincialization.”249  
 Zuo’s view was echoed by other officials, including Cen Chunxuan (governor-
general of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces), Tingjie 廷杰 (lieutenant general of 
Jehol) (1907), Chengxun 誠勳 (lieutenant general of Chahar) (1907), Yigu (general-in-
chief of Suiyuan) (1907), Cheng Dequan (acting governor of Heilongjiang) (1907), and 
Sando (acting lieutenant general of Guihua) (1909). Though they had offered different 
views on how the Mongolian region should be provincialized, it was clear that 
provincialization of Mongolia had now become the mainstream view of the official 
discourse. 
 The proposal to provincialize the Mongolian region was also the subject of debate in 
the public media of the time. For example, in 1905, an influential magazine, The 
Eastern Miscellany 東方雜誌 reprinted an article entitled “Arguments against  
Further Delay in Provincializing Mongolia” 論蒙古改設行省之不可緩 from Sze Pao 
時報 (Times Newspaper), contending that Russia would surely plot to nibble Mongolia 
away from China following its defeat by Japan. Citing the successful provincialization 
of Xinjiang and the British invasion of Tibet (in 1888 and 1903) as examples, the article 
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called for the immediate provincialization of the Mongolian region. To add further 
weight to the argument, the article noted, 
 “What is causing more concern is that, our reporters have heard from time to time 
that the Mongolian vassals have been secretly seduced (by the Russians). Moreover, 
because of their poverty, the Mongols have frequently sold their lands to the Russians. 
Even the nearby Khalkha tribe is no exception….if we do not sort out the mess now, all 
the pasturelands of the six Leagues (in Inner Mongolia) will become the public 
properties of Russia in ten years’ time…” 
 The article concluded that provincialization of Mongolia was the only viable option, 
and should not be delayed any further despite the huge costs involved. 250 
 On 9 December, The Eastern Miscellany reprinted another article entitled “The Way 
to Govern Mongolia should be Clearly Constituted Now” 論今日宜明定統治蒙古之
法 from Nanfang Pao 南方報 (The Southern News), which read, 
 “That we did not start to discuss how to manage Mongolia until today is a belated 
action. Still, being late is better than inaction.…..For today’s Mongolia, external 
relationship (with Russia) was a priority…..We should work out a plan on the 
governance of Mongolia as soon as possible, and announce it to the whole world, so that 
foreigners know clearly that Mongolia is our territory….Now that jun xian has been 
installed in Xiyu 西域 (the Western Regions, i.e. Xinjiang). China proper and the three 
Northeastern Provinces are under our control. The provincialization of the whole 
Mongolian territory should have been effected a long time ago.”251  
 From the above articles, it was obvious that strengthening the Mongolian frontier 
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against Russian intrusion was the primary consideration behind the provincialization 
proposal. Naturally, the proposal was not without dissenters. For example, in 1908, an 
article entitled “Private Views on Provincializing the Frontiers” 沿邊改建行省之私議, 
reprinted in The Eastern Miscellany, opposed the immediate provincialization of 
Mongolia and Tibet on the grounds that (a) the cash-strapped State was unable to meet 
the huge financials costs incurred in provincialization; (b) it was impossible to establish 
jun xian in Mongolia and Tibet, where the territory was vast but the population sparse; 
and (c) the ethnic tensions between Han and Mongols would make governance of these 
frontier regions very difficult.252  
 However, till the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the Court took no steps to 
provincialize most parts of Inner Mongolia, with the exception of Manchuria, or 
Dongbei 東北 (the Northeast), which included fringes of the Mongolian steppe and 
was technically part of Inner Mongolia and vice versa. 
 The provincialization of Manchuria was effected in 1907. Under the new 
arrangement, Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang were raised to provincial status, now 
generally known as Dong San Sheng 東三省 (the three Northeast provinces), and their 
jurisdictions were enlarged to cover the newly established jun xian on banner lands as 
well as the Mongolian banners they formerly superintended. All the imperial resident 
posts were abolished and replaced by a viceroy and governors. With the creation of the 
three Northeast provinces, the total number of provinces in Qing China was increased to 
22. 
 Historian Chang Chi-hsiung notes that the pro-provincialization camp was composed 
of civilian and military officials stationed in Inner Mongolia and the three Northeastern 
Provinces, as well as court officials, governors and governors-general in the heartland, 
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whilst those officials stationed in Outer Mongolia were unanimously against making the 
region provinces.253 According to Chang’s analysis, the Qing’s inaction was mainly due 
to, among others, financial hardship. In other words, the cash-strapped Qing court was 
unable to raise enough money to provincialize the whole Mongolia.254  
 Chang’s view was indeed a correct observation because, according to official 
estimation, the costs required to set up a new province (such as construction of offices, 
annual salaries for additional staff, etc.) would amount to no less than tens of millions 
silver taels.255 
 Judging from Japan’s occupation of Taiwan in 1895 and its intrusion into Dongbei in 
the 20th century, I would argue that provincialization of the frontiers, though an effective 
instrument to extend the State’s control to the borderlands, cannot guarantee the 
territorial integrity against foreign invasion.  
(ii) Lifanbu 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the Lifanyuan played a crucial role in connecting the 
centre and the Inner Asian peripheries politically, culturally, and economically during 
the early Qing period. However, the changing conditions in China’s frontier regions 
since the late nineteenth century called for an overhaul of the State’s traditional policy 
of indirect rule in these borderlands. And this policy shift also led to the replacement of 
the Lifanyuan by the Lifanbu.  
  In the early 20th century there were calls to reform the Lifanyuan. As the above-
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quoted article from Nanfang Pao noted in 1905,  
  “Though we have the Lifanyuan taking charge of the governance of the frontier 
territories, it has long been so corrupt that no one can tell what its responsibilities are. If 
we are to shake it up, we must, first of all, clearly define what the rights and duties of 
the Lifanyuan have over the frontier territories.”256   
 In 1906, the Qing court introduced large-scale reforms to the metropolitan 
administration, including the replacement of some of the venerable liu bu 六部 (Six 
Boards, namely Boards of Civil Office, Revenue, Rites, War, Punishment, and Public 
Works) by cabinet ministries, after the fashion of Japan and other parliamentary 
governments. For example, the Hubu 户部 (Board of Revenue) was replaced by the 
Duzhibu 度支部 (Ministry of Finance); Xingbu 刑部 (Board of Punishment) was 
transformed to Fabu 法部 (Ministry of Justice); Bingbu 兵部 (Board of War) was 
changed to Lujunbu 陸軍部 (Ministry of the Armies). New ministries, such as 
Shangbu 商部 (Ministry of Trade), Xunjingbu 巡警部 (Ministry of Police)257, Xuebu 
學部 (Ministry of Education) and Youchuanbu 郵傳部 (Ministry of Posts and 
Communications), were also set up to meet the new political, social, and economic 
challenges.  
 It was in the same exercise that Lifanyuan was reorganized as Lifanbu. 
Organizationally, the Lifanbu would continue to be headed by a shangshu 尚書, who 
was assisted by two shilang 侍郎, a number of langzhong 郎中, yuanwailang 員外郎 
and other bureaucrats. Besides, the ministry would continue to be manned by Manchu 
and Mongol administrators. 
 However, the significance of the change lies in the new ministry’s mission. In this 
connection, a blueprint entitled Lifanbu guanzhi caoan 理藩部官制草案 (Draft plan 
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on the bureaucratic establishment of Lifanbu) was drawn up by the Court, outlining the 
organization and responsibilities of this new ministry. According to a detailed account 
attached to Prince Qing’s memorial on the administrative reforms, the change was 
necessary because: 
  “Colonization (of the frontiers) is the key to counter international competitions, 
since it will achieve stability and defend the borders of Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai. 
As the administrative work involved is as important as those of the other ministries, 
Lifanyuan is therefore transformed to Lifanbu.”258 
  The statement suggested that the main task of the new Lifanbu would be the 
promotion of migration to the frontier regions in order to strengthen their defense, and 
this represented a sharp departure from the traditional Manchu policy of ethnic 
segregation. The new policy shift was actually the State’s response to the public calls 
for colonizing the frontiers since the late nineteenth century.  
  For example, during the famous Gongju Shangshu movement 公車上書 in 1895, 
famous reformist Kang Youwei 康有為 submitted a petition urging the Court to 
implement different reforms, and one of the proposals he put forth was the colonization 
of the frontiers: 
 “In the northwestern provinces, lands are wasted and populations are scarce. This is 
more so in the three northeastern provinces, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. With population 
so small, the productivity of land cannot be developed. If we move people to these 
regions, we will open up new sources of benefit, and strengthen the border defense.”259 
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  The call for colonizing the frontiers became more urgent with the growing Russian 
intrusion into Mongolia. An editorial entitled “Moving People to Strengthen the Borders 
Cannot be Further Delayed Now” 徙民實邊為今日之不可緩 published in The 
Eastern Miscellany in 1907, read, 
 “Today, to move people to strengthen the borders is the most important strategy. 
Given the State’s shortage of financial resources to develop the frontiers, moving the 
surplus population to fill up the frontier wastelands not only will save money in the 
development of the borders, but will also reduce the risks of having too many people 
with too little food in the heartlands. ….Although there are tens of thousands li of sand 
in Mongolia, fertile lands are not lacking (in the region). ….If we do not urgently plan 
for ourselves, the whole Mongolia will become Russia’s preserve someday…”260  
  The call was echoed by another article entitled “Private Discussion on Moving 
People to Strengthen the Borders” 徙民實邊私議 published by The Eastern 
Miscellany in 1908, which read, 
  “In today’s China, the most populous province was Shu 蜀 (Sichuan Province), 
whose population exceeds 80,000,000. This was followed by Wu-Yue 吳越 (Jiangsu-
Zhejiang Provinces), Chu 楚 (Hunan-Hubei Provinces) and Yue 粵(Guangdong 
Province)…..With the continued growth of population, it would become ever more 
difficult to make a living. With making a living becoming ever more difficult, the 
quality of life would become ever more substandard…..If we turn our attention to the 
western and northern frontiers, (we will find) vast expanses of land that know no 
bounds. If we do not improve the people’s livelihood by moving them from populous 
regions to regions where the population is scarce, our strong neighbor (Russia) will 
watch closely for every opportunity to bully us with violence, and we will be unable to 
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defend ourselves. What a pity!”261  
  From the above, it was clear that the calls for colonizing the frontiers aimed to 
achieve (a) to develop the frontier regions; (b) to relieve the population pressures in the 
heartlands; and (c) to strengthen the borders against Russian intrusion. What was also 
noteworthy was that these calls had mainly come from Han Chinese intellectuals. It was 
in pursuance with these goals that re-organization of the Lifanbu was to proceed.  
   If the newly established Lifanbu was to proceed with colonizing the borderlands, 
the greatest hurdles that had to be overcome beforehand were the absence of accurate 
statistical data about the frontier regions, as well as and the lack of relevant rules and 
regulations to guide the various reforms in the borderlands. It was against this 
background that two new bureaus, namely Diaochaju 調查局 (Investigation Bureau) 
and Bianzuanju 編纂局 (Editing Bureau) were created in the Lifanbu in 1907.  
  In 1910, in compliance with an instruction issued by the Xianzheng Biancha Guan 
憲政編查館 (Office to Draw up Regulations for Constitutional Government) that all 
yamen 衙門 (government offices) in the country should set up their respective 
Xianzheng Choubeichu 憲政籌備處 (Preparatory Office for Constitutional 
Government) to prepare for the coming constitution, the Diaochaju and the Bianzuanju 
were combined to form a Xianzheng Choubeichu, with its responsibility being the 
preparation of constitutional reforms in the frontier regions. In the same year, in 
contravention of the traditional arrangement that the Lifanyuan should only be manned 
by Manchu and Mongol officials, the Court approved the posting of several Han 
officials, such as Cao Rulin 曹汝霖, Lao Naixuan 勞乃宣, Wu Tingxie 吳廷燮 and 
Wang Rongbao 汪榮寶, to the Lifanbu to assist in the planning and implementation of 
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constitutional reforms in the borderlands.262 Perhaps, a more significant reform to the 
Lifanbu would have been a proposal to set up the Zhichansi 殖產司 (Colonial 
Development Division) and Bianweisi 邊衛司 (Border Defense Division). According 
to the Court’s planning, the former would be responsible for opening Mongolian lands; 
protecting forestry; coordinating livestock breeding, hunting, textile, fishery, mining and 
other industries; and constructing railways, whilst the latter would be responsible for 
training and deployment of Mongolian and Tibetan armies; setting up schools and relay 
stations, and handling border affairs and trade, etc. Undoubtedly, these two offices, if 
established as proposed, would become useful instruments in realizing the ministry’s 
new goals of promoting migration and strengthening border defense. However, as 
evidenced by a court memorial of 1909, the authorities concerned were still 
investigating the feasibility of the proposal despite its importance and urgency.263 
While no reasons could be found in official documents for the delay, I guess shortage of 
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Chapter 5 Xinzheng in Inner Mongolia (II) 
 
 In the preceding chapter, I have examined the Qing state’s xinzheng reforms in the 
areas of land reclamation, imposition of Chinese-style administrative units, and 
reconstitution of Mongolian governing institutions in Inner Mongolia. In this chapter, I 
will deal with the remaining important reforms in the Mongolian region south of the 




 Given the threats posed by Western powers and Japan to the territorial integrity of 
the Qing empire since the mid-nineteenth century, military revitalization, as highlighted 
in the famous Reform Edict of 29 January 1901, was naturally one of the top priorities 
of xinzheng reforms. In December 1903, the Court set up a Lianbing Chu 練兵處 
(Commission for Army Reorganization) for planning the reorganization and 
modernization of its armies. In the following year, the Lianbing Chu submitted 
proposals to the Throne detailing the organization, pay, and creation of new armies, as 
well as the establishment of a whole hierarchy of military schools in the empire. These 
proposals were subsequently approved by the Court and became the guidelines for the 
military revitalization programs implemented throughout the empire.  
The guiding principles of the Court’s military revitalization program were set out 
by an imperial edict issued in August 1901, which reads,  
“In our opinion, training of generals is the prerequisite of military revitalization, 
and this in turn relies on education. To this end, we must set up plenty of wubei xuetang 
武備學堂 (military academies)….However, the effects of wubei xuetang cannot be 
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achieved overnight, and the number of trained personnel from the existing xuetang in 
different provinces cannot meet our needs. ….In the circumstances, we ask all the 
generals-in-chief, governors-generals, and governors in all the provinces to strictly cut 
down the garrisons under their purview, and select certain battalions to be trained as 
standing armies, reserves, and patrols with modern firearms. The training must be 
serious so that they will become powerful armies…”264  
The same guidelines were applied to Mongolia, which, as discussed in previous 
chapters, had long served as a “screen” for China proper against external threats from 
the north. The growing presence of Russia and Japan in the region no doubt made the 
need to strengthen the regional defense all the more pressing. Referring to the military 
deployments of Russia and Japan in northeastern China following the Russo-Japanese 
War in 1905, Wu Luzhen remarked,  
 “Should they (Russia or Japan) invade Mongolia one day, the four eastern 
Mongolian leagues would have to bear the brunt. Hence, today’s Manchuria is 
yesterday’s Korea; tomorrow’s four eastern Mongolian leagues will become today’s 
Manchuria. Barring that China does not want to strengthen herself; if China does, it 
must step up its border defense. If China wants to step up the border defense, the gain or 
loss of Mongolia and Manchuria will be of utmost importance…If we manage not to 
lose Mongolia, we can gradually advance from there and stop their (Russian or 
Japanese) southern intrusion. Therefore, we operate in Mongolia not just for Mongolia’s 
sake. We would use Mongolia as a defense base and as a precursor to the restoration of 
Manchuria.”265   
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There were two approaches to strengthen the Mongol region’s defense. The first 
one, naturally, was to train Mongolian soldiers, who had played an important role 
militarily during the early Qing period, but whose military prowess had declined since 
the nineteenth century. As Zhang Zhidong remarked, 
“The Mongolian leagues stood together, through thick and thin, with the different 
reigns of our Holy Qing, and share weal and woe with China today. During the reigns of 
Yongzheng and Qianlong, the Mongolian tribes contributed their armies to the 
subjugation of the Zunghars and the Huis, and accomplished great meritorious services. 
Of late, the Mongolian vassals are penniless, and have become ever more poor and 
weak, thus giving the Russians a chance to come in.”266  
Zhang therefore suggested that the state should seek to revive nomadism in 
Mongolia, and train Mongolian soldiers with the profits accrued therefrom. As he noted,  
“A strong Mongolia would serve as our scouts and sentinels. A weak Mongolia 
would become the fish and meat on their (Russian and Japanese) chopping board. The 
difference between these two scenarios was impossible to measure.”267  
Zhang’s view was shared by some reform-minded Mongol jasaks and princes, such 
as Prince Gungsangnorbu of the Kharachin Right Banner, and Prince Guanchuksurong 
of the Horqin Banner. For example, Prince Gungsangnorbu argued that “Able-bodied 
Mongols are noted for their bravery, and have made a lot of praiseworthy contributions 
to the state since its establishment.” He then urged the Lujunbu 陸軍部 (Ministry of 
Army) to help train Mongolian soldiers, and organize them into army units for the 
defense of the Mongolian borderlands.268  
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Gungsangnorbu also set up a military academy, namely Shouzheng Wubei Xuetang 
守正武備學堂, in his banner for the training of Mongolian military personnel. 
External threats aside, Mongol princes and jasaks also found it necessary to turn 
the subjects of their respective banners into militias for their own protection against the 
bandits that plagued their banners. As Wu Luzhen noted in 1906,  
“Of late, owing to the Boxer uprisings and the rampancy of hufei 鬍匪 (bearded 
bandits) in the region, all the banners started to train their own military forces along the 
lines of the militia system (in China proper)…”269  
However, the effectiveness of such Mongolian militia was in grave doubt. As Wu 
Luzhen reported, 
“However, from what I have heard, such military service was considered a type of 
feudal duties and, therefore, the militias were not very well provisioned. As a 
consequence, the militias were extremely tired and weak, and were deeply imbued with 
bad habits, with some of them being drug addicts. These militias were nothing but 
guards of honor created for the purpose of good public impression.”270  
The other aspects of Mongol military revitalization did not fare much better either. 
As Wu Luzhen added, 
“A visit to the Academy (Shouzheng Wubei Xuetang) revealed that the number of 
students fell short of the available places. Their form and spirit were far inferior to that 
of Beiyang. The Taijis hung firearms on the wall of their homes but these were old 
models of more than one hundred years ago….Most of the newly acquired firearms 
were old-fashioned with wooden-butts, and they were only good for hunting, unable to 
defend against the hufei . …The horses of the cavalry were untrained and poorly 
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fed….In short, it could be said that there was no military system in Mongolia.” 271  
 The second approach was to revitalize the existing Manchu (Eight Banners) and 
Han (Green Standard) garrisons in the region, and to create modernized armies 
according to Western standards. Despite the strategic importance of Mongolia to the 
security of the empire, the state garrisons in the region were also in very bad shape 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yigu, in his capacity as the Suiyuan 
general-in-chief, pointed out, “all the barracks were full of tired and weak soldiers who 
had been imbued with deep-rooted bad habits (i.e. opium smoking).272  
Commenting on the newly recruited soldiers in eastern Mongolia, Wu Luzhen also 
noted, “The recruited soldiers are a motley group, with good ones and bad ones mixing 
together. Drills and exercises are rare. It cannot be ruled out that some of them have 
secret connections with bandits.” 273 He also added that, “there was no coordination 
between different army corps as if there were great gullies separating them.”274  
The Court’s military re-vitalization program was mainly composed of measures to 
re-train existing army units in westernized (and Japanese) drills, tactics, and weaponry; 
to establish new and modernized armies; and to establish wubei xuetang for the 
grooming of military personnel. In Inner Mongolia, the program was mainly undertaken 
by the imperial residents, namely the jiangjun, dutong/fu dutong 都統/副都統, of 
different Mongolian towns on a local basis.  
The aim of re-training was to turn the dilapidated army units into a modern army of 
changbeijun 常備軍 (regular army). For example, in 1901, Xinke 信恪, the Suiyuan 
general-in-chief, was tasked to turn the Manchu garrison under his command into a 
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changbeijun and to establish a wubei xuetang in the city. According to the plan, he was 
to pick 300 men from the Banner troops to undergo a one-year military re-training 
program. After the first year, the re-trained soldiers would be placed on reserve and 
another batch of 300 soldiers would be selected for training. The same process would be 
repeated every year until all the Banner soldiers were re-trained. Meanwhile, 60 young 
men from the Mongol Eight Banners were recruited to study at the Suiyuan Wubei 
Xuetang 綏遠武備學堂, where they were taught westernized/Japanese drills. In 1906, 
the Suiyuan Wubei Xuetang was changed to Suiyuan Lujun Xiaoxuetang 綏遠陸軍小
學堂 (Suiyuan Army Elementary School) in accordance with the Lianbing Chu’s 
regulations. In the first year, a total of 30 students from the nearby banners were 
enrolled, and the subjects being taught included Guo Wen 國文 (Chinese), English, 
history, geography, arithmetic, physics, moral education, drawing, drills, and military 
strategy, etc.275   
Apart from the poor quality of the troops and recruits as discussed above, shortage 
of funding also severely handicapped these frontier officials’ efforts to modernize their 
forces. As Yigu talked about the retraining program in Suiyuan,  
“At the beginning (of the retraining program), we had to borrow the 10,000-odd  
taels of majiayin 馬價銀 (horse silver) in our inventory to meet the (inception) 
expenses. This sum has already been used up within these two years. We have yet to 
acquire flags, military uniforms, books, equipment, and other necessities. However, we 
have already run out of money and cannot afford to buy these items.”276  
According to Yigu’s plan, recurrent expenditure for the re-training program and 
operation cost of the military academy was supposed to come from the yahuangyin and 
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land taxes arising from the opening of the horse-farms at Suiyuan. However, the soil 
quality in question was so poor that few Han Chinese farmers had shown interest in 
them. As a consequence, both the re-training program and the academy were on the 
verge of bankruptcy. Yigu had to make use of the revenues collected from coal and 
mining as well as other sources to meet the expenses.277 
 Similarly, due to shortage of funds, the size of the Tumed standing army had to be 
reduced from 300 to 200 troops, with the savings arising therefrom to be utilized to 
acquire uniforms and other provisions for the soldiers.278 Also, because of shortage of 
funding, the cavalry of Chahar had to turn to the Beiyang Army 北洋軍 for the 
provision of firearms and ammunitions.279   
The military revitalization program in eastern Mongolia was also plagued with the 
chronic problem of funding shortage. As Xiliang 錫良, the viceroy of Dong San Sheng 
reported in 1909 (or two years before the Qing dynasty collapsed):  
“The Lujunbu had previously stipulated that each of the Fengtian, Jilin, and 
Heilongjiang provinces should train one zhen 鎮280 of (modernized) army within two 
years, and the deadline fell on the seventh month of this year. As things now stand, 
Fengtian has just re-organized six ying of infantry, and one ying of artillerymen…Jilin 
has trained one xie of infantry. Nothing has been done for the training of army in 
Heilongjiang. Since the situations of these three provinces are equally important, how 
can we delay action in Heilongjiang? This is because raising money is extremely 
difficult and as such we are unable to accomplish so many tasks simultaneously.”281  
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 In the absence of real battles fought between Qing armies and foreign intruders 
during the xinzheng period, it would be difficult to measure the effectiveness of the 
military revitalization program in the Mongol region. However, judging from the quality 
of the Qing troops and Mongolian militias as evidenced by eyewitness reports of the 
time, and the chronic problem of funding shortage that had seriously handicapped the 
implementation of the reform, I have strong doubts about how much could be achieved 
in the revitalization program.    
 
Educational Reforms 
 As highlighted in the Reform Edict of 1901, to secure rencai 人材 (men of real 
talent) was one of the top priorities of xinzheng reforms. The Edict declares,  
“The first essential, even more important than devising new systems, is to secure 
men of administrative ability. Without new systems, the corrupted old system cannot be 
saved; without men of ability, even good systems cannot be made to succeed.”282  
 Securing men of real talent was to be achieved through implementing educational 
reforms throughout the empire. In China proper, educational reforms included the 
establishment of a new system of civil and military schools; the incorporation of more 
practical questions in civil service testing; replacement of military examinations with 
training at new military schools; and the encouragement of study abroad.283 Because of 
Mongolia’s frontier status, the educational reforms implemented in the region were 
mainly confined to the establishment of modern schools, and the concomitant 
introduction of new curricula at these new schools. 
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 During the early twentieth century, both Han and Mongol elites repeatedly urged 
the Court to introduce educational reforms in Mongolia as they unanimously agreed that 
the Mongols were backward and ignorant. In their opinion, Lamaism was the chief 
cause of the Mongols’ ignorance and hence the urgent need for educating the Mongols 
with modern knowledge. For example, in a memorial to the Throne, Zhang Qihuai 章
啓槐, a neige zhongshu 內閣中書 (cabinet assistant), pointed out,  
“All the people of Mongolia, regardless of their gender and age, engage in raising 
livestock. They have no schools and know nothing about education. As a result, the 
people are ignorant and education cannot be applied…..What is most inconceivable 
about the people of Mongolia is that they have blind faith in religion (i.e. Lamaism)….If 
we are to eradicate their superstitious belief, we must make education available to them 
all, and the way to educate the mass is through the establishment of many elementary 
schools.”284  
 Similarly, a number of Mongolian jasaks and princes, such as Prince 
Gungsangnorbu, Prince Palta of Old Torgot Right Banner, Prince Guanchuksurong of 
Horqin Banner, and Prince Nayantu of Khalkha, and Duke Bodso of Horqin Banner, 
also appealed to the Throne for promoting education in Mongolia.285 For instance, 
Prince Gungsangnorbu observed,  
“In Mongolia, there has been no education except for the lamas. As a result, most 
people (Mongols) are simple-minded morons with little common sense. Surely, less than 
one or two out of 100 people understand the Han language; even the number of those 
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who understand the Mongolian language is very small. Now that a strong neighbor 
(Russia) is watching us with evil intentions and is inciting (us) in various ways…The 
Mongols have blind faith in Lamaism. If foreigners take advantage of our faith, there 
will be no end of trouble for the future. In the circumstances, educating (the Mongols) is 
of the topmost priority today.”286  
 Understandably, the most effective means to educate the Mongol mass was 
through the establishment of modern schools in the region. During the first decade of 
the twentieth century, a number of modern educational institutions were set up in Inner 
Mongolia. Broadly speaking, these institutions could be classified into three main 
groups: those set up by imperial residents, chiefly for the children of the Manchu Eight 
Banners and Mongols; those set up by zhou-, xian-governments, chiefly for Han 
children; and those set up by Mongolian jasaks and princes for the children of their 
respective banners.287  
 These schools were of different levels, such as gaodeng xuetang 高等學堂 
(higher schools), zhongxuetang 中學堂 (middle schools), gaodeng xiaoxuetang 高等
小學堂 (higher elementary schools), xunchang xiaoxuetang 尋常小學堂 (lower 
elementary schools), and mengxuetang 蒙學堂 (primary schools). In addition to 
educating Mongolian children with new knowledge, these modern schools had a more 
important mission, namely to strengthen the ties between the heartland and the frontiers 
through cultural assimilation. In other words, the schools were tasked to integrate 
Mongolia with China culturally and make the traditional nomadic Mongols, in the 
words of Christopher Atwood, into modernizing sedentary Chinese.288  
                                                      
286 “Kalaqin junwang Gong Sang Nuo Er Bu jingchen guanjian zhe,” p. 451. 
287 Hao and Chimeddorji eds., Neimenggu tongshi, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (I), pp.      
436-437. 
288 Christopher P. Atwood, Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia’s Interregnum Decades, 
1911-1931 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2002), p. 44. 
143 
 
  During the first few years of the xinzheng decade, xuetang of different levels and 
purposes were set up in the Mongolian region, with some of them being transformed 
from the existing old-style shuyuan 書院 (academy). The abolition of Keju 科舉 
(civil service examination system) by the Court in 1906 further boosted the 
establishment of modern schools in the region. By 1911, in the Suiyuan-Guihua district 
alone, there were nine xuetang, including two zhongxuetang, three gaodeng 
xiaoxuetang, two xunchang xiaoxuetang, one Man-Meng xuetang 滿蒙學堂 (Manchu-
Mongol school) and one Huibu xuetang 回部學堂 (Muslim school).289 
 The most representative of these modern schools was Guisui zhongxuetang 歸綏
中學堂 as it was one of the earliest (set up in 1903) and well-established modern 
schools in the region. In 1906, the school premises were enlarged to admit over 100 
students. It also adopted the new curriculum approved by the Qinding xuetang 
zhangcheng 欽定學堂章程 (Imperially Approved School Regulations). Under this 
zhangcheng, subjects like xiushen 修身 (Confucian ethics), wenxue 文學 (literature), 
jingxue 經學 (study of Chinese classics), lishi 歷史 (history), dili 地理 (geography), 
suanxue 算學 (arithmetic), bowu 博物 (natural science), lihua 理化 (physics and 
chemistry), riwen 日文 (written Japanese), riyu 日語 (oral Japanese), yingwen 英文 
(English), tuhua 圖畫 (drawings), yuege 樂歌 (music and songs), and ticao ke 體操
課 (physical exercise) should be taught at schools.290 On the basis of this curriculum, I 
would argue that, whilst acquisition of modern knowledge was an important goal of the 
educational reform, the grooming of junzi 君子 (man of noble character) in accordance 
with Confucian tradition continued to be the top priority of the educational system, even 
in the empire’s frontier regions. 
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 In theory, the same curriculum should be adopted by all modern schools 
throughout the empire whilst permitting necessary variations to suit different local 
situations. However, owing to the shortage of qualified teachers and suitable textbooks 
for new subjects such as arithmetic, foreign languages, bowu, etc., the curricular of 
many xuetang in Mongolia continued to be confined to the teaching of Confucian 
classics.291 In my opinion, this should be a common problem encountered in most parts 
of the empire given the huge upsurge in the demand for western-trained teachers and 
new textbooks during the xinzheng period.  
Apart from shortage of qualified teachers and suitable teaching materials, another 
hurdle to promoting education in Mongolia was the Mongols’ apathy towards schooling. 
For example, as late as 1910, Puliang 溥良, the Chahar dutong, reported to the Court 
that “despite the unfolding of new atmosphere, most people still cling to old traditions, 
and were unaware of the benefits of schooling. As a consequence, education will not 
make much headway (in Mongolia).”292   
 Many leagues and banners of Inner Mongolia, such as the Kharachin Right and the 
Tumed Left Banners of the Josotu League, the Horqin Right Centre, the Jalait, the 
Gorlos Front, and the Durbet Banners of Jirem League, also set up schools of their own. 
In Outer Mongolia, there was one mengxuetang in each of its banners and one 
xiaoxuetang in each of its leagues.293   
Among these reform-minded Mongol jasaks and princes, Prince Gungsangnorbu 
alone had set up two xuetang and one military academy, namely Chongzheng Xuetang 
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崇正學堂, Yuzheng Nü Xuetang 毓正女學堂, and Shouzheng Wu Xuetang 守正武學
堂 within his banner. Of these modern schools, Chongzheng Xuetang, established in 
1902, was regarded as the first modern school in the Mongolian society.294 Some of the 
Mongolian students trained in these schools were subsequently sent to study abroad 
(mainly Japan) and later became zealous participants in Prince Gungsangnorbu’s 
political activities in Beijing during the fall of Qing dynasty.295  
 As stated above, apart from teaching the Mongols modern knowledge, these 
xuetang were also tasked to strengthen the ties between the heartland and the 
borderlands through Mongol-Han assimilation. In practical terms, the assimilation was 
to be achieved through teaching Mongolian children Chinese language, whose official 
language status was legalized by the State in 1904.296 As Wu Luzhen remarked, 
 “Teaching the (Mongolian) children Hanyu 漢語 (oral Chinese) is important in 
elementary schools; in (Mongolian) higher elementary schools and middle schools, 
teaching the students Hanwen 漢文 (written Chinese) is important. This is because 
unification of language is always closely related to (unification of) the nation.”297  
 Another reformist Yao Xiguang 姚錫光 also elaborated on the merits of Mongol-
Han assimilation as he argues,  
“In my humble opinion, there is no better way to reform Mongolian education 
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today than “Mongol-Han Chinese assimilation”, since this will bring this country, 
Mongolia and Han Chinese every advantage and no harm. ….If assimilated, the 
Mongols and Han Chinese will join hands as people of the same country in their 
resistance against foreign aggression……thus bringing the country every advantage and 
no harm. Mongolia was poor because its people do not know how to make a living. 
However, through Mongol-Han Chinese assimilation, the Mongols will be able to learn 
the know-how of farming, handicraft, trade, and other means of living of Han 
Chinese……thus bringing Mongolia every advantage and no harm. Previously, during 
the sixteenth and the seventeenth years of Emperor Guangxu’s reign, the riot of Jindan 
金丹 bandits broke out in Jehol because of the accumulated rancor between the 
Mongols and Han Chinese, and the enmity between them still exists today……If the 
two peoples are assimilated, the enmity between the host (Mongols) and guest (Han 
Chinese) will vanish, thus bringing Han Chinese every advantage and no harm.”298   
 On a more practical level, some state officials also suggested that mastery of the 
Chinese language would facilitate, among others, the teaching of new knowledge and 
the implementation of xinzheng: 
“The Mongols of the northwestern frontiers were simple and crude. Generally, 
apart from Mongolian, the Mongols would sometimes learn a little bit of Manchu. Only 
very few of them mastered the oral and written Chinese language. However, illiteracy of 
Chinese would seriously handicap the enlightenment of Mongols and the 
implementation of xinzheng. Since there are so many subjects to be taught in the general 
course these days, illiteracy of Chinese would cause a lot of contradictions in teaching. 
Hence, illiteracy of Chinese would inconvenient education. Moreover, xinzheng 
implementation involves so many items that the Mongols have never heard of. As they 
cannot read Chinese characters, they are very often suspicious and surprised. Hence, 
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illiteracy of Chinese would inconvenient the execution of policies….”299  
 With a view to achieving assimilation and modernization, the state vigorously 
promoted Chinese learning at Mongol xuetang. Whilst ancient Chinese classics, such as 
Qing Wen Jian 清文鑑 (Pentaglot Dictionary), San Zi Jing 三字經 (Three Character 
Classic), and Sishu 四書 (Four Books), etc., would continue to be used as textbooks 
for Mongolian students,300 new Guo Wen (Chinese) textbooks were also introduced. In 
this regard, the introduction and distribution of Man Meng Han He Bi Jiao Ke Shu 滿蒙
漢合璧教科書 (Textbook in a combination of three Scripts: Manchu, Mongolian and 
Chinese) as a textbook for Mongolian elementary schools in northeast China was 
illustrative of how Guo Wen education was implemented in Inner Mongolia (and 
Manchuria). 
 The Man Meng Han He Bi Jiao Ke Shu was a Manchu-Mongol translation of the 
Chinese textbook entitled Zui Xin Chu Deng Gao Deng Guo Wen Ke Jiao Ke Shu 最新
初等高等國文科教科書 (The Latest Primary and Higher Chinese Textbook), which 
was published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai in 1904. In 1909, Xiliang, the 
viceroy of Dong San Shen, assigned a dismissed official Rongde 榮德 to take charge 
of the translation work. In his memorial to the Throne, Xiliang explained why it was 
necessary to translate Chinese textbooks,  
“If we are to import new knowledge (into Mongolia), we must teach (the students) 
Chinese-written science subjects. The Chinese language is complicated whilst the 
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Mongolian language is simple. Meanings and examples (in Chinese) therefore cannot be 
accurately translated (into Mongolian) without the aid of the Manchu language…If we 
are to strengthen the border defense, we must first of all set up schools; if we are to set 
up schools, we must first of all translate (Chinese textbooks)”.301  
In order to meet the needs of the Xuebu’s new curriculum, many new textbooks 
were published in China, both by the Xuebu and private publishers. However, the 
contents of many of the privately published textbooks were, in the words of a court 
official Zhang Shipei 張世培, “rebellious, absurd, and contradicting the Confucian 
ethical code” whilst the textbooks compiled under the aegis of the Xuebu were 
“overloaded with contents; not of the right level; with poor style and layout; with 
inappropriate expressions; poorly illustrated”.302 That the Zui Xin Chu Deng Gao Deng 
Guo Wen Ke Jiao Ke Shu was selected as the new textbook for Mongolian elementary 
schools was probably because its contents conformed to the specifications of Xuebu and 
met the needs of the time, and that its editorial standard was higher than other similar 
textbooks of the time.303 All told, between 1909 and 1910, Xiliang had printed 20,000 
copies of the textbook (of different volumes) and distributed them to different xuetang 
and Mongolian banners.304  
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In addition to teaching the Mongols Chinese language, the Man Meng Han He Bi 
Jiao Ke Shu also served as an important vehicle for promoting guo min jiao yu 國民教
育 (national education) as it was a textbook that started from the standpoint of Guo Jia 
國家 (the nation)305. For example, one of its texts read, 
“Our China is situated on the eastern part of Asia…..Five thousand years ago, its 
civilization started to flourish, and (China) is thus the most famous ancient country on 
earth. Since the time of our distant ancestors, we have lived in this country, clothed in 
this country, eaten in this country. This remains unchanged from generation to 
generation, up to our time. As we are the subjects of China, how can we not love 
China?”306 
 Given the fact that the Man Meng Han He Bi Jiao Ke Shu was only introduced in 
Dong San Shen shortly before the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the subsequent 
turmoil in the region, it would be difficult to ascertain the impact of Chinese language 
education upon the Mongolian children.  
Moreover, the effect of another goal of the education reform in the region, namely 
Mongol-Han assimilation, was also highly doubtful as evidenced by the eyewitness 
report submitted by Yao Xiguang following his inspection tours of eastern Inner 
Mongolia:  
 “During last year and this spring (1905-1906), I have twice toured the frontier to 
inspect Mongolia, where I found xuetang set up by zhou, xian (governments) and 
Mongolian royal houses. Of the Mongolian xuetang, only the Kharachin royal house 
had set up one mengxiaoxuetang 蒙小學堂 (primary school), one wubei xuetang 武備
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學堂 (military academy), and one nüxuetang (women’s school). There were no 
Mongolian students in xuetang founded by zhou and xian; nor were there any Han 
Chinese students in Mongolian xuetang. Obviously, there was no hope of Mongol-Han 
Chinese assimilation. Moreover, zhou-, xian-governments’ chief motivation (of setting 
up schools) was to use this as a cover to extort money, and they had no intention to 
promote education. That they were corrupt was needless to say.”307   
 However, of more concern to the Qing state was the situation in the Mongolian 
schools, as Yao went on to report:  
 “As to the Mongolian xuetang, they were unanimously interested in the promotion 
of military drills. The examples they cited in lectures or the talks they gave during their 
free time were all about the restoration of Chinggis Khan’s enterprise, with a view to 
inspiring their three million fellow countrymen. There was no mention whatsoever of 
the military achievements of our imperial (Qing) ancestors. It would not be difficult to 
infer what their ulterior motive was….”308  
 Mongol-Chinese historian Zhou Jinghong 周競紅 remarks that the late Qing 
educational reform introduced during the xinzheng period had, to a certain degree, 
advanced the enlightenment of Mongolian consciousness309; in particular, its modern 
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school education system had created the social conditions for the rise of new Mongolian 
social elites.310 No doubt, the educational reform had somewhat changed the cultural 
scene of the Mongolian region, and exposed Mongolian youths to new thinking. For 
example, Yun Heng 雲亨, one of the Mongol leaders in the Suiyuan-Baotou uprising 
against the Qing court in 1911, joined the Zhongguo Tongmenghui 中國同盟會 
(Chinese United League) during his study at Guihua-Suiyuan Zhongxuetang.311  
 
Modern Transport and Communications 
(a) Transport 
 During the xinzheng decade, the Qing state introduced measures seeking to 
improve the connection between China proper and the frontier regions. Closer 
connection not only would strengthen the centre’s control over the peripheries, but 
would also reinforce the state’s defense against foreign intrusion into the borderlands. 
One of these measures was the construction of railroads plying between the heartland 
and the frontiers.  
In Qing China, the controversies surrounding railroad construction started in the 
early 1860s. Conservatives opposed the building of railway networks in China on the 
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grounds that this would invite foreign penetration into the country, cause disturbance 
and panic among the people, and waste large sums of money. They even branded the 
railroad proponents, such as Li Hongzhang and Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳 as traitors. The 
Court vacillated between the two camps till 1889, when it finally came to the view that 
railroad building was important to the country’s modernization and defense.312 
 For the Mongolian frontiers, some officials argued that railroad construction should 
be accorded top priority given the fact that the State’s only rail link between China 
proper and the region at the time was the line between Shanhai Pass 山海關 and 
Fengtian,313 whilst all the other railways in the region were controlled either by Russia 
or Japan, thus posing a serious security threat to the region. As Wu Luzhen observed, 
“The effect of railroads is the greatest. Making good use of railways will enrich the 
country and benefit the people; if not, they will be used by another country as a tool of 
subjugation. For instance, with the opening of the Siberian Railway, Russia became the 
greatest power of the world. The completion of the Mid-East Railway was the real 
image of the loss of the three northeastern provinces, and it led to the great tragedy of 
Russo-Japanese War… The foreigners are operating the railways in the eastern part of 
our country because of their high stakes in Manchuria and Mongolia. (By constructing 
rail roads) we can take a leaf from them and beat them at their own game.”314  
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Wu’s view was shared by other frontier officials in the region, such as Cheng 
Dequan 程德全, then acting governor of Heilongjiang, who argued in 1906 for building 
railway networks to connect the Mongol areas, 
“The first and foremost task is to improve transport service in order to open the 
frontiers. Of the Mongolian areas in the northwest, with the exception of Jehol, Suiyuan 
and Chahar,…..all other areas are deserts and inaccessible places, and they were remote 
in distance and cold in weather. …..What should we do if we are to start (reforms) from 
the scratch? Without improving transport service to facilitate circulation, there would be 
no ways to introduce and implement reforms (in the region).”315  
Even Mongolian jasaks and princes, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu and Prince 
Guanchuksurong also urged the Court to build railroads in the region.316 For example, 
Gungsangnorbu stated in his memorial to the Court, 
“The poor transport service between Mongolian banners has already handicapped 
new developments. Moreover, Russia’s Siberian Railway running from the northwest to 
the southeast has encompassed the whole Mongolia. Since the (Russo-Japanese) War, 
Japan has been active in the southeast whilst Russia has turned its attention to the 
northwest. If we do not construct railroads urgently, it will be very difficult to resist 
(foreign) intrusion…”317  
From the above discussion, it was apparent that Qing frontier officials and 
reformed-minded Mongolian chiefs finally come to realize the strategic importance of 
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railroad to the defense and development of the Mongolian region. However, considering 
the huge construction costs involved and the large areas of land that would be covered 
by a railroad project, it would be difficult for any individual official or banner chief to 
undertake such project on his own. 
In theory, the Youchuanbu 郵傳部 (Ministry of Posts and Communications) set up 
in 1906 would centralize and coordinate all the railroad building projects throughout the 
empire. However, like other xinzheng reforms in the region, most of the rail lines in 
Mongolia were actually planned by individual imperial residents and frontier officials. 
One of the major railroad proposals was the link between Jinzhou and Aigun. The 
project was first mooted by Cheng Dequan (see above) in 1906, but it was subsequently 
revised to start from Jinzhou, via Chaoyang, Xilietu Hure Banner (also known as Little 
Urga), Liaoyuan, and Taonan, and terminates at Aigun. If the proposal had materialized, 
there would have been a rail line running through the three eastern Mongol leagues 
(Josotu, Juu Uda, and Jirem) of Inner Mongolia, thus bringing about significant benefits 
to the region in terms of transportation, commerce, and defense.318 However, owing to 
funding difficulties and Japan’s interference and obstruction, this project never 
materialized.319  
The first successful example of Chinese financed rail line during the period was the 
Beijing-Zhangjiakou railway. Proposed by Yuan Shikai in 1905, the line connected 
China’s capital city with the town of Zhangjiakou that borders Inner Mongolia. This 
railway commenced operation in 1909. In 1907, Yuan Shikai proposed to extend the 
Beijing-Zhangjiakou railway to Urga in Outer Mongolia, but obviously the proposal 
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was not followed through.320  
In the following years, other railway proposals were put forth by different officials 
with a view to connecting China proper with different cities or towns in Mongolia and 
Xinjiang. As late as early 1911, the Qing state still came up with plans to build three 
railways that would traverse the Mongol region: one from Zhangjiakou to Kyakhta that 
would connect the region from south to north; one from Zhangjiakou to Jehol that 
would link up Inner Mongolia; and one from Urga to Ili that would link up Outer 
Mongolia.321 However, up to the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the only two 
completed railways in the region were the Beijing-Zhangjiakou railway and the Beijing-
Fengtian railway (an extension of the Shanhai Pass-Fengtian railway), whilst all other 
proposals still remained at the planning stage.322  
Apart from building railways, there were proposals to operate long distance coach 
service in the region. For example, in 1911, Sando, the amban of Urga, proposed to 
operate a coach service plying between Zhangjiakou and Urga. Again, there was no time 
to implement such a proposal before the fall of the dynasty.    
 
(b) Posts and Communications 
 Another way to connect the heartland and the frontiers was through improving the 
postal and telecommunication services between the two. Since the 1870s, postal and 
communication services had been set up by reform-minded officials in the heartland, in 
particular at coastal cities and trade ports. In 1889, the State opened a telegraphic line 
between Jilin (through some Mongolian banners of the Jirem League) and the town of 
Heihe on the southern bank of Heilong Jiang (Amur River) in the north, and Beijing in 
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the south. In 1897, the State started to lay another telegraphic line from Zhangjiakou to 
Urga in Outer Mongolia, and later extended it to Kyakhta in 1899.  
 During the xinzheng period, telegraphic offices were set up in different parts of the 
Mongolian region, such as Changtu, Liaoyuan, Taonan, Chifeng, and Guihua of Inner 
Mongolia, as well as Altay, Kobdo, Uliastai of Outer Mongolia. At the same time, 
Prince Gungsangnorbu also paved telegraphic lines linking the Kharachin Right Banner 
with Chengde and Beijing with his own resources.323  
Most of the post offices in the borderlands were converted from the traditional 
relay stations. Since 1896, the State had set up post offices in places like Changtu, 
Chaoyang in Inner Mongolia. Following the establishment of the Youchuanbu in 1906, 
more post offices were established in various cities and towns of the Mongolian region, 
such as Taonan, Liaoyuan, Chifeng, Guihua, Baotou, Wuchuan, Wuyuan, Salaqi, 
Tuoketuo, and Horinger in Inner Mongolia, and Urga and Kyakhta in Outer 
Mongolia.324  
 Since the late nineteenth century, the Qing state finally realized the importance of 
modern transport and communication system to the country’s territorial integrity and 
survival. In this regard, different proposals were advanced or implemented in order to 
connect the heartland and the frontiers through railway building and postal and 
telecommunication expansion. However, as can be seen from the above discussion, the 
effect was disappointing. This was, I would argue, mainly due to the State’s financial 
insolvency, thus preventing the State from implementing many necessary reforms. The 
proposed Jinzhou-Aigun railway was a telling example. The importance of the line to 
the country’s survival was well recognized by the State but, in the words of Xiliang, the 
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viceroy of Dong San Sheng, “The rail track would be lengthy and the fund required 
would be substantial….Even if we were to devote the whole country’s resources to its 
construction, we would become bankrupt before its completion.”325 To Xiliang, the 
only way out was to raise loans with the United States and Britain, but the Throne was 
reluctant to do so, probably having regarded to the sovereignty issue involved. In the 
absence of necessary funding, the project eventually fell through. 
 
Modern Enterprises 
(a) New Industries 
In order to revitalize the economy of the Mongolian region with a view to 
generating new revenues to tackle the challenge of debt and to finance the 
implementation of New Policy reforms, the Qing state also, in addition to undertaking 
large scale reclamation activities, promoted modern enterprises and mining in the 
region.  
Following agricultural expansion and influx of large numbers of Han immigrants, 
handicrafts began to flourish in Inner Mongolia. However, in most of the nineteenth 
century, handicrafts in the region were relatively primitive. They were produced by 
small workshops and their mode of production remained manual. Most of the 
handicrafts were traditional trades, such as leatherworking, felting, woodworking, 
ironworking, etc., and they mainly existed in cities and towns. For example, by the end 
of the same century, there were some 30 leatherworking workshops, and 20-30 felting 
workshops in the town of Guihua.326  
 During the xinzheng decade, with the State’s backing, modern businesses and 
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industries began to emerge in Inner Mongolia. The most representative of these new 
concerns included the Maofang Gongyiju 毛紡工藝局 (Wool Processing Bureau) at 
Guihua, the Dabusu Zaojian Gongsi 大布蘇造鹼公司 (Dabusu Soda Manufacturing 
Company) at the Gorlos Front Banner, the Zonghe Gongchang 綜合工廠 (Multi-
industry Factory) at Kharachin Right Banner, the Menggu Shiye Gongsi 蒙古實業公司 
(Mongolia Industrial Corporation) headquartered in Beijing, and the Xiangyu Muzhi 
Gongsi 祥裕木植公司 (Xiangyu Logging Company) at the Greater Khingan 
Mountains. A brief survey of these concerns would give us an idea of the development 
of modern enterprises in Inner Mongolia in late Qing period.  
 The Maofang Gongyiju was a joint state-private business concern set up by Hu 
Fuchen 胡孚宸, the bingbeidao 兵備道 (rectifying official of armed forces) of 
Guihua-Suiyuan, in 1905. Its inception capital was made up of 4,000 silver taels from 
official offerings, and 1,000 taels from private shares. It employed and trained some 50 
artisans in the trades of wool textile and dyeing. However, its mode of production was 
still manual operation with wooden machinery, and its operation scale was slightly 
larger than that of a workshop.327 
 The Dabusu Zaojian Gongsi was a joint venture between a Changchun soda 
manufacturer and the jasak of the Gorlos Front Banner. Established in 1909, the 
company employed over 1,000 workers in the processing of soda with indigenous 
method. It was not until after the Republican years that the factory started to 
manufacture with machinery.328 
 The Zonghe Gongchang was founded by Prince Gungsangnorbu around 1905. In 
this connection, four Mongolian youths of the Kharachin Right Banner had been sent to 
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Tianjin to undergo training in trades like weaving, dyeing, soap and candle production, 
etc. before becoming artisans of the factory. A technician from Tianjin was also 
employed to teach workers carpet weaving. The finished products of the factory and 
commodities imported from Beijing, Tianjin, and other cities were sold at a department 
store also established by the prince.329 
 The Menggu Shiye Gongsi was set up in 1910 by a group of prominent Mongolian 
princes stationed in Beijing, such as Prince Amurlingghui of the Horqin Left Rear 
Banner, Prince Gungsangnorbu of the Kharachin Right Banner, and Prince Nayantu of 
Outer Mongolia, with its mission being to “multiply the Mongols’ livelihood.” While 
claiming an inception capital of over 500,000 silver taels, the actual capital it managed 
to raise was merely 60,000 taels. From its inception till the Qing collapsed in 1911, the 
corporation planned to launch several ambitious projects, such as the long-distance 
coach service between Zhangjiakou and Urga, some reclamation activities of the Gorlos 
Rear Banner, salt trade of the Ujimqin Banner, and the inland water transport of the 
Yellow River in west Mongolia. Probably due to its small amount of operational capital 
and short life span, none of these projects were ever realized before the corporation’s 
final closure in 1914.330  
 The Xiangyu Muzhi Gongsi was founded by a Mongol Fu Desheng 阜德勝 and 
some Mongolian shareholders in 1905. It was reported to be a joint state-private 
enterprise with an inception capital of 16,000 silver taels. Operating at the Greater 
Khingan Mountains, the company was engaged in logging and exporting timber. One 
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year after its inception, the timber sold by the company amounted to some 8,000 silver 
taels. Upon Fu Desheng’s death, his son Fu Hai 阜海 opened another company and 
continued the logging business in Taoerhe (a tributary of Nenjiang River) area until the 
company’s closure in the early Republican years.331  
 
(b) Mining 
 Mongolia has abundant mineral wealth, such as gold, coal, silver, and others. 
Before the middle of the nineteenth century, extractive activities, mostly done by Han 
migrant workers, in the Mongolian region were officially banned because of the 
Mongols’ aversion towards mining (which, in their view, would unleash curses and 
cause misfortunes) and the Manchu court’s policy of ensuring Mongolia untainted by 
foreign influence.332 As discussed in Chapter 2, the State had set up a number of Gold 
Watch-posts within the Mongolian region to prevent the exploitation of its mineral 
resources. 
However, in 1852, owing to fiscal crises, the Court formally lifted the ban on 
mining throughout the empire, and private participation was also invited. As a 
consequence, extractive activities appeared in the Mongolian region for the first time. 
Important mines of the time included the silver-mine at the Haller Ancuta Mountain, the 
Honghuagou gold -mine, the Changhanggou silver-mine, the Tucao silver-mine, and the 
Xilapian silver-mine.333 In 1889, the Court established its first state-run gold-mine in 
Mohe in northern Manchuria.334 Relevant regulations were also drawn up to regulate 
such activities, with one of its provisions stipulated that, apart from payments of tax and 
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share dividends, one tenth of the proceeds from mining would go to the concerned 
Mongolian banner. However, owing to poor management and heavy taxation, most of 
these mines were closed several years later.335  
During the xinzheng era, mining ventures popped up in different parts of the 
Mongolian region as mining had now become, in the eyes of the Qing government, a 
profitable path for the generation of much-needed state revenue. The mines mainly 
concentrated in the Josotu and Juu Uda Leagues and Hulun Buir in eastern Inner 
Mongolia. Large mines included Zhuanshanzi gold-mine, the Tucao silver-mine, and the 
Ganhe coal-mine, etc.336 Some of the ventures were run by the State, some by private 
capital, and some jointly by State and private capital. Some of the mine operators, such 
as Han capitalist Xu Run 徐潤, imported mining machinery from the West and 
employed foreign experts to run the operation.337  
In Heilongjiang, under the oversight of frontier officials, such as Cheng Dequan, 
Zhou Shumo 周樹模, extractive activities began to flourish. Important mines included 
the gold mines at Jilalin and Qiqian River, and the coal mine at Chagan Ula.  
In addition to these large mines, numerous small-scale mines were opened in the 
region, but many of them eventually shut down because of backward technology and 
mismanagement.  
 
 From the above discussion, the effectiveness of the State’s economic revitalization 
activities in Inner Mongolia was in grave doubt. For one thing, the scale of most of 
these new enterprises was small, the technologies they employed backward, and their 
                                                      
335 Hao and Chimeddorji eds., Neimenggu tongshi, vol. 5, Inner Mongolia during the Qing Era, (I), p.        
426. 
336 Zhao, Qingmo xinzheng yanjiu, pp. 164-165. 
337 Wang Jingyu 汪敬虞 ed., Zhongguo jin dai gong ye shi zi liao 中國近代工業史資料 [Historical 
Data of Modern Chinese Industries], (Beijing: Ke xue chu ban she, 1957), vol. 2, pp. 1137-1141. 
162 
 
modes of operation were conservative. 
 Another dominant feature of these new enterprises was the leading role played by 
the State, and this would inevitably handicap the development of entrepreneurship. A 
telling example was the gold-mine at Kelesi 克勒司 near the Russian border. 
According to Yanzhi 延祉, the amban of Urga, this gold mine “has yielded very little 
since its inception in 1908 and has incurred heavy losses. Under commercial practices, 
its operation should have been stopped. However, since the mine has been reported to 
the Court, we dare not stop its operation abruptly.”338 
 
Conclusion 
 Historically, the Manchu subjugation of Inner and Outer Mongolia during the 
seventeenth century terminated for good the long standing separation and military 
confrontations between the agrarian state in China proper and the nomadic tribes 
roaming north of the Great Wall. However, thanks to the Qing court’s segregation 
policy, political, economic, cultural, and ethnic integration between the peoples on both 
sides of the Great Wall remained elusive for most parts of the Qing rule. As the 
discussion in the preceding chapter shows, the Qing court had long been caught in a 
dilemma over the maintenance of its segregation policy between the heartland and the 
Mongolian frontier. On the one hand, the Manchu rulers tried to protect their Mongolian 
ally by denying Han Chinese migration to the north. On the other hand, as ruler of the 
different national constituencies, the Manchu emperors had to find ways to relieve 
hardship in impoverished regions in China proper, and this sometimes required them to 
condone or even encourage migration of Han Chinese to the northern territories. As a 
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result of these conflicting pressures, Beijing shifted back and forth, lacking commitment 
to any single goal. It was not until the xinzheng decade that the Court finally and 
formally abandoned such policy ambiguities and firmly encouraged the political, 
economic, cultural, and ethnic integration between Han Chinese and the Mongols.  
The Qing court implemented xinzheng reforms in the Mongolian region with a 
view to combatting the twin challenges of debt and threat. In this regard, I think fangken 
mengdi was a telling example of how the Court sought to accomplish the dual tasks. Not 
only would the reclamation of pasturelands for cultivation generate much needed 
revenue for the State to repay its enormous war debt (and to finance the reforms), the 
encouragement of Han Chinese to migrate and settle on the reclaimed Mongolian 
frontier (yimin shibian) would, in theory, also help the State to strengthen its border 
defense against foreign (Russian) threat.  
As fangken mengdi amply shows, this so-called “New Policy” was neither new nor 
innovative, in that this merely represented a continuation and institutionalization of 
expedient measures that the State had previously introduced to meet circumstantial 
needs throughout the empire. The same can be said of the expansion of jun xian zhi and 
the provincialization of the three northeastern provinces in Manchuria, which actually 
followed examples either in the Mongolian or other frontier regions.   
One noteworthy feature of the xinzheng in Inner Mongolia was the warm, if not 
zealous, support shown by its Mongolian princes and jasaks for many of the reforms. 
This was markedly different from the hostility towards the reforms displayed by their 
counterparts north of the Gobi. One explanation, in my opinion, can be found in the 
different levels of social and economic developments between Inner and Outer 
Mongolia, which made these Inner Mongolian elites more open to new ideas and 
renovations.  
On the face of it, the Qing court’s execution of xinzheng reforms in the Mongolian 
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region was an attempt to modernize (or Westernize) its management and control of the 
region. However, a closer examination would reveal that the implementation of 
xinzheng in Mongolia (and other Inner Asian frontiers) was more an attempt to Sinicize 
than to Westernize the region. I would argue that this was a logical development 
following the meteoric rise of Han officials in the Manchu court’s policy-making 
process since the mid-nineteenth century, and the consequential change of mindset of 
the ruling Manchus. Instead of clinging to their Inner Asian instinct of guarding against 
Han Chinese commercial and agricultural penetration into Inner Asia, the Manchus had 
now obtained a new insight whereby they positively recognized that the mobile 
commercial and agricultural elements of sedentary of Han Chinese society would be the 
most effective forces in sustaining the Manchu court’s internal and external sovereignty 
in the vast and largely nomadic land of Inner Asia.339 By converting Mongolian 
pastureland en masse into farmland, populating the region with large numbers of Han 
Chinese immigrants, and expanding Chinese-style civil administration in the region, the 
Manchu court was in fact advancing Han-Chinese interests, with which the Court’s 
interests were now closely entwined, in its Inner Asian frontiers. Finally, the abolition of 
cultural barriers that separated the Mongols from Han Chinese, and the attempt to 
promote Mongol-Han assimilation through guowen education threatened to replace 
Mongol culture with that of Han Chinese. All these had caused serious alarm among the 






                                                      
339 Liu Xiaoyuan, Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese 
Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 




Xinzheng in Outer Mongolia 
 
 On 29 December 1911, a group of Khalkha noblemen proclaimed (Outer) 
Mongolia’s independence from the Qing dynasty and the elevation of the 8th 
Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, now bearing the title of Boghd Khan (the Great Khan), as head 
of their new state—the Yeke Mongghol Ulus (Great Mongolian Nation). Earlier on, in a 
petition dated 29 July 1911 signed by the Khutuktu and these Khalkha nobles to the 
Russian Tsar seeking the latter’s assistance in their struggle against the Manchu rule, its 
authors claimed, 
“Over the past two hundred years the Mongolian khans and ruling princes have 
been the rulers of their commoners, enjoying their native products and living peacefully, 
but in recent years high-ranking Chinese (Manchu) officials have become powerful and 
begun to meddle in our national affairs. In particular, the worst thing is their violation, 
in the name of the ‘New Policy’, of the old traditions by taking over land to use for 
farming…..”340  
 From the above statement, the Khalkha nobles pinpointed, among other things, the 
xinzheng reforms as one of the principal grievances that had given rise to their 
independence movement. However, as Mei-hua Lan has pointed out, relatively little of 
the Qing court’s New Administration was accomplished in Outer Mongolia due to 
desperate financial condition, time limitations, and the Mongols’ opposition.341 This 
raises an array of questions: what were the xinzheng reforms that Qing officials had 
introduced in Outer Mongolia? How had such reforms impacted the Outer Mongols? If 
the xinzheng reforms were not the sole cause of the independence movement, what else 
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had caused the Outer Mongols to break away from the crumbling Qing empire, to whom 
they had submitted for over two hundred years? This chapter seeks to answer these 
questions. 
 
Limited Xinzheng Reforms in Kobdo and Uliastai 
 Located north to the Gobi Desert and far away from the Chinese heartland, Outer 
Mongolia was still relatively underdeveloped by early twentieth century. As at 1910, the 
total number of households of the four aimags in Outer Mongolia was merely 49,191.342 
Nomadism was still the principal means of living of its inhabitants, and agriculture was 
negligible. Though the region was rich in mineral resources, mining activities were 
relatively rare because of local opposition. Transport and communication links between 
Outer Mongolia and China proper was inadequate as there were neither railroads nor 
highways connecting them. It was said that the telegraphic line between Zhangjiakou 
and Kyakhta installed around 1898 was the only modern facility in Outer Mongolia.343 
 The xinzheng reforms in Outer Mongolia were primarily undertaken by the 
imperial residents stationed in the region, namely the jiangjun (general-in-chief), dutong 
(general), and dachen (minister) of Uliastai, Kobdo, and Urga on their own initiatives 
with the limited local resources that were available. Given Outer Mongolia’s economic 
and social conditions as described above, it was readily apparent that implementation of 
xinzheng reforms would be a daunting, if not impossible, undertaking. Relatively 
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speaking, the reforms implemented in Uliastai and Kobdo were limited in terms of scale 
and impact, whereas those introduced by Sando 三多, the last amban (dachen) of Urga, 
were regarded by many Chinese contemporaries and historians as the trigger for the 
Khalkha Mongols’ independence movement in 1911.344  
Kobdo 
 Geographically, Kobdo was close to Russia and, as a consequence, the number of 
foreign merchants there was higher than other places in Outer Mongolia.345 This fact 
implied that there was a pressing need for the town to step up its defense. However, 
because of the underdeveloped state of its economy, the town had to rely on Xiexiang 協
餉 (annual financial assistance) from inland provinces such as Shanxi and Henan to 
support its administration. Whenever such financial assistances fell in arrears, the 
Kobdo government had to turn to merchant loans to keep it going. In 1902, the Kobdo 
government was too bankrupt to repay its merchant loans (that were borrowed to pay 
the local garrison) that it had to appeal to Beijing for assistance.346 In the 
circumstances, resources were hardly available for the implementation of xinzheng 
reforms.   
 As early as January 1902, Ruixun 瑞洵, the canzan dachen 參贊大臣 of Kobdo, 
memorialized the Court saying that he planned to train a new army at a yearly cost of 
120,000 silver taels, open lands for cultivation at a cost of 40,000 taels, and promote 
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animal breeding at 50,000 taels yearly (for buying Mongolian herds) in the areas under 
his jurisdiction.347 In response, the Court advised Ruixun, “You should first raise 
money for the reforms, then implement them by stages, in order to achieve concrete 
results.”348 In December 1903, Ruixun again memorialized the Court requesting to put 
all the proposed reforms on hold on grounds of difficulties in raising the necessary 
funds.349 Actually, the only “reform” that Ruixun had introduced in Kobdo during these 
two years was renaming the Jichaeshangju 稽查俄商局 (Inspection of Russian 
Merchants Bureau) as Yangwuju 洋務局 (Foreign Affairs Bureau).350  
In 1907, owing to shortage of funding, the Court had to ask the Beiyang Army 北
洋軍隊 to assign some of its firearms to the newly established cavalry in Kobdo.351  
Uliastai 
  The situation in Uliastai was no better. For example, in the years of 1902 and 
1904 respectively, Lianshun 連順, the jiangjun of Uliastai, had twice petitioned the 
Throne to exempt the town from raising new taxes on the ground that its inhabitants 
were too poor to afford them, and his requests were acceded to.352  
In February 1910, Kunxiu 堃岫, the jiangjun of Uliastai, reported that he planned 
to build a primary normal school in the town, expand the local police force, set up a 
bureau to help people quit opium-smoking, set up a chamber of commerce, and 
establish an office to take charge of the xinzheng reforms. He requested a provision of 
20,000 silver taels from the central government as an annual subsidy for implementing 
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the reforms.353 However, the Court did not give immediate approval for Kunxiu’s 
proposals and merely referred them to the relevant ministries for further deliberation.354 
Given that all the proposals put forth by Kunxiu were common reforms that had actually 
been implemented in many parts of the empire, I could only surmise that the Throne’s 
inaction was due to its financial difficulties. 
 
Xinzheng Reforms in Urga before 1910 
 Generally speaking, the implementation of xinzheng reforms in Urga could be 
divided into two stages: from 1901 till 1910, and from 1910 till the collapse of the Qing 
dynasty one year later, with Sando taking up the post of the amban of Urga as the 
watershed. The pace of reform during the first stage under Sando’s predecessors was 
rather moderate, but it began to gather momentum in the later stage until the Qing 
officials were ousted from Outer Mongolia.  
An important “achievement” of the xinzheng in Urga during the first stage was the 
exploitation of natural resources, in particular gold mining, of Outer Mongolia. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, a Russian-Belgian Joint Stock company, Mongolor, was 
established in 1900 to exploit the concessions for mining gold in the territories of 
Tiisiyetii Khanate and Sechen Khanate aimags. However, the Mongols opposed gold-
mining from the outset. In May 1900, they sent a letter to the Lifanyuan to express their 
opposition. In this letter they said that gold-mining was harmful both to their way of 
living and to their land.355 Despite the Mongols’ opposition, the cash-strapped Qing 
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Court, after much vacillating, finally gave its approval in 1906 for the gold in the two 
aimags to be mined, with a Russian, Baron Victor von Grot, who had previously 
participated in the operation of Mongolor, as the manager. Nominally a Sino-Russian 
joint enterprise, the company was granted concessions to mine gold for twenty-five 
years. It was stipulated in the relevant regulations of the company that 13.5% of the 
gold extracted annually would go the Qing court’s coffer, while another 3% would go to 
the banners concerned. During the five years between 1906 and 1910, the revenue 
received by the Qing government from this source worth over 460,000 taels of silver, 
and that received by the banners concerned was over 100,000 taels.356  
  At the same time, the Manchu authorities faced strong opposition from the Outer 
Mongols on their proposal to open lands for cultivation. In a letter of 28 June 1906 to 
Yanzhi 延祉, the Manchu amban of Urga, the head of the Sechen Khanate aimag stated 
that there was no land in his territory available for agriculture because of geological and 
climatic unsuitability, and that the limited suitable land available was already being used 
to breed the herds. He continued by stating that the Mongolian tradition was to use good 
pasture land to breed animals, not to cultivate land and build villages; that the pasture 
land for animal husbandry would decrease if Han Chinese people came to cultivate and 
build houses and shops, and that land opening would inevitably cause trouble and 
conflict because Han Chinese people did not understand the Mongolian language and 
customs. He concluded by requesting the Manchu amban to exclude their land from 
cultivation. In August, the nobles of the Tiisiyetii Khanate aimag also sent a similar 
letter to the Manchu amban.357 In the face of the Mongols’ strong opposition, Yanzhi 
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sent a memorial to the Manchu court expressing his support for the Mongols: 
  “Their (the two aimags’) northern part borders on Russia and is an unimpeded 
sweep of barren sand. No grass is grown in the southern part where cultivation is 
difficult. The middle part is rather fertile but cultivation would decrease pasture land. 
On balance, building railways and opening gold and coal mines would do more good 
than harm to the region.”358  
On receipt of Yanzhi’s submission, the State took no further action to open the 
lands of the Sechen and the Tiisiyetii Khanates. 
 Notwithstanding the above, the ambans of Urga managed to carry out several, 
albeit small, reforms in the area. For example, a school was set up in September 1908 to 
teach 40 students from the two eastern aimags the languages of Manchu, Mongolian 
and Chinese.359 In June 1909, an Office of Vaccination was established to tackle 
smallpox, and another office was set up to help people quit smoking.360 In July 1905, 
Pushou 樸壽, then amban of Urga, obtained permission from the Court to establish a 
New Army battalion with the revenue collected from various commercial taxes. At the 
same time, a patrol force of 77 men was also set up to help maintain law and order.361  
 
Sando’s Modernization Drive in Urga 
Sando, a Sinicized Mongol, was appointed to succeed Yanzhi (who was relieved of 
his duties because of illness) as amban of Urga on 26 November 1909. Upon his arrival 
in Urga in March 1910, Sando started to change the moderate tempo of his 
predecessors’ reforms to a more aggressive one.  
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Sando was a zealous xinzheng supporter. In August 1909, while serving as 
fudutong in Guihua, Sando proposed that the whole Mongolian region be reorganized 
into four aimags, with one minister heading twelve subordinate bureaus (General, 
Investigation, Police, Land Reclamation, Business Promotion, Finance, Army Training, 
Culture, Judiciary, Traffic, Negotiation, and Consultation) in each aimag to take charge 
of its administration. He further proposed that a sum of 1,200,000 silver taels be 
allocated to each aimag to finance its administration in the first year, but the allocation 
would be reduced gradually and, after five years, the administration would have to be 
wholly financed by the Mongols themselves. Although this proposal was not approved 
by the Manchu court, it clearly shows Sando’s ambition in promoting drastic, extensive 
reforms in Mongolia and, as the following discussion will show, his aggressiveness in 
implementing the xinzheng reforms made him highly unpopular among the Khalkhas. 
During Sando’s short tenure (one year and nine months) in Urga, he 
introduced/proposed to introduce the following reforms: 
One of the first reforms Sando introduced upon arrival in Urga was to strengthen 
law and order of the town by recruiting 100 patrolmen and an additional 44 Mongolian 
policemen, and placed them under the management of a newly set-up Yingwu Chu 營務
處 (Bureau of Military Matters). This was considered necessary because the only state 
garrison stationed in the area, namely a cavalry battalion of the Xuanhua Army 宣化軍 
(stationed in Urga since 1888), was already stretched to its limits as it was required to 
defend Urga, Kyakhta, and the gold mines in the area against foreign incursions and 
domestic bandits.362  
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In May 1910, Sando requested to raise the salaries of the some 30 state officials 
stationed in Urga from a total monthly amount of some 10,200 silver taels to 22,300 
taels, with a view to lightening the Mongolian commoners’ heavy financial burden that 
had been caused by the hefty tanpai 攤派 (exactions) imposed, often illegally, on the 
banners by these officials.363 Later in the same year, Sando also prohibited the illegal 
extortions of Mongolian commons by officials of the Shabi Yamen.364 
 Sando also reorganized the Office of Vaccination established in 1905 into the 
Office of Sanitation (with a branch office set up in Kyakhta), and expanded its business 
to cover medication and combatting opium-smoking.365   
In addition to setting up two half-day schools to teach illiterate Mongols to read, 
Sando also chose six Mongolian students to learn the Russian language at the school set 
up by the Russian Consulate, with a view to training them as Russian-Mongolian 
translators.366  
In the area of communication, Sando proposed to set up, in addition to the post 
offices in Urga and Kyakhta, a Wenbaoju 文報局 in Beijing to expedite the delivery of 
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official communications between the capital and Urga.367 In a telegram to Beijing, 
Sando reported that he had already set up, among others, two newspaper-reading areas 
in Urga and Kyakhta; and that he had sent out people to investigate natural resources 
and collect information for railway construction and cultivation.368  
In January 1911, Sando established a Bingbei Chu 兵備處 (Army-Training 
Office) to replace the Yingwu Chu as the organization responsible for the training of a 
New Army in Urga. Under the leadership of a Japan-trained officer Tang Zaili 唐在禮, 
the Bingbei Chu would supervise all the Xuanhua troops, patrol battalions, the 
Mongolian militias of the Sechen and the Tiisiyetii aimags, as well as officials and 
soldiers of the relay stations and watch-posts of the area. The tax drawn from gold-
mining would be used to fund army training.369 During that summer, Sando and Tang 
began to organize the New Army, recruiting Mongols into the cavalry, as well as local 
Chinese people and Banner soldiers from Suiyuan into the machine gun battalion.370 
However, for reasons to be discussed in the following paragraphs, not a soldier of the 
New Army was trained up to the end of Qing rule in Outer Mongolia.  
In February 1911, Sando reported that new taxes on timber, coal, carriages, and 
camels would be collected in order to subsidize the future law courts in Urga and 
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Kyakhta. Further new charges would also be levied to replace customary fees and to 
subsidize the implementation of xinzheng.371  
In August 1911, Sando established a Kenwuju 墾務局 (Bureau of Cultivation 
Affairs) and its sub-offices to take charge of the opening of the land in the Tiisiyetii 
Khan aimag for cultivation. According to his plan, land taxes would be collected from 
1912 onwards.372   
As to the preparation for constitutional rule (which constituted the centerpiece of 
xinzheng reforms of the Qing empire after 1906), Sando’s predecessor Yanzhi had 
reported that there were no qualified Mongols available to form any self-governing 
body in Urga. Though Sando was in agreement with Yanzhi’s view, he did not hesitate 
to carry out the relevant preparation work, saying “Now that the people lack the 
capability to exercise self-rule, the officialdom should, within its own capacity, 
endeavor to catch up and set up the standards.”373 To this end, apart from promoting 
education, Sando conducted various investigations and produced reports on population 
and household statistics, revenues and expenses, and prepared an administrative 
budget.374 The investigation and production of statistics, like proposals to provincialize 
the region, no doubt caused suspicion among the Mongols, in particular the Mongolian 
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religious and political elites, about the Manchu court’s real intentions.  
Sando’s aggressiveness in steamrolling the reforms not only was due to his 
personal ambition, but also was due to Beijing’s pressure. As Chen Lu 陳籙, who 
headed the Chinese delegation to the Kyakhta Conference in 1914 to discuss Outer 
Mongolia’s independence, reported,  
“Not long after Sando had come to Urga, letters and telegrams from different 
organizations of the Central Government, especially the Cabinet and the Junzi Fu軍諮
府 (General Staff Council), kept pouring in, repeatedly urging him to carry out the 
various xinzheng reforms immediately.”375  
Such great urgency in pressing for reforms in Outer Mongolia was most likely the 
Manchu court’s response to the increasingly difficult situation in Mongolia, in particular 
the growing Russian (and Japanese) presence in the region.  
 
On the basis of the above discussion, it was obvious that the xinzheng reforms that 
had been implemented in Outer Mongolia were limited in scope and scale as compared 
with those introduced in Inner Mongolia. Moreover, the reforms that had been proved 
controversial in Inner Mongolia, such as reclamation of lands for agriculture, large scale 
migration of Han Chinese settlers, introduction of Chinese-style administration, etc., 
were almost absent in Outer Mongolia. Indeed, Sando had proposed to introduce or had 
actually imposed a number of new taxes and fees to finance the reforms. It was 
estimated that, in Urga alone, the amount of baojuan 包捐 (miscellaneous taxes) paid 
by its merchants and commoners reached 24,000 silver taels per year.376 Sando also 
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repeatedly made the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu and the Khalkha noblemen to donate 
large sums of money to finance the xinzheng reforms.377 This was in addition to the 
contributions already made by the Khutuktu and Khalkha noblemen for the purchase of 
bonds issued by the State—Zhaoxin gupiao 昭信股票 as a means to finance the 
reforms: the Khutuktu alone had contributed 60,000 silver taels to such purpose.378 
Though all these additional financial burdens had no doubt aggrieved the Khalkhas, I do 
not think they should be the root causes of the Outer Mongols’ breakaway from the 
empire. Clearly, the New Policies by themselves were not sufficient causes of the 
Khalkhas’ independence movement, and the real causes had to be found elsewhere. 
 
Khalkha Mongols’ Reaction to Xinzheng  
Although Sando himself was a Mongolian Bannerman, he became very unpopular 
among the Khalkha Mongols soon after his taking up the post of Urga amban. On 6 
April 1910, a conflict between the Han Chinese and Mongols in Urga broke out after a 
couple of lamas from the Gandan (the largest temple in Urga) had quarreled over prices 
with a clerk at a Chinese lumber shop called Deyiyong 德義勇. When Sando and a 
party of soldiers arrived on the scene to investigate, they were stoned by the Mongols. 
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Sando handled the incident harshly, ordering the lamas to pay for the damage done to 
the Chinese lumber shop, and recommending the dismissal of Badmadorji, the chief 
administrator of the Shabi Yamen, for failing to control the lamas.379 In May 1910, the 
two eastern aimags and the Shabi Yamen wrote the Lifanbu, accusing Sando of twisting 
the facts of the Deyiyong incident by listening to only one-side of the story and 
requested his discharge.380 This incident was a clear manifestation of the explosive 
ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and the Outer Mongols, and Sando’s high-handed 
response further aggravated the situation. 
 Sando’s unpopularity among the Outer Mongols made the implementation of 
xinzheng reforms under his charge more controversial, and the Mongols expressed their 
opposition against the reforms openly and repeatedly. For example, they considered the 
ideas of setting up a self-government assembly and conducting an election unsuitable 
for the Mongolian society, since most Mongols were nomadic and had not settled in 
defined places. Naturally, they opposed the opening of pasture land. In March 1911, the 
two eastern aimags suggested to the amban that each of them would offer 2,000 silver 
taels annually to the State if the latter agreed to stop opening Mongolian land for 
cultivation.381 However, as discussed above, this was of no avail as Sando subsequently 
set up a Kenwuju to reclaim Mongolian lands. 
 Moreover, as discussed above, Sando’s aggressiveness in pushing the reforms 
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imposed a heavy financial burden on the Mongols. According to Chen Lu, Sando 
created more than twenty government agencies in Urga during his short tenure and all of 
these new organizations were to be financed by the Mongols. He noted; 
 “In Urga city alone, over twenty new organizations had been created. All the seed 
monies of these organizations, as well as their regular supplies of fuel, utensils, bedding, 
horses and miscellaneous expenses, were to be charged on the Mongols. The Mongolian 
officials exacted the money from the Mongolian commoners. Unable to bear the burden, 
the Mongolian commoners fled. As a result, all the banners adjacent to the city were 
empty of people.”382 This appeared ironic when we compared it with Sando’s earlier 
proposal to lighten the Mongolian commoners’ financial burden by raising the Urga 
officials’ salaries.  
 Of all the new agencies created in Urga, the Bingbei Chu under the leadership of 
Tang Zaili was most hated by the Mongols. According to Tang’s own opinion, this was 
because “the Bingbei Chu in Urga was resolute in moving ahead (with the reforms), 
thereby causing jealousy among the Mongols and the Manchu officials.”383 However, 
independent observers, like Chen Lu, gave a different version of the story: Tang arrived 
in the city with his family and bodyguards, over 100 people in all. They were 
undisciplined and haughty, causing resentment among the Mongols. Moreover, Tang 
had a new office and large military barracks constructed for the Bingbei Chu. This 
further burdened the Mongols since the expenses of the new office buildings and the 
military barracks and food and firewood were to be paid by them.384 Finally, because of 
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strong opposition from the Mongols and the Russian Minister at Beijing, the Bingbei 
Chu was abolished in late November 1911 and Tang was forced to leave Outer 
Mongolia.385 
 
Mongolian Secret Mission to Russia  
 In the summer of 1911, under the guise of a religious ceremony held in Urga for 
conducting the yearly presentation of their vow to the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, a group 
of Mongolian princes and high lamas held a meeting with a view to hammering out a 
united response to the xinzheng reforms, but the participants were divided over what 
they should do. About one month later, a second meeting was secretly convened in the 
neighboring Bogda Khan Mountain, and it was attended by the four khans, Prince 
Khandadorji, Da lama (Chief Abbot) Tseringchimed, and several other leading figures. 
The participants concluded that the xinzheng reforms were unbearably oppressive, and 
decided to request Russian assistance to stop them. Khandadorji, Tseringchimed, and an 
Inner Mongolian activist Khaisan were chosen as envoys to Russia. The delegation left 
secretly and individually for Russia in July, arrived in St. Petersburg on 15 August 1911 
and presented to the Tsar the joint petition dated 29 July 1911 referred to at the 
beginning of this chapter.   
 In their petition, the Mongolian leaders, in addition to voicing their grievances 
about the xinzheng reforms, also criticized the Qing court’s changed attitude towards 
Lamaism: 
“(S)ince our first Jebtsundamba the Holy Lama, we have been worshipping in the 
yellow-sect of the religion and have respect for the Manchu khaans……We, the four 
Khalkha aimags, …respectfully submitted to the Manchu khans earlier, because they 
had worshipped in the Buddhist religion and spread the blessings. But it remained in 
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name only and now is no longer true. On the contrary, the suffering created by them is 
clearly increasing…..”386  
Apart from the joint petition to the Tsar, one of the representatives of the 
Mongolian delegation, Sh. Sandag, also submitted to the Russian Foreign Ministry a 
memorandum in which a host of complaints against the Manchu rule were listed. What 
was noteworthy was that the memorandum says, among other things, the Khalkhas’ 
desire for independence with Russia’s assistance: 
“We, the Khans and ruling princes, shall elevate unanimously the most universally 
respected Bogd as the Great Khaan. Then we shall establish a nation of our own. We 
shall rely on your great country and have faith in your assistance.”387  
The contents of the petition and the memorandum have caused confusion among 
historians as to the real goal of the Mongolian delegation’s mission: whilst the former 
seems to suggest that the Mongols were merely seeking Russian assistance to stop the 
Manchu court’s xinzheng in Mongolia so that the region could return to its status quo, 
the latter shows that the Mongols’ real goal was, with the help of Russia, to establish an 
independent state of their own. In this regard, Nakami Tatsuo argues that the goal of the 
majority of Mongolia’s leaders during the summer of 1911 was merely to return to the 
status quo ante, whilst the memorandum was the work of individual members of the 
delegation, some of whom, such as Khandadorji, Tseringchimed, and Khayisan, were 
supporters of Mongolian independence.388 However, considering the paramount 
importance of the issue of national independence, I find it inconceivable that individual 
delegation members would act on their own initiative without the prior approval of the 
Jebtsundamba Khutuktu and other leaders. 
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The Tsarist government was divided over how to deal with the Mongolian request 
for assistance. Some (such as A. A. Neratov, the acting Russian Foreign Minister) 
suggested that it should be ignored on the ground that the Russian government was not 
yet ready to exploit the agitation for their own interests, whilst others (such as V. N. 
Kokovtsov, the acting Russian Prime Minister) argued that the Mongolian approach 
would offer Russia an opportunity to influence the Qing government’s Mongolian 
policy. Finally, at a special conference held on 16 August under the chairmanship of its 
prime minister, P. A. Stolypin, the Russian government concluded that it would be 
undesirable for it to actively intervene in the Mongolian question since it would weaken 
Russian influence in the West and deflect attention from the more urgent Near and 
Middle Eastern questions. At the same time, the conference also considered that support 
for the Mongols in their desire to resist the Qing government’s colonial (i. e. active 
promotion of Han Chinese migration) activities would fully correspond to Russian 
interests.389 The conference concluded: 
 “…..it would best correspond to our political tasks as well as to the present 
political situation, if the Imperial Government, without active intervention in the 
Mongolian question, without taking responsibility upon itself of giving armed support 
to the Khalkha Mongols in their intended separation from China, would step forward as 
a mediator between them and, through diplomatic means, support the aspiration of the 
Mongols to preserve their distinctiveness without breaking with their suzerain, the 
emperor of the Great Qing dynasty.”390  
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  In line with the above conclusion, the Russian government instructed its minister in 
Beijing, Ivan Y. Korostovets, to serve a diplomatic note on the Qing court expressing its 
concern about the xinzheng reforms in Outer Mongolia. Meanwhile, it also advised the 
Mongolian delegation that their aspirations for complete independence from China were 
not practical, but the Mongols could expect Russian support in their struggle to maintain 
the original Khalkha system. In order to protect the returning Mongolian delegation and 
to emphasize the Russian wish to preserve the Khalkha system, the conference urged 
that immediate reinforcement of the Russian consular guards in Urga with two Cossack 
squadrons.391 
 Sando was totally unaware of the delegation’s activities until he was notified by the 
Court in early September that the Russian minister in Beijing had received a telegram 
from the Tsarist government urging the Qing court “to stop the New Policy immediately 
in order to end the fears of the Mongols”.392  
 A terrified Sando then issued a sternly worded order to the league chiefs of the two 
eastern aimags and the chief of the Shabi Yamen, demanding them to submit a report on 
the case within five days. In the order, Sando insisted that the New Policies in Mongolia 
were “in no way subject to interference by foreigners (Russians)” and that the Mongols 
should “make reports to the Imperial Resident about the New Policy” and “not turning 
to foreigners for help”. He demanded an urgent report “as to what exactly the Mongols 
grudge and fear, why the princes within our jurisdiction have said nothing truth from 
start to finish….”393  
 Sando’s warning vividly showed how he (and many Qing officials in Beijing) was 
out of touch with the real situation in Urga. Instead of seeking the Mongols’ 
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understanding and support, Sando resorted to reproaching them for enlisting Russian 
assistance, which was consistent with his governing style as demonstrated by his 
handling of the Deyiyong incident. Understandably, Sando’s high-handed manner failed 
to get any cooperation from the Mongols, who merely gave him evasive answers, 
denying the dispatch of any delegation to Russia.  
On the other hand, under the pressure of Russia for abandonment of its reforms in 
Outer Mongolia, the Qing court finally blinked. In September 1911, the Court gave 
approval for the suspension of xinzheng reforms in Urga. As stated above, in November 
of the same year, the controversial military organization Bingbei Chu was disbanded, 
and Tang and his officers were recalled. 
Mongolia Proclaimed Independence 
 Although the Mongolian delegation failed to obtain any firm commitment from the 
Russian government regarding their quest for independence, the outbreak of the 
Wuchang Uprising 武昌起義 on 10 October 1911 and the subsequent revolts in other 
parts of China proper had turned the situation more favorable for the Mongolian 
independence movement. On 28 November 1911, a group of Mongolian noblemen and 
high lamas submitted a joint memorial to the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu: 
 “….now great turmoil happened suddenly in the south. There is plenty of the news 
regarding the matter that new regimes have been established and independent countries 
have been formed in many provinces. Also, the authority of the Manchu imperial family 
has greatly weakened. We offered the mandala, begging you to instruct clearly what we 
Mongols now ought to do exactly.”394  
 The Jebtsundamba Khutuktu replied that the time was ripe for the Mongols to form 
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an independent state of their own. To this end, a “General Administration Office in 
charge of Khalkha Affairs”, composed of seven important Mongolian personages, was 
formed to rule the country as a provisional government. It discarded the Qing dynasty 
reign title Xuantong in favor of “Gongdai” 共戴 (Elevated by All). It also ordered the 
mobilization of 4,000 soldiers from the neighboring banners to Urga on the pretext of 
sending the army to Beijing to protect the Qing emperor from Chinese revolts, but its 
real intention was to secure the Mongolian-Chinese borders.  
 On 1 December 1911, the provisional government issued a proclamation to the 
Mongols, Russians, Tibetans, Chinese and all ecclesiastical and secular commoners: 
 “At present we often hear that in the southern land (China) the Manchus and 
Chinese are creating disturbances and are about to precipitate the fall of the Manchu 
dynasty. Because our Mongolia was originally an independent nation, we have decided, 
after consultation, to establish a new independent nation, based on our old tradition, 
without the interference of others in our own rights.”395  
 Apparently, the provisional government sought to justify the Mongolian 
independence movement on the imminent collapse of the Qing dynasty, and the need to 
protect Mongolia from Han Chinese interference. This clearly shows that, in the views 
of the Mongols, Mongolia had been an independent country before its subjugation by 
the Manchus and that, after subjugation, Mongolia was only part of “Manchu China”, 
not “Chinese China”. With the demise of Manchu rule, there would be no reasons for 
them to remain within the Qing empire or its successor state. 
 On the same day, Sando received an official letter issued in the name of Mongolian 
nobles and high lamas demanding him to provide the above-mentioned 4,000 troops 
with weapons and provisions as they had been, falsely, raised to protect the Manchu 
emperor, and he was required to reply within three hours. Sando did not reply. On the 
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same evening, the Mongols gave Sando an ultimatum, demanding him, his civil and 
military officials, and soldiers to leave Mongolia in three days. Sando considered the 
military forces under his command (130 poorly-equipped Chinese soldiers) would not 
be strong enough to engage the joint Russian-Mongolian forces. He therefore gave up 
and left Mongolia for China on 4 December 1911 under Russian protection. Sando’s 
expulsion from Mongolia effectively marked the end of Manchus’ domination of Outer 
Mongolia.  
 
Why Outer Mongolia? 
 As can be seen from the above discussion, owing to the desperate financial 
condition of the State, time limitations for the reform implementation, and the 
Khalkhas’ opposition to the individual measures, relatively few of the New Policies had 
been accomplished in Outer Mongolia, as compared with those undertaken in Inner 
Mongolia. Theoretically, the Khalkha Mongols were much less affected by the reforms 
than their brethren south of the Gobi. Why then did the Khalkha Mongols, unlike their 
southern kinsmen, seek independence from the Manchus, to whom they had submitted 
over two hundred years?  
 Judging from the fact that the Khalkhas had approached Tsarist Russia before the 
commencement of New Policies in Outer Mongolia for assistance in their attempt to 
break away from the Qing empire, it is evident enough that the implementation of 
xinzheng was not the sole cause of the Mongolian independence movement. In this 
regard, I would argue that the xinzheng was able to trigger the actual declaration of 
independence was mainly because it had deepened the anti-Manchu (and anti-Chinese) 
feelings that had been brewing among the Mongols for many years.  
  Chen Lu argues that corrosion of the Qing frontier administration and exploitation 
of the Mongols by Han Chinese merchants were the root causes of the Mongolian 
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independence movement of 1911. He writes, 
  “The corruption of the frontier administration in the Northwest region had begun 
since the middle of Emperor Daoguang’s reign. The selection for appointment as the 
banshi-, canzan-dachen stationed in Mongolia was regarded as an opportunity to 
discharge the (bad) staff of Lifanyuan. Most of those selected (for appointment) were 
Manchu officials of inferior quality. Under their lead, vagrants of the Eight Banners 
tyrannized the Mongolian people. To the Mongolian princes and noblemen who came to 
Beijing for title inheritance or annual chaojin, the Lifanyuan would concoct all sorts of 
regulations so that it could suck their bloods by various means. For the Shanxi 
merchants and people in Mongolia, moneylending was their principal business, and they 
exploited (the Mongols) by exacting high interest rates, and turned their lives a hell of 
darkness. The (Mongolian) commoners were helpless and were subject to oppression. 
For more than 200 years, all these malpractices had become customary. As a 
consequence, the Mongols at all levels were, without exception, hostile to the Chinese 
officials ….”396  
   Indeed, Chen Lu was not alone in spotting the problem. In a confidential note to the 
Throne, Ruixun, the canzan dachen of Kobdo, also pointed out, 
 “Kobdo borders with Russia and, therefore, the number of foreigners (Russians) 
trading in our banners is higher than other places. For more than one day, the Russians 
have lured the Mongols with promises of gains, goods, and loans. To make things 
worse, my predecessors had not been taking good care of the Mongols; they 
blackmailed the latter under all pretexts. As a result, the Mongols have lost faith in 
us. …..The merchants and commoners from the heartland often say that foreigners were 
not a cause of concern for the merchants; what worried them most was that the Mongols 
would exploit any opportunity and rise in revolt. In order to protect their properties, 
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many of the merchants are planning to leave Kobdo…”397  
As a matter of fact, Chen Lu’s and Ruixun’s observations were echoed by many of 
the complaints listed in the Mongolian representative Sh. Sandag’s memorandum 
submitted to Russian Foreign Ministry in 1911, as illustrated by the following 
grievances: 
(a) There are many ruling princes, non-ruling princes and high and low-ranking 
officials who have not inherited their titles because they could not pay a large 
amount of silver to Manchu-Chinese officials and thus their inheritances had 
been delayed for many years.398  
(b) Manchu officials robbed Mongolian princes and noblemen of their legal 
awards.399  
(c) There were many cases of disputes between Chinese and Mongols. The Mongols 
were always being oppressed and their property confiscated, and they were 
unjustly executed or forced into exile. There is no place where justice can be 
obtained. On the other hand, if the Chinese create trouble, they can get away 
without punishment.400 
(d) As a result of unjust oppression, innocent Mongols are escaping from their 
banners, and the banner chiefs were blamed and punished for the exodus of 
Mongolian commoners.401  
(e) The greedy Han Chinese merchants’ moneylending and economic exploitation 
had been sucking the Mongol people dry.402  
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 As for the xinzheng measures implemented in Outer Mongolia, it seems that, apart 
from imposition of all kinds of new taxes, the Khalkhas were most concerned about the 
State’s new strategy of yimin shibian 移民實邊 (moving large numbers of Han 
Chinese farmers to Mongolia to “fill up” the border region), as evidenced by Sh. 
Sandag’s complaints: 
 “The decision to move a large number of Chinese to the territory of the northern 
banners of Khalkha means, first, the destruction of the nomadic life and, secondly, 
proves that they intend to strengthen the northern frontier.”403 
 Interestingly, the Mongols rightly recognized that the xinzheng reforms would 
further the interest of Han Chinese at the expense of the Mongols:  
 “The Chinese have discussed moving a large number of Chinese into Mongolia and 
making Mongolia a province of China. They want to give great powers to the Chinese 
officials to reduce the power of ruling Mongolian princes.”404  
 Understandably, large-scale Han Chinese settlement, coupled with the Qing court’s 
on and off debates over the proposed provincialization of the Mongolian region (as 
discussed in chapter 4), would invoke fears among the Khalkha noblemen and lamas 
that they would eventually lose their traditional quasi-independence status and that their 
land would become part of China proper in the same manner as the provinces in the 
heartland. Sando’s reform measures, such as the centralization of all military matters 
under the management of the Bingbei Chu, the proposed opening of Mongolian land for 
cultivation, the collection of population and household statistics, etc., would deepen the 
Khalkhas’ suspicion. And the Manchu court’s decision in 1910 to dismantle all barriers 
in the interactions between the Mongols and Han Chinese (by allowing Han-Mongolian 
marriages, adoption of Chinese names and learning of Chinese by the Mongols, etc.) 
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further confirmed the Mongols’ fears of losing their culture and traditional way of life:  
“This is not only breaking the old laws but is an example of the wicked intentions 
(of the Chinese). How can we Mongols submit to this kind of ignorant government?”405 
 In addition to detailing the Mongols’ grievances against the Manchu state and Han 
Chinese immigrants, Sh. Sandag’s complaints also demonstrates the Mongols’ 
conceptualization of their independence. As Uradyn E. Bulag remarks,  
 “In this document, and indeed in subsequent documents, the Mongols claimed that 
they had been an independent ulus (country) prior to submitting to the Manchu 
emperors in 1691, and that their acceptance of a place within the Manchu empire was 
predicated on the latter’s respect for Buddhism. The Mongol-Manchu relationship was 
conceptualized as an alliance rather than conquest.”406 
 In this regard, Mei-hua Lan also notes, 
 “According to the custom in the steppe, clans gathered around a capable leader in 
times of success and deserted him if he failed or when he died; a nomadic state was a 
confederation under a charismatic leader for common interest, and it was to be dissolved 
when the reasons for their early alliance ceased to exist. The Mongols considered their 
relations with the Manchus one of alliance. Therefore, if the Manchu state appeared 
incompetent or its actions failed to benefit them, the Mongols certainly were not 
reluctant to break relations with them.”407  
 As for the different responses of the Inner and Outer Mongols to the New Policies, 
this can be attributed to their different political and economic priorities. As discussed in 
chapter 2, owing to their geographical and historical differences, Inner and Outer 
                                                      
405 Onon and Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution, p. 12. 
406 Uradyn E. Bulag, “Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of 
Independence and the 1911 Revolutions,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 10, no. 3 (2012), 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872. 
407 Lan, “China’s ‘New Administration’ in Mongolia,” p. 52. 
191 
 
Mongolia had gradually developed diverse political, social and economic conditions 
during the two hundred years under Manchu rule and, consequently, their priorities were 
different from each other. This in turn called for different application of policies from 
the State. Clearly, Sando and the Qing court failed to heed the advice of Zhongrui, the 
banshi dachen of Kobdo, when they pushed fervently ahead with the reforms that, in 
their opinion, had been so successfully implemented in Inner Mongolia:   
“Inner Mongolia can be considered plentiful and populous; therefore, the task there 
is to jiao 教 (educate). However, Outer Mongolia is extremely exhausted, and its 
prowess weakened. The task there should be to yang 養 (nurture). Since they are 
different, how can the policies towards them be the same?”408   
 Last but not least, the overtly Han nationalist agenda adopted by the Chinese 
revolutionaries during the early stage of 1911 Revolution, namely “quchu dalu huifu 
zhonghua 驅除韃虜，恢復中華” (Drive out the barbarians and restore China) would 
no doubt deepen the Mongols’ suspicion and harden their desire to break away from 
China. An example was Wang Zongluo, a Mongolian student at the Army Nobles’ 
School. Even before 1911, Wang met secretly with Mongolian schoolmates at the 
Yonghegong Lamasery in Beijing, and spread revolutionary thoughts, in particular on 
Mongolia’s independence. In Wang’s opinion, “in today’s China, no matter which party 
comes to power, it will carry out the Han program of ‘expelling the northern barbarians,’ 
which offers no benefit to the Mongolian people”. Thus, in order to defend Mongolia’s 
interest, “once he heard that Outer Mongolia had declared independence and the 
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Jebtsundamba had become the emperor, he resolved to go to Outer Mongolia to join the 
national independence movement.”409  
 
Conclusion 
 In his study of the Mongols’ country-consciousness, Christopher P. Atwood has 
made the following observation about the Qing Mongols: 
“The switch of ultimate sovereignty from a Mongol Khaan to a Manchu emperor 
thus seems to have little direct impact on the country-consciousness of the Mongols. 
Through the Qing period, the Mongols continued to see the Mongolian banners as 
collectively forming a single realm, one on a level with that of China, Tibet, Korea, and 
so forth.”410  
 In my opinion, Atwood’s observation about Qing Mongols’ country-consciousness 
(Mongolian consciousness) is instructive to our understanding of Outer Mongolia’s 
independence movement in the early twentieth century. It makes sense as to why the 
Outer Mongols refused to remain as part of the Han-Chinese dominated Republic; and 
why some of the Inner Mongolian elites chose to join the Khalkhas despite the close 
political, social, and economic links between Inner Mongolia and China proper. 
At the same time, the two states that emerged from the ruins of the Qing empire, 
namely Republican China and the newly established Mongolian state, held conflicting 
conceptions about their national identity and geographical domains. As Xiaoyuan Liu 
aptly remarks, when two nations’ interests based on real or imagined geobodies (i.e. a 
man-made territorial definition which creates effects on people, things, and 
                                                      
409 Quoted in Feng Jianyong, “The ‘political game’ and ‘state-building’: Outer Mongolia during the 1911 
Revolution”, in Joseph W. Esherick and C. X. George Wei eds., China: How the Empire Fell 
(Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), p. 253. 
410 Atwood, “National Questions and National Answers in the Chinese Revolution; Or, How Do You Say 
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193 
 
relationships) come into conflict, one’s willful pursuit of a self-defined national identity 
becomes the other’s apocalyptic omen.411 How would the Chinese and Outer Mongols 
seek to resolve their conflicting conceptions of national identity and geographical 
domains during the early twentieth century? 
On the other hand, with their land geographically sandwiched between China 
proper and Outer Mongolia, how would the Inner Mongols position themselves in the 
ensuing conflicts between their northern and southern neigbours? 


























                                                      






 On 29 December 1911, the Khalkha Mongols declared their independence from the 
Qing empire or, in the words of Mongolian historian Bulag, restored their independent 
ulus prior to submitting to the Manchu emperors in 1691.412 From the outset, the Urga 
government sought to form a state comprising all the Mongols from Outer Mongolia, 
Inner Mongolia, Tangno Uriyangqai, and Hulun Buir. However, this Pan-Mongolian 
movement, the first of its kind in the twentieth century, ended up in failure because, 
among other things, the Inner Mongolian elites refused to join their brethren in the north 
and chose to remain in the newly established Republic of China that succeeded the Qing 
empire.  
    Moreover, the Mongolian independence movement of 1911 engineered by the Urga 
government proved to be short-lived as the signing of the tripartite agreement between 
Republican China, Tsarist Russia, and Outer Mongolia at Kyakhta on 7 June 1915 
effectively put an end to it. Under the agreement, Outer Mongolia agreed to recognize 
China’s suzerainty, whilst China and Russia in turn recognized its autonomy.  
This chapter mainly examines why the state-building process of the Khalkha 
Mongols ended up in failure. Specifically, I would examine why the Inner Mongolian 
elites, despite their enthusiastic support for the independence cause during early 1912, 
chose to remain in the Chinese Republic in the end. For the purpose of this study, I will 
leave aside the Mongols in other parts of the region. 
 
 
                                                      
412 Bulag, “Independence as Restoration: Chinese and Mongolian Declarations of Independence and the 
1911 Revolutions,” http://www.japanfocus.org/-Uradyn_E_-Bulag/3872.  
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Han Chinese Views on the Frontier Ethnic Groups 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the Wuchang uprising in October 1911 and 
the subsequent independence movements (which in effect meant secession from the 
Qing court in Beijing, not standing alone as independent states) that broke out in many 
provinces of China proper were launched under the banner of Han nationalism. It was a 
racial revolution undertaken by the Han people, who generally considered themselves as 
conterminous with the Chinese nation, seeking to overthrow the Manchus because of 
the latter’s ineffective resistance to imperialist encroachment on China since the mid-
nineteenth century. There was little role, in the views of Han nationalists, for the non-
Han ethnic groups to play in the new Chinese state that was to succeed the Qing empire.  
Han racial nationalism, no doubt, would cause great anxiety among the non-Han 
groups, such as the Mongols, Tibetans, and Huis (i.e. the Muslims in Xinjiang). For 
instance, in a letter to the Minbao 民報, a group of young Mongolian intellectuals 
lamented, “The Han gentlemen were only concerned about the grievances caused by the 
(Manchus’) devastation of their own race, they never gave any thought to those  
(grievances) suffered by the Mongols.”413 On the basis of this complaint, it was 
apparent that these young Mongolian intellectuals, who were no doubt exposed to 
Western ideas introduced into China during the late 19th century, also felt aggrieved by 
the Manchu subjugation of their race and were eager to join hands with the Han 
revolutionaries in their struggle against the Qing rule, for they went on to say in the 
same letter, 
“Now that we and the Han race share weal and woe, life and death together in our 
common pursuit of the great enterprise (against the Manchu dynasty), in future the Han 
                                                      
413 “Menggu yu hanzu jiehe gongshen taoman fuchou dayi zhi xuanyanshu,” 蒙古與漢族結合共伸討滿
復仇大義之宣言書 [Declaration of the Mongols and Han Race joining hands in the vengeance 
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race and we will share the same good fortune and happiness, enjoy equal status, jointly 
establish one republican government, apply the same republican constitution. All we 
know is that we are subjects of one nation, not two races…….We hope that the Han 
gentlemen will not despise and abandon us on the grounds that we are unlearned, poor 
and, therefore, not capable of joining the great enterprise.”414 
 Notwithstanding the young Mongols’ appeal, Han nationalists of the time did not 
consider the non-Han ethnic groups part of the Chinese nation. Nor did they think 
highly of these peoples, as evidenced by the writings published in Chinese press during 
the late Qing/early Republican era. For example, an article in the leading revolutionary 
newspaper Minlibao 民立報 stated, 
“Although China is composed of five peoples, actually only the Han have national 
consciousness and political understanding. The Manchus and Huis lag behind. The 
Mongols and Tibetans are like a herd of animals, primitive, simple-minded, and 
isolated. They have no idea what national politics are all about.”415  
Influential Chinese thinkers of the time also took a disparaging view of the frontier 
peoples, though they might be more open-minded than the Han nationalists over the 
question whether these peoples should be included in the new nation state or not. For 
example, Liang Qichao 梁啟超 agreed that the Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans had, from 
the beginning to end, never been a part of the Zhonghua minzu 中華民族. However, 
considering that these peoples had long lived within the borders of China, he believed 
that the absorptive power of Han culture would eventually be capable of assimilating 
them as well.416  
                                                      
414 “Menggu yu hanzu jiehe gongshen taoman fuchou dayi zhi xuanyanshu,” Minbao, 25 April 1908. 
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 Another thinker Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 argued that “the lands of Zhongguo 中國
are the counties and prefectures of the Han dynasty and the people are called the Hua 
華 people. If we only take the borders of the Han, then Mongolia, the Hui areas, and 
Tibet are not on the maps…We should let these people stay or leave as they choose.” On 
the other hand, Zhang added, though the Mongols were yu 愚 (ignorant), the Han 
merchants who traded with them could help transform them. He therefore concluded 
that Mongolia (as well as Xinjiang and Tibet), though not originally part of China, could 
be incorporated into the nation if their peoples could be properly assimilated.417 
 Given the divergent views among Han Chinese about how to deal with the ethnic 
groups in the borderlands, a debate emerged shortly after the Wuchang uprising between 
proponents of the Greater China principle (namely, the new republic should encompass 
the five major ethnic groups—Han, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Huis) and those 
of the China proper position (namely, the top priority of the new republic was to 
preserve China proper whilst the rest could be included or not). Eventually, it was the 
Greater China principle that prevailed.418 For example, the above-quoted Minlibao 
stated in a front page editorial in early November 1911, “Once we have wrought our 
revenge and the republic is established, then we must combine the Huis, Tibetans, 
Mongols, and Manchus into one state with equal rights.”419  
 However, as Esherick notes, the arguments that favored the integration of the five 
                                                      
Study of the Chinese nation in history], (1922), in Shen Peng 沈鵬 et al. eds., Liang Qichao quanji 
梁啟超全集 [The complete collection of Liang Qichao’s work] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), 
vol. 6, p. 3455. 
417 Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, “Zhonghua minguo jie,” 中華民國解 [Explaining the Republic of China], 
(1907), in Zhang Taiyan quanji 章太炎全集 [The complete collection of Zhang Taiyan’s work] 
(Shanghai:Shanghai People’s Press, 1985), vol. 4, pp. 252-262.  
418 Joseph W. Esherick, “How the Qing became China,” in Joseph W. Esherick, Hasan Kayali and Eric 
Van Young eds., Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World 
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 243-244. 
419 “Minguo qingzhu wen,” 民國慶祝文 [In celebration of the Republic], Minlibao, 7 Nov. 1911. 
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races into a single nation had two prominent themes: the loss of the frontiers would 
expose China proper to partition; and the Mongols and Tibetans were too weak and 
backward to protect themselves from foreign control, so they should be assimilated and 
modernized under Chinese leadership.420 In this respect, the views of the Han 
intellectuals of the early Republican period were no different from those of the Qing 
officials who implemented xinzheng reforms in the borderlands, or the Qing emperors 
since Kangxi. That is, Mongolia (and other frontier regions) must be retained as China’s 
screen against foreign invasion. These arguments are best summarized by the following: 
“Mongolia, the Hui lands (i.e. the Eastern Turkistan or Xinjiang), and Tibet have 
long been included in our territory. Together they formed China’s pingfan 屏藩 (border 
screen). If Mongolia were lost, it would be impossible to protect the lands north of the 
Yellow River. If the Muslim frontier were lost, then the Guanzhong 關中 area (literally 
meaning “Inside the Passes”, referring to the region between Shaanxi and Henan 
provinces) could not rest in peace. If Tibet were lost, the southwestern provinces could 
not sleep easily. If we wish to defend China proper and the northeastern provinces, we 
must first defend Mongolia, the Hui lands, and Tibet. But in terms of race, religion, and 
customs, these lands are different from us. If we do not first promote the ideal of nation-
state and explain the relationship of the races, once the old regime is overthrown and the 
new state is established, the Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans may secede from our country 
and follow some foreign powers.”421  
 With the “Greater China” principle prevailing, the concept of a new Chinese nation 
that would encompass the five races replaced Han racial nationalism as the underlying 
principle of the new republic, and groups that sought to promote the concept of Wuzu 
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yijia 五族一家 (five races as one family) sprang up in China, such as Gonghe tongyi 
hui 共和統一會 (Republican Unity Society), Zhonghua minguo datong hui 中華民國
大同會 (Republic of China Great Harmony Association), Wuzu guomin xiejin hui 五族
國民協進會 (Society for the Progress for the Citizens of the Five Races) and others. 
However, none of these organizations could put forth any convincing arguments as to 
why the five races should be united to form a new state. Moreover, considering the 
disparaging views expressed in the Chinese press about non-Han ethnic groups and, in 
particular, the Mongols (it was commonplace in the Chinese press to refer to the 
Mongols as YuMeng 愚蒙 (ignorant Mongols)), no wonder that these peoples would 
find the promises of equal citizenship in the new republic empty slogans. 
For some Mongolian elites (most of whom were from Inner Mongolia) stationed in 
Beijing, their distrust of Republicanism and the concept of Wuzu yijia was strong. In 
order to take concerted action to protect their interests against the upcoming 
monumental changes, these Mongolian elites formed a Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui 
蒙古王公聯合會 (Federation of Mongolian Princes and Dukes) in the capital city on 
24 October 1911. They first sought to support the Manchu royal house against the 
republic and when this failed, some of them, including the reform-minded Prince 
Gungsangnorbu, even threatened to declare Inner Mongolia’s independence from 
China.422  
 
China Seeks to Woo the Mongols 
 Initially, most Chinese did not take Outer Mongolia’s declaration of independence 
in 1911 seriously as they were under an illusion that Mongolia (and Tibet) would, 
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sooner or later, join hands with other rebellious provinces in the heartland to form the 
new Chinese state. As a consequence, there was not much public outcry when the 
Khalkha Mongols declared their independence. However, when the Chinese government 
subsequently realized that the Mongols were committed to separating from China and to 
establishing their own state, it tried to woo the Mongols back by means of coercion and 
persuasion. In addition to threatening military suppression of Mongolian uprisings for 
the independence cause, one of the measures of persuasion, taken by the Chinese 
Republican government, first the Provisional government in Nanjing and later the 
government in Beijing, was the promotion of the concept of Wuzu yijia. 
On New Year’s Day 1912, Sun Yatsen, the provisional president of the newly 
established Republic of China, declared,  
“The foundation of the state lies in its people. Uniting the Han, Manchu, 
Mongolian, Hui, and the Tibetan regions in one state, and the Han, Manchu, Mongolian, 
Hui and Tibetan nationalities as one people—this is national unification.”423  
 On 12 February 1912, the Nanjing Provisional Government announced seven 
clauses of favorable treatment to the Manchus, Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans. According 
to these clauses, the four non-Han ethnic groups were to enjoy a status equal to that of 
the Han Chinese, receive protection of private property, hold original inherited degrees 
of nobility, obtain assistance for impoverished princes and nobles, and be free to 
practice traditional religious beliefs.424  
 The provisional government’s call for uniting the five races was echoed by the 
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Manchu court, as evidenced by a document attached to the Imperial Edict of Abdication 
issued by the new Empress Dowager in the name of the boy-emperor Xuantong on the 
same date. The document, entitled Conditions of Treatment for the Manchu, Mongol, 
Hui, and Tibetan Races 滿蒙回藏各族待遇條例 read, 
“They (the Manchus, Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans) enjoy equal status with Han 
Chinese; their existing private properties are protected; the hereditary titles of these 
princes and dukes remain unchanged; (the State) would help those princes and dukes 
whose livelihoods are in distress; ….. Manchus, Mongols, Huis, and Tibetans are free to 
practice their existing religious beliefs.” 425  
This was followed by an order issued by Yuan Shikai, who assumed presidency of 
the Republic of China after reaching a compromise with the revolutionaries in southern 
China. The order stated,  
“Now the (Chinese) State is a republic of five nationalities. Since Mongolia, Tibet 
and Manchuria are part of China’s territory, and the Mongolian, Tibetan and Manchu 
peoples are all citizens of the Republic of China, usage of the imperial term “fanshu” 
藩屬 (vassal state) should be discontinued. Now we should prepare a comprehensive 
plan to unify administration of the Mongolian, Tibetan and Hui areas with the goal of 
minzu zhi datong 民族之大同 (Great unity of all peoples).”426  
Notwithstanding the Republican government’s repeated propagation of concepts 
such as wuzu yijia and minzu datong, etc., it was highly doubtful whether the non-Han 
peoples really enjoyed a status equal to that of Han-Chinese in the new state. As 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, Han Chinese had long held a disparaging view 
about the frontier peoples, and that the latter’s inclusion into the new Chinese state was 
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premised on their assimilation of Han culture. No wonder that Mongolian-Chinese 
scholar Zhou Jinghong has argued that the various policies executed by the Republican 
government showed that wuzu yijia and minzu datong were, in essence, a national 
assimilation led by the Han race, not a datong under the principle of national equality.427  
To back up its words, the Republican government started to strengthen the civil 
administration of Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang. On 12 April 1912, Yuan Shikai issued 
an order to the effect that Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang should no longer be treated as 
vassals and, hence, the Lifanyuan(Lifanbu) should be abolished and its responsibilities 
taken up by the Interior Ministry. A MengZang Shiwuchu 蒙藏事務處 (The Office of 
Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs) was established on 8 May 1912 under the Ministry. On 
9 July 1912, the Office was reorganized into the MengZang Shiwuju 蒙藏事務局 
(Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs) under the direct supervision of the prime 
minister, with a view to demonstrating the importance the central government attached 
to the management of Mongolia and Tibet. 
 To allay the uneasiness of the Mongols about the new republic, the Beijing 
government, in addition to the seven clauses of favorable treatment to the four non-Han 
ethnic groups, further emphasized its intention to preserve the rights and privileges of 
the old Mongolian ruling classes by issuing the Regulations of the Treatment of the 
Mongols 蒙古待遇條例 on 21 August 1912. This was probably made in response to 
the requests submitted by the Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui. The Regulations 
stipulated that the Mongolian tribes would no longer be treated as vassal states but as a 
part of neidi 內地 (the inner provinces) and, hence, documents from the central 
government to Mongolian offices should not use terms like lifan 理藩 (managing 
vassals), zhimin 殖民 (establishing a colony), or tuozhi 拓殖 (colonizing); the ruling 
power of the Mongolian princes and nobles would remain intact; the Mongolian princes 
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and nobles would inherit titles and ranks, and enjoy privileges in their banners as 
before; the titles of the Mongolian khutuktus and lamas would remain the same; while 
only the central government had the right to negotiate with foreigners and to take charge 
of foreign affairs regarding Mongolia, it would ask local administrative organs to 
discuss important issues of their jurisdictions with the concerned banners and to carry 
out the resolutions; the hereditary salary of the Mongolian princes and nobles would be 
paid liberally; etc.428 
 With the promulgation of the Regulations, the Republican government, by means 
of legislation, assured the Mongolian noblemen and lamas of the preservation of their 
traditional privileges and rights, and the protection of their ruling power. It also defined 
the relationship between the State and Mongolia. Moreover, the Regulations sought to 
refute the Outer Mongols’ propaganda that the new Chinese government was out to 
destroy Mongolian political system, traditions, and religion. An indication of the 
success of the Regulations was that, on 9 September in the same year, Prince 
Gungsangnorbu accepted the Republican government’s appointment as the Director of 
MengZang Shiwuju,429 an act that symbolized the trend that the Inner Mongols had 
finally opted to return to the Chinese regime in their pursuit of greatest interests.430  
   The above regulations were, in Bulag’s words, part of the Chinese Republican 
government’s “going imperial” strategy that sought to appease the Mongols by tapping 
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into the heritage of the former Qing empire’s techniques of rule in the service of 
nationalism, even though such measures violated the very sensibility of nationalist 
ideology.431 During 1912-1913, the Chinese government, like its Manchu predecessor, 
repeatedly conferred titles and material benefits to Mongolian noblemen, jasaks, and 
lamas who supported the Republic, and this practice continued until 1915. For example, 
the sixth Janggiya Khutuktu, who was the most senior lama in Inner Mongolia, was 
awarded the title of “Hongji guangming da guoshi” 宏濟光明大國師 (Great State 
Master with Complete Benediction and Radiance) and a yearly salary of 10,000 yuan, 
and his family members were awarded nobility titles in recognition of his allegiance to 
the Republic. It was reported that, between 1912 and 1915, a total of 240 khutuktus and 
lamas, 135 princes and dukes, and 301 taijis had been conferred titles and material 
benefits by the Republican government.432  
In addition, Beijing also moved to familiarize the Inner Mongols with the idea of a 
republic. In November 1912, as a measure to counteract Urga’s appeal for national 
unification of Outer and Inner Mongolia, the Republican government started to send out 
representatives as Comforting Emissaries 慰問使 to Inner Mongolian leagues to 
explain the meaning of the republic. The message was that president of the republic was 
chosen by the people for his talent and virtue and, under the principle for equality of the 
races, an appropriate and qualified Mongol could become president as well.  
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Inner Mongols’ Response 
The various measures taken by the Republican government to placate the Inner 
Mongols appeared to have worked. Between 28 October and 1 November 1912, the ten 
banners of the Jirem Leagues held a conference at the Changchun city of Jilin, which 
was also attended by representatives of the Chinese government. At the conference, the 
state representatives repeatedly assured the Mongolian banners of the validity of the 
Regulations of the Treatment of the Mongols and the concept of wuzu gonghe. Finally, 
upon the State’s promise that the banners would be maintained (i.e. no further expansion 
of cultivation on Mongolian land) and no establishment of provinces, the Inner 
Mongolian representatives agreed to accept the various proposals put forth by the 
Republican government, including, among others, the stationing of State garrisons at 
strategic points in the Mongolian frontiers; Mongolian princes and jasaks would not 
borrow foreign loans without the Central government’s permission; Mongols would not 
mortgage their properties to foreigners so as to protect (the nation’s) territorial integrity; 
Mongols’ implementation of xinzheng reforms must be approved by the State; Mongols 
should abide by the laws of the Republican government; etc.433   
Judging from the agreements reached at the Changchun conference, it was clear 
that the Inner Mongolian elites were further drawn to the orbit of Republican China. In 
other words, they were distancing themselves from the Urga government. 
 Apart from the repetitive assurances given by the Republican government to the 
Inner Mongolian banners, the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement on 3 
November in the same year no doubt had the effect of further estranging the Inner 
Mongols from the Khalkhas. While details of the agreement will be discussed in the 
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following paragraphs, suffice it to say that the ambiguity of the terms used in its text 
(such as naming “Mongolia” instead of “Outer Mongolia” as its signatory) had given 
rise to an impression among the Inner Mongols that the Urga government was selling 
out their interest to Russia without their consent. On 23 November 1912, the Menggu 
Wanggong Lianhe Hui issued the following statement: 
“The Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui considers that the Russo-Urga Agreement 
was the work of a few persons in Urga. The whole Mongolia has long supported 
republicanism. We neither recognize the Urga government, nor its right to sign 
agreements with foreign governments. The signed agreement is therefore void.”434   
This statement was followed by resolutions reached by the four eastern Inner 
Mongolian leagues of Xinligol, Jirem, Juu Uda, and Josotu, which unanimously 
condemned the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and vowed to resist Russia’s invasion of 
Inner Mongolia.435 Moreover, Prince Gungsangnorbu, in his capacity as the director of 
MengZang shiwuju, told a group of foreign reporters that Mongolia was part of China’s 
territory, and that the Mongols would firmly resist Russia’s occupation of Mongolia and 
its infringement on their freedom.436  
Soon after the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, the Urga government 
began to launch military campaigns into Inner Mongolia in early 1913. In this 
connection, it appealed for Inner Mongolian banners’ cooperation in resisting the armies 
of Republican China. In their response to Urga’s appeal, the Yeke Juu Mongols refused 
to cooperate on the grounds that,  
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“In the areas adjacent to the Great Wall, we and Han cultivators have long mixed 
together and, as such, it would be difficult to differentiate the good from the bad. 
Moreover, since our League has long engaged in nomadism, our land is bordering 
(China) on the south, and our strength is feeble, it would be quite difficult for us to 
protect ourselves (against China).”437  
On 23 January 1913, the banners of the Yeke Juu and Ulan Qab leagues in western 
Inner Mongolia held a conference at the Suiyuan town. Lasting over three months, the 
conference passed five resolutions, namely: (a) (they) support republicanism; (b) they 
do not recognize the Russo-Urga Agreement, and would dissuade Urga from declaring 
independence; (c) they would request the Republican government to dispatch troops to 
protect important places of the western leagues, and the expenses would be borne by the 
State; (d) plans should be drawn up to improve the Mongols’ livelihood, and the misrule 
resultant from years of reclamation activities should not be repeated; and (e) promotion 
of the Mongols’ education.438  
The two leagues also published a joint statement, which, in my opinion, best 
summarized the reasons as to why the Inner Mongols opted to side with the China: 
“Mongolian territory and Chinese heartland are mutually dependent on each other 
as if they were lips and teeth. For hundreds of years, Han and Mongols have long been 
one family. …Now that the Republic has just been set up, that the five races are one 
family, and that there are no quarrels between the South (China) and the North 
(Mongolia)….We Mongols, as a member of the Chinese nation, should contribute our 
effort to sustain the Republic…. 
                                                      
437 Xi meng wang gong zhao dai chu 西盟王公招待處 [Reception Bureau for the Noblemen of Western 
Mongolian Leagues] ed., Xi meng hui yi shi mo ji 西盟會議始末記 [The Whole Story of the 
Western Leagues Convention], in Minguo jing shi wen bian 民國經世文篇 [Collected Writings on 
Statecraft of the Chinese Republic], 1913 (reprinted Taipei: Wen hai chu ban she, 1971), p. 2332. 
438 Xi meng wang gong zhao dai chu ed., Xi meng hui yi shi mo ji, pp. 2333-2352. 
208 
 
Since the establishment of the Republic, the State has treated us kindly by 
abolishing all the harsh rules and regulations previously in force, and granting us all 
kinds of preferential conditions. Moreover, our traditional customs, such as nomadism, 
religion, etc., are preserved. We are now free of all shackles and enjoy freedom together. 
When we take in money from all over the country, our desolate and cold lands will 
become rich and populous…..Should we seek to secede (from China) and form a state 
of our own because we have already declared independence, we should first look at our 
present situation very carefully: we lack households and manpower everywhere; our 
finance is deficient and our revenue is meagre; we have long engaged in nomadism and 
have never had any military training or war. We are incapable of defending ourselves 
just for the sake of self-esteem. Should the Republican government dispatch an army to 
punish us, what can we rely on to defend ourselves?  
One may suggest that we can temporarily turn to the Russians for assistance if we 
are unable to defend ourselves. This is something that most frightened and upset the 
princes and dukes of these leagues, something that would be inadmissible in any event. 
The Russians have plotted to annex our land for a long time….Once our land becomes 
part of their (Russian) territory, all our real powers will fall into the Russians’ hands. 
When we become Russia’s vassal, will it be too late to repent?” 439  
Simply put, the Inner Mongols opted to remain in the newly established Republic 
of China because: (a) Inner Mongolia’s close proximity with China geographically; (b) 
the Chinese government’s undertaking to preserve the Mongolian elites’ traditional 
privileges and rights, ruling power as well as Mongolia’s culture, customs and religion; 
(c) staying with China would bring Mongolia prosperity and wealth; (d) Mongolia was 
too weak and poor to defend itself against China; and (e) their distrust of Russia’s 
scheme in Mongolia.  
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Amid the battles fought between Outer Mongolian expeditionary forces and 
Chinese armies in Inner Mongolia, the noblemen of Jirem League and Chinese state 
representatives convened another conference at Changchun between 13 and 16, October 
1913. In addition to appealing Hulun Buir to give up its independence claim, the 
conference also passed, among others, a resolution on the common defense between the 
four leagues in eastern Inner Mongolia. As such, the six leagues of Inner Mongolia were 
now acting in unison with the Republican government against Outer Mongolia’s 
unification movement.   
 
China’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Woo Outer Mongolia 
 On 30 December 1911 the Mongolian provisional government in Urga sent a 
telegram to the Qing court to formally notify its proclamation of independence. In the 
telegram, the Khalkhas reiterated their reasons for breaking away from the Qing empire: 
 “But during the last few decades, the (Manchu) government has lost its high 
principles, the ministers in charge of frontier affairs and high-ranking officials of the 
ministries have violated laws and regulations. … This has been especially apparent on 
the pretext of developing the so-called ‘New Policy’…….and it is crystal clear now that 
they want to ruin our religion and destroy our nation through their so-called ‘New 
Policy’.”440    
 Apparently, the Khalkhas continued to attribute their independence movement to 
Manchu officials’ misrule and the xinzheng reforms, which they claimed were 
threatening to ruin their religion and nation, while concealing their earlier attempts to 
break away from the Qing empire. 
 In early 1912, the newly established Republican government of China sent three 
telegrams to Urga successively trying to dissuade the Khalkhas from proclaiming 
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independence, by informing them of the establishment of the Republic, and promising 
them equal status for the five races in the new regime, and abolition of all the old 
oppressive laws and unjust governing in Mongolia, but to no avail. In their reply 
telegram dated 12 March 1912 to the Chinese government, the Mongolian government 
pointed out,  
 “(B)ut we Mongols have different traditions, language and literature from those of 
the Chinese. Our Mongolian and Chinese cultures are as far apart as heaven and 
earth…. If we, the Mongols, should live with the highly cultured Chinese as a family, it 
may create conflicts between us.”441   
 As discussed in the previous chapters, this was the same reason that the Mongols 
had repeatedly put forth against the Qing State’s reclamation and Han migration 
activities in the region.  
Seeing that persuasion failed to achieve the desired result, the Chinese government 
decided to use intimidation, as evidenced by President Yuan Shikai’s telegram to the 
Boghd Khan (formerly the 8th Jebtsundamba Khutuktu), which read,  
 “Although Mongolia occupies a large territory, the population is so small. Even if 
all the Mongols were put together, the number is smaller than the population of one 
province of the Inner Land (China). Furthermore, Mongolia is economically backward, 
and its natural income is very small. … 
It is hard to believe that you are about to begin a war with China without 
preparation. Your political institutions are based on the feudal system, and your 
administrative and judicial institutions cannot be compared to those of the strong 
countries of the world. Therefore it is very hard for you to be independent.”442  
 In response to Yuan’s veiled threat, the Boghd pointed out, “China is separated by 
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the Gobi from Mongolia, and thus Mongolia is beyond her reach. Even if China had a 
huge army and many people, she might not find an opportunity to use them.443   
 Like the Qing court’s reaction to the news of Outer Mongolia’s independence 
declaration, Yuan Shikai offered to send a special emissary to Urga to negotiate the 
question of Outer Mongolia’s abrogation of independence, but the offer was turned 
down by the Boghd, who suggested that the negotiation should be conducted through 
Russia instead.444  
The Boghd’s reply effectively brought an end to the debate between the two sides 
over the independence issue. Moreover, the above exchanges also revealed both sides’ 
negotiation positions. From China’s perspective, Outer Mongolia was weak and small 
and, therefore, needed China’s protection. As such, Yuan had seriously under-estimated 
the Khalkhas’ military prowess and their determination to break away from China. As 
later events would show, during early 1913, Chinese troops were unable to repulse the 
Mongolian expeditionary forces sent to liberate their southern brethren, thereby causing 
serious destruction in Inner Mongolia. 
  On the other hand, the Boghd’s replies also revealed the Outer Mongols’ attitudes 
towards Russia and China. As discussed in Chapter 1, Russia had been, at least for some 
Khalkha noblemen, an effective counterweight against China’s domination. As a matter 
of fact, as late as 1980s, many Mongolian reformers still had ambivalent feelings about 
Russia (the USSR). For example, Tomor–orhiryn Erdenebileg, a Mongolian reformer 
who had majored in Chinese studies at university, told Morris Rossabi during an interview 
held on 21 June 1998, that he believed that Russia (the USSR) had saved Mongolia from 
continued Chinese rule, and that failure of the Mongolian independence movement in 
1911 was due to, among others, internal divisions, the interventions of Chinese warlords, 
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and Mongolian noblemen.445  
     Moreover, the reply also revealed the so-called logic of “collaborative 
independence”, which, as Bulag notes, has developed into Mongolia’s Third Neighbor 
Policy as a means to retain its independence and initiative at the borders of two powerful 
states in the twenty-first century. “Collaborative independence” was predicated on the 
weak state (Mongolia) forming an alliance with a powerful neighbor (Russia) to ward off 
the threat of another powerful neighbor (China). However, this collaborative alliance was 
different from classical model of pitting one against another, in that the Mongols sought 
Russian assistance in defense against China’s aggression, they did not serve Russia’s 
interest against China.446  
 
Khalkhas’ Consolidation of Outer Mongolia 
 Immediately following its establishment, the Mongolian provisional government in 
Urga took steps to consolidate the whole region of Outer Mongolia by sending troops to 
take Uliastai and Kobdo, as these two cities were still under Qing rule. The Mongolian 
forces faced little resistance in Uliastai. On 12 January 1912, Kuifang 奎芳, the 
military governor of Uliastai, surrendered to the Mongolian forces without a fight, and 
the remaining Manchus left five days later. 
On the other hand, the provisional government faced tough resistance in Kobdo. 
The Mongolian forces started to attack Kobdo in May 1912 but it was not until 20 
August 1912 when the city finally fell, after fierce fighting and destruction of many 
shops and killing of many Chinese. With the conquest of Kobdo, the Khalkhas finally 
consolidated Outer Mongolia and started to look southwards with a view to uniting with 
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Inner Mongolia to form a larger state of Mongols. 
 
Khalkhas’ Overture to Inner Mongolia 
Since their declaration of independence, the Khalkhas continuously kept their 
brethren in Inner Mongolia informed of the developments in Outer Mongolia and 
encouraged them to join the new Mongolian state. One of the documents dispatched 
from Urga to the Southern Mongols accused Chinese officials of “unjustly managing 
their internal affairs, exploiting the Mongolian masses, destroying their religion, and 
ignoring their old traditions.”447Apparently, the Urga government was appealing to the 
Inner Mongols by exploiting the Mongolian consciousness that was based on their 
common traditions, religion, and ethnicity. Moreover, like the Chinese government, 
Urga also resorted to “going imperial” measures to woo Inner Mongolian nobility by 
promising titles and material benefits to those who were willing to pledge allegiance to 
it. It seemed that Urga’s appeal was quite successful because, according to one source, 
38 out of the 49 Inner Mongolian banners had expressed their wish to join the newly 
independent Mongolian state.448 There were also reports that the Jalait Banner of Inner 
Mongolia had secretly purchased firearms from Germany with an intention to expulse 
the Han Chinese settlers out of their territory.449  
The following submissions by Inner Mongolian banners should give us a glimpse 
as to why they chose to join the Khalkhas’ independence movement. For example, a 
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petition from the Avga Nar banner of the Xilingol League (which was close to Outer 
Mongolia geographically) expressed their worries about the erosion of Mongolian 
tradition and religion under the new Chinese regime: 
“In the sixth month of this year, we were frightened after receiving an order from 
the government of Yuan Shi-kai to cut our pigtails if we have them….and the lamas 
were ordered to grow their hair and become laymen on the pretext that Buddhism is 
useless…”450  
It should be pointed out that I cannot find any independent source that would 
substantiate the above allegation. Also, judging from the measures taken by the 
Republican government that sought to woo the Inner Mongols, I am inclined to 
disbelieve the complaint. I have quoted this complaint merely as an illustration of the 
grave concerns harbored by many Inner Mongols about the risks of losing their religion 
and traditional way of life under the Republic. 
Another commonly cited ground put forth by the Inner Mongols for submitting to 
Urga was their memory of their glorious past under Chinggis Khan, as evidenced by the 
petition of the Jasagtu banner of the Jirem League, which claimed  
“We treasure the sacred heritage of the Great Chinggis Khaan who was the founder 
of Yuan dynasty. We have decided to submit to our former ancestral nation and we shall 
pray for the everlasting fortune of this nation.”451  
Generally speaking, the banners adjacent to Outer Mongolia (such as those in the 
Xilingol league) were more eager to join the new state than those neighboring China, 
especially the leagues (e.g. the Josotu league) that had been swamped by Chinese 
farmers because of their close proximity with China proper. Some Inner Mongolian 
noblemen, such as Rashminjuur, even went to Urga in person, bringing their subjects 
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along with them, to support the independence movement.  
As a matter of fact, some of the staunchest supporters and eager activists of the 
independence cause, such as Khaisan and Togtoh, were from Inner Mongolia. Khaisan 
was one the members of Khalkha delegation dispatched to Moscow in July 1911, whilst 
Togtoh was a fugitive wanted by the Manchu court for organizing armed resistance to 
the state’s reclamation activities in the Gorlos Front Banner. An Inner Mongolian 
nobleman Udai, the jasak of the Horqin Right Front Banner, together with the jasaks of 
Jalait and Horqin Right Rear Banners, declared independence of their banners in 
response to Urga’s appeal in August 1912, and attacked Taonan in eastern Inner 
Mongolia, causing a lot of damage to the local Mongols. According to a letter from 
Zhao Erxun to President Yuan Shikai on 3 September 1912,  
“Udai rebelled and repulsed the State’s soldiers at Taonan, where he burned, killed, 
and plundered with a lot of cruelty and savage. If we do not suppress the Mongolian 
bandits in Taonan as a warning to others, all the banners will follow suit, then all the 
zhou-xian in Manchuria will fall into enemy hands, and the hundreds of thousands of 
Han Chinese who live in these zhou-xian will lose their lives and properties…”452  
From Zhao’s letter, we can tell how precarious the situation in Inner Mongolia was, 
and how much distrust existed between Han officials and the Inner Mongols.  
 
Russo-Mongolian Agreement 
In early 1913, following the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement, Russia 
started to provided Outer Mongolia with money and weapons, with which the Khalkhas 
began to launch military campaigns in Inner Mongolia with a view to liberating their 
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kinsmen from the Chinese rule. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the 
Agreement caused much resentment among the Inner Mongolian elites and therefore 
should be looked at more closely. 
The Agreement was a diplomatic agreement initiated by Russia as a means to put 
pressure on China for its refusal to recognize Russia’s interest in Outer Mongolia. From 
the outset, the negotiations between Russia and Outer Mongolia were acrimonious. On 
the one hand, Urga insisted on full independence of the new state, and its inclusion of 
Inner Mongolia (and Barga). However, Russia explained that it was unable to support 
the Mongolian request for full independence as it was obliged to keep its promise to 
respect China’s territorial integrity. Regarding the Mongolian request for inclusion of 
Inner Mongolia, I. Y. Koroskoveta, the Russian plenipotentiary representative, 
explained, “Uniting all Mongolian nationalities is not in the policy of the Russian 
Government. Since it is very important for Outer Mongolia to attain a self-rule first, it is 
(in) appropriate to consider that issue now.”453 The Mongols were given a choice 
between cooperating with Russia and the preservation of their existing autonomy and a 
return to their previous status. Eventually, the Mongols had to accept Russia’s terms in 
order to secure the latter’s financial and military aid. In addition, a rumor that the 
negotiations between China and Russia over Mongolia were going smoothly in Beijing 
also helped force the Khalkhas to compromise. In return, the Russian representative also 
made compromises in the texts of the agreement, such as agreeing to the use of the term 
“Mongolia” instead of “Outer Mongolia” (without any provision on its territory) in the 
Russian text, and the use of “Mongolian nation” in the Mongolian text.  
 The agreement was signed on 3 November 1912. Article 1 of the agreement 
provided that Russia would help Mongolia to uphold its autonomy, to maintain its 
national army, and to prevent the penetration of Chinese troops and immigrants into its 
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territory. (The Mongolian version of the agreement contained a provision that the two 
sides mutually recognized each other’s government, thereby implying the new 
Mongolian state was independent and internationally recognized.) Article 2 provided 
that Mongolia would give Russian subjects all the privileges enumerated in the attached 
commercial protocol, and would not let people of another country enjoy more privileges 
than the Russians. Article 3 provided that Mongolia was obligated not to conclude with 
China or other countries any treaty that would infringe upon or modify the clauses of 
the agreement and its attached protocol without Russian concurrence.  
 The commercial protocol annexed to the agreement provided Russian subjects 
privileged economic position in Mongolia, granting them the right to move freely from 
one place to another throughout its territory, to engage in every kind of commercial, 
industrial, and other business, to enter into agreements of various kinds, to import and 
export without payment of custom dues, and to freely develop their private business and 
Russian credit institution and open branches. No wonder that a Russian scholar E.M. 
Darevskaya observed that the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 1912 had provided the 
Russians a complete freedom to expand their activities in Mongolia, “leading to the 
rummaging and domination of Mongolia in many ways.”454  
On the basis of the above, no wonder that Inner Mongolian elites should come to 
the conclusion that Urga was selling out their interests to the Russians without their 
consent. As a consequence, the Agreement helped convinced many undecided Inner 
Mongolian elites that siding with the Republic of China would be in their best interests.  
 
Military Campaigns in Inner Mongolia 
At the initial stage, the campaign was generally victorious. However, by the 
autumn of 1913, shipments of weapons, ammunitions, and provisions to the Mongolian 
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troops, which were supplied solely by Russia, almost completely ceased, and this made 
further military operations nearly impossible. Soon some of the Mongolian soldiers 
began to flee. In late October, Chinese troops began to mount counter-attacks after more 
reinforcements had arrived. By late 1913, they had recovered most of the lands 
previously lost to the Mongolian army.  
The military conflict between the Mongolian forces and Chinese troops had 
seriously ravaged various parts of Inner Mongolia in terms of human life and property. 
In a letter to the Chinese Senate, the Menggu Wanggong Lianhe Hui noted,  
“Since Urga’s declaration of independence, Inner and Outer Mongolia have been 
ravaged by successive wars for two years. Of late, telegrams from Baotou, Chahar and 
Jehol warned that an area stretching several thousand li from east to west has been 
infested with bandits. The lives and properties of our Mongols are being devastated 
every day.”455  
The extent of the damage in Inner Mongolia was so great that the local people 
characterized the military conflict as “the disturbance of year of the cow”.456 Rather 
than uniting Inner and Outer Mongols into a new state, the Khalkhas’ military 
campaigns had the opposite effect of pushing their southern kinsmen further into the 
arms of China.457  
 
Conclusion 
Mongolian consciousness began to grow steadily in the late nineteenth century, as 
evidenced by the Mongols’ widespread anti-Manchu and anti-Chinese sentiments. The 
xinzheng reforms no doubt further fostered its growth by inadvertently fanning the 
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Mongols’ resentment against the Manchus and Han Chinese with measures that 
infringed upon the Mongols’ political and economic interests (such as large-scale land 
reclamation activities and imposition of Chinese style administrative units) and other 
measures that sought to assimilate the Mongols (e.g. educational reforms).  
Hence, for the Republican government who sought to succeed the territories and 
peoples of the Qing empire, its chief task was how to pacify the sentiments of the 
Mongols and make them accept their new identity as a member of the Republic. To this 
end, the Republic government discarded Han nationalism in favor of Wuzu yijia. In 
addition, the Republican government also implemented practical measures to woo the 
people of Mongolia, including “going imperial” ones and repeatedly assuring 
Mongolian elites of the protection of their vested interest. Understandably, some of the 
Inner Mongolian elites were still suspicious of the conception of Wuzu yijia and a Han-
dominated republic. Consequently, many Inner Mongolian banners responded 
enthusiastically to Urga’s independence initially. On this point, Makoto Tachibana notes 
that there were Inner Mongolian nobles showing obedience both to the Republic of 
China and the Boghd Khan government simultaneously in order to wait and see how the 
situation would develop. He therefore argues the number of banners that expressed 
submission to the Boghd Khan government (38 out of 49 banners) does not reflect the 
actual reaction of Inner Mongolia.458 His view was borne out by the fact that many 
Inner Mongolian princes and jasaks, who had initially pledged their allegiance to Urga, 
subsequently gave their support to the Republic Government. For example, Prince 
Gungsangnorbu sent a representative in early 1912 to discuss the unification of Inner 
and Outer Mongolia and, for this reason, he was appointed by the Urga government as 
the Chief Minister in charge of the affairs of the forty-nine banners of Inner Mongolia. 
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However, Prince Gungsangnorbu later shifted his allegiance and joined the Chinese 
government and became president of MengZang Shiwuju in September 1912. 
 The shifting of allegiance of the Inner Mongolian elites could be attributed to 
several contingent factors. First, the repeated assurances given by the Republican 
government to the Inner Mongolian noblemen of the preservation of their traditional 
privileges, rights and ruling power had convinced the latter that siding with the Chinese 
Republic would serve their best interest. Second, the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and 
its commercial protocol had antagonized the Inner Mongolian elites, who feared that 
Urga had sold out their interest to the Russians. Third, the military campaigns launched 
by the Khalkhas and Udai, and the destructions resultant therefrom further alienated the 
Inner Mongols.  
 However, I would argue that a more fundamental cause of the eventual split 
between Outer and Inner Mongols was the great differences in social and economic 
developments between them. The differences were undoubtedly the result of the 
Manchu court’s differential policy towards the Outer and Inner Mongolia, but the 
disparities between the two were further aggravated by the xinzheng reforms 
implemented during the first decade of the twentieth century. Historically, Inner 
Mongolia, being close in proximity to China proper, was closer to China politically, 
economically and socially than Outer Mongolia. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the 
reforms introduced in Inner Mongolia were much more intensive and extensive than 
those in Outer Mongolia. In particular, the spectacular growth in the number of Han 
Chinese settlers and proliferation of Chinese-style administrative units among the Inner 
Mongolian banners during the xinzheng decade would make it much more difficult and 
risky for the Inner Mongols to seek either independence or unification with Outer 
Mongolia. Intellectually, the Inner Mongolian elites, because of their personal 
experiences, were more susceptible to new ideas than their Khalkha counterparts. As a 
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result, they were much more receptive to the New Policy reforms than their northern 
brethren. Some of them, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu, even introduced reform 
measures in their own banners. The differences in outlook between Inner and Outer 
Mongolian elites would certainly make it difficult for the two to cooperate, even in 
matters involving Mongolian unification. In this regard, W. W. Rockhill, an American 
diplomat and sinologist, correctly observed that the Inner Mongols would not recognize 
the rule of the Khalkhas because the development and culture in Inner Mongolia were 


























                                                      






 Since its subjugation by the Manchus in the seventeenth century, the Mongolian 
region had constituted a strategically significant part of the Qing empire’s Inner Asian 
frontiers. The Manchu policy towards the Mongols was to utilize them as a mobile 
military reserve to defend the empire’s northern borders, and to suppress uprisings 
within the boundaries of the empire.  
To manage and control the Mongols, the Manchus had devised a banner system 
with a view to preventing the Mongols from uniting under a powerful leader. The Court 
also sought to secure the loyalty of Mongolian nobility with a system of hierarchical 
ranks, titles, rewards, salaries, and marriage alliances. In addition, the Manchu court 
patronized Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism), to which the Mongolian tribes bore 
allegiance, to ensure the loyalty of Mongolian subjects. In line with its divide–and–rule 
strategy, the Court promoted the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu in Outer Mongolia, and the 
Janggiya Khutuktu in Inner Mongolia, with a view to countering the Dalai Lama’s 
influence in the Mongolian region.  
 A central feature of the Qing policy towards its Inner Asian peripheries was to 
restrict the contact between these frontier peoples and Han Chinese in China proper, or 
the penetration of Chinese trade and agriculture into these regions. During the early 
Qing period, this policy was strictly enforced in the Mongolian region. However, the 
segregation system was gradually eroded by Han Chinese penetration, lawful and illicit, 
into the region in the form of commercial expansion and agricultural migration. On the 
agricultural front, apart from frontier officials’ connivance of Han Chinese migrants’ 
cross-border cultivation, the Manchu emperors, being ruler of the different national 
constituencies of the empire, sometimes found it difficult to deny Han Chinese 
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migration beyond the Great Wall, especially when natural disasters struck in the 
northern part of China proper. With the spread of Han agricultural migration in the 
region, the State had to set up Chinese-style administrative units (fu, ting, zhou and 
xian) in the settlement areas to manage and control Han Chinese migrants, thereby 
fragmenting Mongolian territories and weakening the authorities of the Mongolian 
princes and jasaks in these areas. 
 Continued agricultural expansion in the region led to substantial reduction of 
pasturelands in the region, and this in turn caused a decline in nomadism among the 
Mongols. As livestock herding had long been Mongolia’s subsistence economy, decline 
of nomadism inevitably pauperized many Mongols.   
 Another factor that led to pauperization of the Mongols was Han Chinese 
moneylending in Mongolia, which grew simultaneously with Chinese commercial 
expansion in the region. With debts continued to accumulate steadily, many Mongols 
were unable to repay them and became pauperized.  
The combined effects of the state’s oppressive taxation, Chinese settlements, 
shrinkage of pasturelands, unpayable debts, and abuses of banner princes’ authority led 
not only to pauperization of the Mongols but also to economic and social decay of 
Mongolia during the nineteenth century. As a consequence, popular resentment against 
Chinese traders and settlers began to emerge and, by the late nineteenth century, anti-
Qing sentiment also emerged in Mongolia. The Mongols’ resentments against Han 
Chinese and Manchus not only led to interethnic tensions but also the amplification of 
Mongolian consciousness (consciousness of being a member of the Mongolian Ulus) 
during the late Qing period. As history would show, this deep-rooted attachment to the 
Mongolian ulus was further fanned by the various xinzheng reforms, which sought to 
further Han interest at the expense of the Mongols’, and turned out to be the premodern 





  Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Qing empire had been plagued by the twin 
challenges of the debt and the threat. Owing to the needs to fight external wars with 
Western powers and Japan, and to suppress internal uprisings that broke out in different 
parts of the empire, the imperial treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy. China’s defeat 
by the expeditionary forces of the Eight-Nation Alliance following the Boxer Uprising 
of 1900 proved to be the last straw: a war repatriation of 450,000,000 silver taels was 
imposed on the Qing state. 
Moreover, military defeats led to large portions of the empire’s territory being 
taken up by the foreign powers as “concessions”, and their presence threatened the Qing 
court’s survival and China’s territorial integrity. In desperation, the Qing court finally 
issued an imperial edict on 29 January 1901, calling for implementation of xinzheng 
reforms with a view to renewing the national strength by wealth and power. 
 The xinzheng reforms, known as New Policy (Policies) or New Administration in 
English, were introduced throughout the empire, including Mongolia, during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Implementation of the reforms also coincided with the 
steady rise of Han Chinese officials in the late Qing politics. As a result, the reforms 
were dominated by Chinese political, economic and cultural visions.  
As with other parts of the empire, the principal goals of the reforms in the 
Mongolian region were to raise money for the debt-ridden State and to counter the 
growing security threat posed by the Russian presence in the region.  
 Thanks to its geographical proximity to China proper, Inner Mongolia was the 
place where the reforms were first introduced and implemented with much zeal. As a 
consequence, the impact of the reforms on the Inner Mongols was more explicit, thus 
serving as a warning to the Outer Mongols of what would happen if the reforms were to 
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spread to their land.  
To battle the twin challenges of the debt and the threat, the Court introduced the 
following reforms in Inner Mongolia: 
(a) Fangken Mengdi (Reclaiming Mongolian lands for agriculture) 
This reform was, in essence, an institutionalization of a former expediency as well 
as an expansion of China’s agriculture-based economy into Mongolia. Instead of 
seeking to relieve population pressure in China proper, the goals of this reform were 
to generate revenue for the debt-ridden State by reclaiming Mongolian pasturelands 
for cultivation, and to counter Russian presence in the region by encouraging large-
scale Han Chinese migration. Whilst the reform managed to raise money for the 
cash-strapped Court, it also brought about certain long term effects on Inner 
Mongolia, including further decline of nomadism; growing importance of 
agriculture; and further decrease of Mongolian population against continued 
increase of Han Chinese population. 
(b) Military reform 
The reform was composed of setting up modern military academies and re-training 
the dilapidated Banner armies into modern regular armies. However, the reform did 
not achieve much because of acute shortage of funding and the poor quality of 
serving soldiers (many of whom were drug addicts). 
(c) Expansion of Jun xian zhi (Chinese-style Administration) and Choumeng gaizhi 
(Reforming Mongolian institutions) 
The overall aim of the reforms was to strengthen the State’s control over the 
Mongolian periphery. This mainly involved institutional reforms in the management 
and control of Mongolian affairs, such as replacement of the Lifanyuan by the 
Lifanbu at the center, expansion of jun xian zhi in Inner Mongolia, and proposed 
provincialization of the region:  
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(i) Apart from some structural streamlining, the Lifanbu was tasked with the 
additional responsibility of colonizing Mongolia and strengthening its 
defense; 
(ii) The expansion of jun xian zhi in Inner Mongolia was, again, an 
institutionalization of a former expedient measure. While this was formerly 
implemented to meet practical needs of governance, the reform was now 
introduced with a view to strengthening the center’s control over the 
Mongolian frontier. Further expansion of jun xian zhi inevitably increased 
interethnic tension, fragmented Mongolian territories, and weakened the 
authorities of the Mongolian noblemen; and 
(iii) Provincialization also sought to enhance the center’s control over the border. 
However, due to strong opposition from frontier officials in Outer Mongolia 
and shortage of money, only Manchuria was provincialized up to the end of 
Qing rule. 
(d) Educational reform 
The introduction of educational reform in the Mongolian region was aimed at 
enlightening and, more importantly, assimilating the Mongols with Han Chinese 
culture. To these ends, schools at different levels were established in the region. The 
most important innovation of the new school curriculum was the teaching of 
guowen (Chinese), with a view to promoting Mongolian-Han Chinese assimilation. 
However, as with most xinzheng reforms, the effect of educational reform was 
doubtful: ethnic segregation continued to exist in the schools; for local governments, 
school construction became a cover for money extortion; and, to the disappointment 
of the State, Mongolian schools furthered the growth of Mongolian consciousness 
rather than fostering a new national identity that the State had sought to promote.    
In addition, the State also introduced various reforms with a view to reinforcing the 
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center-periphery connection, or promoting economic developments of the region. The 
former included railway construction, setting-up of post offices, and laying of 
telegraphic lines between Mongolian cities. The latter included the promotion of 
industrial mining and establishment of modern enterprises. However, due to factors such 
as lack of money, improper management, and technological backwardness, most of 
these reforms accomplished little or simply ended up in failure.  
Admittedly, most of xinzheng reforms in the Mongolian region did not have many 
concrete achievements to show for it, they did lay the foundation for Mongolia’s 
continuing modernization, the effects of which are still palpable today. 
 
Outer Mongolia’s Independence 
 For lack of funding, the xinzheng reforms carried out in Outer Mongolia, with the 
exception of Urga, were limited in scale and their impact insignificant. However, the 
reforms introduced by Sando, the last Qing amban in Urga, were generally regarded as 
the trigger for Outer Mongolia’s independence movement in 1911. 
 During his short tenure in Urga from March 1910 till December 1911, Sando had 
introduced a number of reforms and created over twenty new organizations for their 
implementation. He also introduced an assortment of new taxes to finance the reforms. 
All these had imposed a heavy financial burden on the Outer Mongols.  
In July 1911, the Eighth Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, the spiritual leader of Outer 
Mongolia, sent a secret mission to Russia to seek the latter’s assistance in achieving 
independence from the Qing rule. The Russians, who had long considered Outer 
Mongolia its buffer against China, were also concerned by the reforms, especially those 
relating to the training of new armies and large scale Han Chinese migration. Under 
Russian pressure, the Qing court ordered in September 1911 that all the reforms in 
Outer Mongolia be suspended. However, emboldened by the Wuchang Uprising and the 
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consequential chaos in China, the Outer Mongols declared national independence in 
December 1911. With the expulsion of Sando and his staff in the same month, the 
Manchus’ domination over Outer Mongolia since 1691 came to an end.  
 
Xinzheng caused Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911? 
In their petition dated 29 July 1911 to the Russian government, the Outer Mongols 
pinpointed the xinzheng reforms as their major grievances against the Manchu rule. 
Some Chinese historians therefore blamed Sando’s mishandling of the reforms as the 
cause of Outer Mongolia’s independence. However, there is now evidence to show that 
the Khalkhas had approached the Russians for assistance in their pursuit of 
independence well before introduction of the reforms in the Mongolian region. On this 
basis, it is argued that the independence movement was rooted in the deep-seated anti-
Qing and anti-Chinese feelings among the Mongols, which were exploited by the elites 
of Khalkha Mongolia led by the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu. No doubt, the Han 
nationalism that had been prevalent among the Chinese revolutionaries further fanned 
the surge of Mongolian consciousness among the Mongols, who feared that they would 
not be treated equally with Han Chinese in the new nation state. 
The rising Mongolian consciousness aside, there was an old element in the 
independence movement that was rooted in the steppe tradition of Inner Asia. In the 
Mongols’ view, their relationship with the Manchus (not Han Chinese) was that of an 
alliance, and that their breaking away from this relationship was in keeping with the 
custom in the steppe when the Manchus, as leader of the alliance, were incompetent and 
failed to benefit the Mongols. 
 
Nature of Xinzheng 
Apart from institutionalizing previous expedient measures to meet new challenges, 
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the xinzheng in Mongolia was more intended to Sinicize than to modernize the 
Mongols. Instead of shielding the Mongols from Han Chinese commercial and 
agricultural penetration into the region, the Manchu court now turned to Han Chinese 
migrants and traders for assistance in sustaining its rule in the region. As a consequence, 
most of the reforms helped to further Han Chinese interests in the region, and to 
assimilate the Mongols with Han Chinese culture.  
Moreover, the xinzheng reforms further widened the differences between Inner and 
Outer Mongolia in terms political systems, economics and society. They led to closer 
relationship between Inner Mongolia and China, but further alienated the Mongols north 
of the Gobi, who now turned to Russia for support. 
 
National Aspirations in Conflict 
 The demise of the Qing empire in 1911 brought into being two nation states, 
namely the Republic of China and the Yeke Mongghol Ulus. The former, claiming to be 
the successor state of the Qing empire, endeavored to inherit the territories and peoples 
of its predecessor, including, among others, the Mongolian region and the Mongols. The 
latter, a theocracy under the rule of Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, sought to create a unified 
Mongolian state that would embrace all the Mongols of the region, including Inner 
Mongolia. Apparently, the geo-bodily interests of these new states came into conflict. 
 In order to win over the frontier ethnicities, the Republic government discarded 
Han nationalism, in favor of the new conception of Wuzu yijia (five nationalities in one 
family), with a view to integrating the non-Han groups and promoting a new national 
identity of Zhonghua Minzu (Chinese nation). It also tapped into the heritage of the 
former Qing empire’s techniques of rule in order to woo the Mongols by conferring 
titles and material benefits on their elites. However, all the efforts of the Republican 




Split of the Outer and Inner Mongolia 
 Following the Outer Mongols’ declaration of independence in 1911, many Inner 
Mongols responded enthusiastically, and some Inner Mongolian elites even went in 
person to join the newly established Yeke Mongghol Ulus. 
Apart from those zealous Inner Mongolian supporters, there were many Inner 
Mongolian princes who had initially pledged their allegiance to Urga, but subsequently 
gave their support to the Republic Government. Their change of allegiance could be 
attributed to different factors, such as the Republican government’s assurance of the 
preservation of the Inner Mongolian noblemen’s traditional rights and privileges; the 
Inner Mongols’ economic dependence on China; their concern about Russian influence 
in Outer Mongolia; the presence of large numbers of permanent Chinese settlers in 
Inner Mongolia; the well-developed administrative control of the State in the region, 
etc. Most of these factors were, to a large extent, intensified by late Qing xinzheng 
reforms in the region. As a consequence, Outer and Inner Mongols finally split, thus 
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